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ABSTRACT 
Along with the many benefits of IoT, its heterogeneity brings a new challenge to 
establish a trustworthy environment among the objects due to the absence of proper 
enforcement mechanisms. Further, it can be observed that often these encounters are 
addressed only concerning the security and privacy matters involved. However, such 
common network security measures are not adequate to preserve the integrity of 
information and services exchanged over the internet. Hence, they remain vulnerable 
to threats ranging from the risks of data management at the cyber-physical layers, to 
the potential discrimination at the social layer. Therefore, trust in IoT can be 
considered as a key property to enforce trust among objects to guarantee trustworthy 
services. 
Typically, trust revolves around assurance and confidence that people, data, entities, 
information, or processes will function or behave in expected ways. However, trust 
enforcement in an artificial society like IoT is far more difficult, as the things do not 
have an inherited judgmental ability to assess risks and other influencing factors to 
evaluate trust as humans do. Hence, it is important to quantify the perception of trust 
such that it can be understood by the artificial agents.  In computer science, trust is 
considered as a computational value depicted by a relationship between trustor and 
trustee, described in a specific context, measured by trust metrics, and evaluated by a 
mechanism.  
Several mechanisms about trust evaluation can be found in the literature. Among them, 
most of the work has deviated towards security and privacy issues instead of 
considering the universal meaning of trust and its dynamic nature. Furthermore, they 
lack a proper trust evaluation model and management platform that addresses all 
aspects of trust establishment. Hence, it is almost impossible to bring all these 
solutions to one place and develop a common platform that resolves end-to-end trust 
issues in a digital environment.  
Therefore, this thesis takes an attempt to fill these spaces through the following 
research work. First, this work proposes concrete definitions to formally identify trust 
as a computational concept and its characteristics. Next, a well-defined trust evaluation 
model is proposed to identify, evaluate and create trust relationships among objects for 
calculating trust. Then a trust management platform is presented identifying the major 
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tasks of trust enforcement process including trust data collection, trust data 
management, trust information analysis, dissemination of trust information and trust 
information lifecycle management. Next, the thesis proposes several approaches to 
assess trust attributes and thereby the trust metrics of the above model for trust 
evaluation. Further, to minimize dependencies with human interactions in evaluating 
trust, an adaptive trust evaluation model is presented based on the machine learning 
techniques. 
From a standardization point of view, the scope of the current standards on network 
security and cybersecurity needs to be expanded to take trust issues into consideration. 
Hence, this thesis has provided several inputs towards standardization on trust, 
including a computational definition of trust, a trust evaluation model targeting both 
object and data trust, and platform to manage the trust evaluation process. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
In the past decade, the concept of the IoT has attracted plenty of research and produced 
many smart services, where large numbers of heterogeneous objects collaborate to 
solve complex problems. Nevertheless, the scope of the current IoT ecosystem is being 
further expanded due to the novel integration of social network paradigms within the 
conventional IoT model, breeding more innovative business models for a  futuristic 
society [1], [2].   
However, along with the many benefits of these findings, the diversity and sensitivity 
of the information, which is being shared, brings a completely new challenge to 
establish a trustworthy environment among objects connected. But, it can be observed 
that often these challenges are addressed only by considering security matters involved 
and do not evaluate the social and subjective risks among IoT objects and services [3]. 
If knowledge is exploited for malicious intentions, it could result in irreparable damage 
and uncertain dangers. Therefore, the concept of trust in SIoT can be considered as a 
key property to establishing trustworthy and reliable service provisioning among 
various objects.  
The trust concept is an abstract notion, with different meanings depending on both 
participants and scenarios; and influenced by both measurable and non-measurable 
factors. Moreover, inconsistency in trust definitions is leading to difficulty in 
establishing a common, general notation that holds regardless of personal dispositions 
or differing situations. Generally, trust can be defined as a qualitative or quantitative 
property of a trustee measured by a trustor for a given task in a specific context and in 
a specific time period. Trust is a fundamental fact that affects the appetite of an object 
to consume a particular service or product offered by another. This can be observed in 
everyday life, where trust decisions are made. When purchasing a specific product, we 
may favor certain brands due to our trust that these brands will provide excellent 
quality compared to the unknown brands. Trust in these brands may come from our 
past experience of using their products (termed “belief”) or from their reputations, 
which are perceived from other people who bought items and left their opinions about 
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those products (termed “reputation”), or recommendations from close peers such as 
families and friends (termed “recommendation”). 
Although the significance of trust in our physical world is as important as it is in the 
digital environment, building trust and confidence in the latter is much more difficult. 
This is due to our inability to have a physical view of an object, unlike in our physical 
world, where we can view the building of the bank, observe its safe deposits, meet the 
bank personnel, etc. Another issue with trust is that it is difficult to quantify the exact 
trustworthiness value of an object. This is even harder when each object has different 
interpretations and perceptions of the term “trustworthy”. Therefore, they may assign 
different trustworthiness values to the same provider or the service. For example, a 
service consumer assigns “very trustworthy” to the provider for a transaction that he 
has performed. However, another consumer assigns “untrustworthy” for a similar 
transaction from the same provider. These differences further increase the difficulty in 
determining the exact trustworthiness of an object. 
Currently, no distinguishable solution can provide a generic trust modeling 
mechanism, trust management platform, and quantifiable solutions for assessing, and 
aggregating trust metrics (TM) based on numerical and Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
methodologies for the IoT. As such, the motivation of this research is to address these 
substantial gaps in the domain of IoT and present a platform that can support 
establishing trustworthy services and applications. Hence, this chapter will introduce 
the research within this thesis, along with the research problem, research issues, gap 
of knowledge, research motivation, research aims and objectives, research novelty, 
and lastly the overall structure of this thesis is outlined.  
1.2. Research Problem 
As humans, we often make decisions based on trust that we have on other party and 
for that inherited judgmental knowledge helps us to analyze risks and related factors 
to build such perception of trust. Similarly, in an artificial society like IoT, things must 
take necessary decisions at right time to achieve the goals set by humans and avoid 
any threats due to malicious counterparts. However, the inability of things to build up 
a judgmental knowledge like humans, make them vulnerable to risks associated with 
the environment. Therefore, it is important to formalize trust as a quantifiable concept 
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to be used in an artificial society to mitigate such risks and realize perception of trust 
for autonomous decision making, which leads to the research question of this work; 
Is it possible to quantify trust as a computational property to be used by objects in a 
digitized society to combat the misbehaviors’ and establish a trustworthy environment 
for its users? 
1.3. Research Issues and the Gap of Knowledge 
Trust is a broad concept with application across many disciplines and subject areas but 
with no commonly agreed definition. A review of the economic literature on trust 
found that the existence of uncertainty was one factor present in most definitions of 
trust. It is a critical factor that highly influences the likelihood of entities to interact 
and transact in digital environments. However, when it comes to quantitative modeling 
of trust in IoT, there is no commonly agreed definition for trust. Due to this issue, most 
of the trust based solutions presented in the literature address quite isolated problems 
and have become a major drawback in the field to come up with more generic solutions 
to mitigate trust related issues in IoT.   
Moreover, the existing mechanisms for trust management are quite limited to Cyber-
Physical Systems (CPS) like Peer-to-Peer (P2P) and Mobile Ad-hoc Networks 
(MANET). There is no comprehensive management platform or evaluation model 
available to extract TMs from CPSS [3]. One of the most important gaps that this thesis 
intends to discuss here is the lack of using environment information for trust 
evaluation. In an IoT environment, physical devices are owned by human-related 
factors and inherently socially connected by a physical-cyber-social system. 
Moreover, current trust evaluation methods also lack concerns about trustors’ 
subjective properties, in other words, the trust results in a personalized expectation. 
Furthermore, a most common method of assessing trust in IoT applications is to 
estimate trust level of the objects and trust level of the data is assumed to be the same 
as the trust level of the data source. However, there are situations where it is impossible 
to evaluate trust of the objects due to lack of information. Besides, most of the services 
in IoT (e.g. clouded based services) often worry about the trustworthiness of data 
instead of the data source who is generating them. Therefore, it is also important to 
address the challenge of evaluating trust of data while preserving the traditional form 
of trust evaluation which is for objects.   
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On the other hand, trust aggregation methods play an important role in trust evaluation. 
This is vital in a situation where there are several distinct trust attributes (TA) needed 
to combine into one final TM; and where there are, several TMs need to be combined 
into the overall trust value for evaluation. However, only limited work is available in 
this area and the simplest method to deal with trust aggregation currently is to use a 
static weighted sum method. However, this solution is not smart enough considering 
the complexity of an IoT environment and the varied influence of each factor toward 
trust evaluation. Hence, schemes that are more intelligent are required to find these 
weighting factors and thresholds that define a trustworthy boundary, for example, 
using machine learning and data analytics techniques. 
1.4. Research Motivation 
Trust evaluation is currently an emerging concept especially in the digitized 
environment as it shows quite a significant potential towards eliminating risks related 
to privacy and preserving the integrity of the interactions. Despite the many positives 
that the concept of trust could bring to establish a trustworthy environment for its users, 
it still lacks several important facts as discussed in Section 1.3 which need to be solved 
immediately before deploying it in a real-world environment to avoid unnecessary 
threats which can be initiated within the system and outside. 
Therefore, this work is motivated by three main research challenges, which are:   
1. Formalizing concept of computational trust in the IoT environment:  
The concept of computational trust in different communities varies in how it is 
represented, computed, and used. Due to these inherited differences, trust is 
hard to formalize in a general setting, and up to now, no commonly accepted 
definition appears. However, it is important to quantify the level of trust in IoT 
for the reasons discussed in Section 1.3. Hence, motivations to overcome these 
issues are the formulation of a generic definition for trust irrespective of the 
environment. 
2. Design and Develop trust evaluation mechanism targeting IoT environment:  
To evaluate trust, there are many properties that need to be considered. These 
properties could be trust-related attributes as well as environment-related 
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attributes. Moreover, depending on services and applications, the required 
attributes of trust may vary. For example, for a particular application, technical 
attributes may consist of security, reliability, and availability. Whereas, for 
other applications, security and reliability might be enough. 
Therefore, motivation to solve this gap can be resolved in two steps: The first 
one is to develop a trust evaluation model, that basically identify TAs which 
influence the particular service, evaluate the identified TAs and the creation of 
trust relationships based on the trust values.  The second one is to explore a 
trust management platform, that helps on managing the trust evaluation process 
from data collection to trust information lifecycle management.   
3. Development of intelligent trust aggregation technique: 
Once all the TAs are computed, it is important to combine them accordingly to 
observe the influence of a particular TA on final trust. Current methods mostly 
ignore this fact and simply use linear equations with random weighting factors 
to aggregate all the TAs and TMs.  But the assessment of a proper weight is a 
complex task since trust is a varying quantity which depends on many factors, 
e.g. expectations of a trustor, time, context, etc. Thus, schemes that are more 
intelligent are required to find these weighting factors and a threshold that 
defines a trustworthy boundary. This gap motivates to investigate more 
effective trust accumulation methods such as the application of ML techniques.  
1.5. Research Aims and Objectives 
The aims of this research are to identify the benefit of establishing trust in an IoT 
ecosystem in addition to privacy and security, recognize limitations of existing 
solutions, and then to design a trust management platform that negotiates with 
applications and services to autonomously establish trust among them. Furthermore, 
the proposed solution must be able to fill the gap created by existing methods and 
correctly identify and mitigate misconducts through the application of intelligent 
algorithms.  
The thesis work towards these aims by addressing the following objectives: 
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1. Conduct a thorough survey and investigation on; the necessity of trust as a 
computational concept and recognizing positives and negatives of existing 
systems (Chapter 2).   
2. Design a generalized trust definition, trust evaluation model, and a trust 
management platform in which trust can be formalized and produced for any 
service objects or data objects in IoT (Chapter 3).  
3. Intelligent algorithms and assessment approaches to identify the trustworthy 
objects in a given service scenario and predict the trustworthiness of each 
object in future transactions (Chapter 4, 5, 6, and 7). 
4. Demonstrate the effectiveness of devised solutions and techniques based on 
real-world use cases (Chapter 4, 5, 6, and 7).  
5. Collaborate with standardization bodies to stimulate standardization activities 
on trust based on the novel findings (Chapter 8). 
1.6. Research Contributions  
This thesis presents several novel contributions based on the aims and objectives of 
our research. The major contributions of this thesis are to formulate the concept of 
computational trust, trust evaluation model based on knowledge, experience, and 
reputation, trust management platform and their novelties are discussed at the 
beginning of each chapter where relevant. The most important contributions are: 
1. Development of a formalized definition for computational trust, trust 
evaluation model and a trust management platform, which defines a complete 
trust provisioning lifecycle (Section 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4) and its extended version 
towards to evaluate trust of data in Chapter 7 (Section 7.2) along with a 
possible implementation scenario based on crowd sensing use case in a 
distributed environment (Section 7.3), 
Until now, most of the trust profiling models and platforms have been 
developed to target specific application areas such as MANETs, P2P, etc. or 
security and privacy aspects of them. None of them addresses a generic trust 
model that can represent all aspects of trust evaluation based on direct 
interactions, experience, and global opinions. In contrast, the thesis develops a 
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prototype that can evaluate trust in any given scenario based on knowledge, 
experience, and reputation. Then, based on the application or service area, the 
TAs, which define the major TMs, can be extracted accordingly. Furthermore, 
we elaborate on the components that any trust management platform must have 
to evaluate trust according to the proposed model.  
2. Reputation based trust evaluation (Chapter 4). 
According to the proposed trust evaluation model, reputation plays a vital role 
in trust evaluation, as it converges millions of opinions to one single quantity 
that can be used as a metric to make a judgment before the prospective actions. 
Hence, this work proposes a novel reputation and experience based trust 
assessment algorithm for IoT that can calculate relationships among objects 
accordingly before making any associations with them. The basic underlying 
principle in this algorithm is to collect feedback from neighbor objects as 
experiences or reputations based on the previous interactions with them. The 
numerical model adapts the concepts from the PR algorithm and improves it in 
such a way that it generates a trust network based on recommendations and 
reputations instead a number of incoming and outgoing links from an object. 
Further, it shows a significant improvement in terms of detecting most 
trustworthy objects, compared to PR or ID algorithms.  
3. Knowledge based trust evalaution (Chapter 5). 
Even though IoT environment produces large amounts of data, it is 
questionable how much of them can be directly useful for a trustworthy 
evaluation process. Therefore, it is vital to extract trust features by scanning 
social and system level interaction logs and storing them in a Data Repository 
(DR) for further analysis. Hence, a novel numerical model that can extract such 
features is proposed here. First, critical TAs, which represent features of direct 
interactions between trustor and trustee, are identified. Then, a quantifiable 
model is formulated for each of these properties and trustworthiness is 
evaluated based on these equations. In contrast to current methods in which 
they consider only dependable features like delay, bandwidth, QoS, etc., the 
proposed model is more concentrated on realizing the true meaning of social 
trust and hence each of these models is defined and estimated based on social 
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properties like relationships, credibility, social and temporal proximity. 
Further, to improve the practical significance of each model and its 
meaningfulness, the numerical model is developed based on an actual data set 
that in fact represents a real-world use case.  
4. Machine learning based trust evaluation (Chapter 6); and an extended version 
towards data trust prediction based on CF (Chapter 7), 
One of the main motivations to carry out this research is the lack of an effective 
mechanism to determine weighting factors to combine several TAs together to 
estimate final trust value. To date, this has been done using trial and error 
methods or assigning predetermined thresholds depending on the application 
area in the context of trust evaluation. Furthermore, unavailability of a 
mechanism that can correctly label an interaction depending on its 
trustworthiness significantly affects the progression of trust related research 
work and its developments. To solve these two issues, first, an unsupervised 
learning algorithm based on the k-means algorithm that in fact have the 
intelligence to differentiate the trustworthiness of each interaction is 
developed. Based on the results of this algorithm, two more algorithms are 
designed to predict future interactions. The first algorithm is based on Support 
Vector Machines (SVM) and the second one is based on the Collaborative 
Filtering (CF) concepts.   
Moreover, the proposed clustering model in combination with a classification 
algorithm shows 2% improvement in contrast to previous algorithms in terms 
of trust aggregation. In addition, this algorithm can adapt to the changes of the 
interactions over time and gaining a more powerful insight compared to the 
traditional methods like linear aggregation in which behaviors of the objects 
are believed in such a way that they would act in the same manner in the future, 
as before. This shows a prominent feature of our algorithm towards designing 
an autonomous system that can assess trust dynamically without external 
interventions and predicting future misbehaviors intelligently. Furthermore, 
the proposed data trust prediction algorithm based on CF suggests a solution to 
estimate trustworthiness of objects who do not have prior encounters. This has 
never been addressed before in the literature and it further enhances the 
9 
 
accuracy of the proposed model in Section 3.3 when there is only limited 
information available to calculate trust.  
5. Standardization work on trust provisioning (Chapter 8) 
As existing standardization activities on trust are still limited, the thesis has 
extended the results explained in Section 3.2, Section 3.3, and Section 3.4 
towards creating a standard for trust evaluation and management with the 
collaboration with ITU-T.  
1.7. Thesis Organization 
The remainder of the thesis is organized into the following seven chapters and the 
structure of this thesis is shown in Figure 1-1.  
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter outlines a literature review on existing research on trust to investigate its 
positives and negatives. This, in fact, provides the motivation to carry out following 
research by realizing some of the gaps including unavailability of a generic trust 
evaluation model and a trust management platform for IoT; estimating only 
dependable trust in contrast to social trust; absence of autonomous trust aggregation 
and prediction methods; and limited work on data trust estimation and prediction. For 
that, previous work related to trust based on their trust evaluation model, trust 
management, and their novelty are thoroughly investigated.  
Chapter 3: Trust Evaluation and Trust Management  
This chapter first describes the trust concept and key characteristics of trust. Then it 
proposes a possible evaluation model for trust and a trust management platform that 
explains all the steps in the trust evaluation process in an IoT environment starting 
from data collection to decision making.  
Chapter 4: Reputation based Trust Evaluation  
This chapter proposes a algorithm called RpR based on recommendations and 
reputations provided by the objects as an aggregated result of feedback in a distributed 
IoT environment. First, it explains a novel numerical model to aggregate all the 
experiences and opinions from the network based on graph theory concepts. Then a 
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novel algorithm is proposed to evaluate the trustworthiness of each object 
autonomously in a distributed environment. Finally, the effectiveness and performance 
of the algorithm over other similar systems is demonstrated in a simulation 
environment. 
Chapter 5: Knowledge based Trust Evaluation 
This chapter proposes a direct trust evaluation model, which is a vital TM in the 
process of trust provisioning, especially when there are no previous encounters. First, 
important TAs that can define the knowledge in a particular use case, are identified. 
Then based on their definitions, a quantifiable model for each of these properties is 
formulated to evaluate the trustworthiness. Finally, the effectiveness of this model is 
tested based on a real-world data set obtained from a real-world use case. 
Chapter 6: Machine Learning based Trust Evaluation 
This chapter proposes an innovative approach to trust labeling, evaluation, and 
prediction based on ML concepts. One of the issues on applying intelligent learning 
methods in trust evaluation is that the unavailability of labeled data sets based on their 
trustworthiness. Hence, an algorithm based on unsupervised learning is discussed first 
to label any data set with respect to trustworthiness. Then, based on this information, 
a trust prediction algorithm is presented. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed 
algorithm is verified through a simulation but using a real-world data set.  
Chapter 7: Data Trust Evaluation  
This chapter proposes a hybrid trust management platform, which is capable of 
evaluating both data trust as well as traditional object based trust. As data trust is quite 
different from the object based trust, a unique trust evaluation model that represents 
unique features of data is presented first. Afterward, a model to compute individual 
DT attributes and the Data TMs (DTM) is discussed. Additionally, a trust prediction 
algorithm based on CF is proposed to find the DT between trustors and data sources 
who have not had prior encounters. Finally, a possible implementation scenario is 
discussed based on a crowd sensing use case. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion and Future Work  
This chapter summarizes the findings of this thesis and describes the extent of the 
limitations overcome by this research. Furthermore, it reveals future directions of this 
work; how the research will be continued.  
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Figure 1-1: The Structure of the Thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Introduction  
This chapter analyzes the existing work and solutions for all aspects of trust evaluation 
in an IoT ecosystem, mainly considering trust evaluation models and trust management 
platforms as shown in Figure 2-1. First, we demonstrate the merits, and demerits of 
the existing systems, and then provide evidence to stress the shortages of existing 
approaches in the context of providing futuristic trust-based solutions, which justify 
the incentive behind this research.  
 
Figure 2-1. Taxonomy of the literature review. 
2.2. Trust Evaluation Models 
There are several common trust evaluation models, which can be observed in the 
literature like policy based (or rule-based approach), reputation based, knowledge 
based, based on aggregation method, application specific and based on intelligent 
learning algorithms. These trust evaluation models have been investigated under the 
context of different network environment including IoT with different purposes and 
goals. 
 Policy-based Trust Evaluation Models 
Traditionally, policy mechanisms manage the decisions of a system by describing a 
pre-defined set of conditions (rules) and a specific set of actions in accordance with 
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each condition. In this manner, a policy can assist in making a decision for trust 
evaluation when a certain ambiguity level occurs while assessing trust. As a result, 
policy-based trust models normally involve the exchange or verification of trust-
related credentials known as a trust negotiation process.  
A high-level view of generic policy-based trust model is shown in Figure 2-2. To 
establish and calculate trust, trust management needs to integrate trust negotiation 
protocols for creating, exchanging, and managing the credentials of a network object. 
The policy-based trust methods generally assume that the trust evaluator would obtain 
a sufficient amount of credentials from a trustee and from other sources like the policy 
database for trust evaluation after several processes of credential creation and 
exchange. First, trustor would make a request from trust evaluator to access the 
trustworthiness of trustee. Upon receiving the request, trust evaluator might query 
trustee, policy base and other sources to evaluate the trust based on the already defined 
policies at each source as shown in step 2 of Figure 2-2. Once the evaluation process 
is completed, the decision is informed towards trustor by the trust manager as well as 
any update towards policy base. There is an issue called “recursive problem” which is 
related to the trust of the credentials in this approach. This problem can be solved by 
introducing a trusted authority (a third-party object) for issuing and verifying these 
credentials. 
 
Figure 2-2. A high-level view of the policy-based trust model. 
The policy-based trust mechanism is usually used in the context of distributed network 
systems as a solution for access control and authorization [4],[5], [6],[7]. The goal is 
simply to judge whether a user is trustful or not based on a set of credentials and 
predefined rules, before granting rights to access network resources. The focus in this 
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situation is how to apply policy languages for specifying and producing additional 
rules and trust knowledge for trust evaluation procedures. 
For the summary of the research related to policy-based mechanisms, we organize the 
research work into sub-categories of trust evaluation procedures: trust credentials 
establishment, trust negotiation process, and policy/rules trust languages. 
3.3.1.1.  Trust Credentials Establishment 
Conventionally, a credential is information about an object and context of the 
environment needed to evaluate trust. Although the word “credential” is frequently 
used in many research works, there is no common definition or standard to specify 
and determine it. Policies should rely on credential information and other context 
properties in order to judge trust. An obvious example of credentials in trust is the 
use of username and password to gain access control when logging into a 
computer. According to the system policy, having a correct username and 
password proves that the user is trusted by that computer system. In a more 
complicated example, credentials are also automatically generated during a 
negotiation process by leveraging security certificates with digital signatures or 
using Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Note that only certificates that include trust-
related information of an object or context can be used as credentials. For example, 
TrustBuilder [8] dealt with trust by establishing trust credentials using traditional 
security techniques such as authentication and encryption which is called “hard 
security” trust. 
A well-known method of credential exchange is the Kerberos protocol [9]. The 
protocol considers a user as the trustee and a computer as the trustor and enables 
them to securely exchange their own verifiable credentials. For that, the Kerberos 
system needs to use a third party, in this case, another computer, to facilitate the 
credentials exchange process. However, this approach is no longer used since the 
current network systems like the IoT are much more complex and are facing many 
intelligent attacks. 
Recently, many researchers have considered “credentials” in a broader perspective, 
and have used the term “trust metrics”, and “trust attributes” instead of 
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“credentials”. This approach allows us to develop more flexible, scalable, and 
effective trust models. 
3.3.1.2.  Trust Negotiation Process 
An important issue when exchanging and generating credentials is unintentional 
information disclosure, which can result in a loss of security and privacy. The 
question raised is - to what extent an object trusts other objects to see its own 
credential information in exchange for earning their credentials. There are many 
research works dealing with this trade-off between gaining trust and sacrificing 
privacy such as in [10],[11],[12]. These researchers considered several particular 
contexts in accordance with the types and number of credentials. They analyzed 
the loss of privacy once any credentials are revealed to other objects. This trade-
off approach has motivated some researchers to develop a trust platform by 
developing architecture systems based on that trade-off principle. 
TrustBuilder is a typical example in which a mechanism is implemented for 
analyzing and choosing the reasonable solution for the trade-off in the context of 
web services [8]. The trustor needs to understand the risk of losing privacy 
information when revealing credentials in exchange for earning trust. Based on this 
mechanism, trust is gained when a successful trade-off is made, sufficient 
credentials are revealed while some level of privacy is still maintained. The 
concept of a trust transitivity property is also characterized in TrustBuilder in the 
form of a “credentials chain”. For example, if object A trusts B’s credentials and 
B trusts C’s credentials, then A trusts the credentials of C to some degree.  
Based on the credentials chain concept, some research works designed and 
developed trust frameworks that perform credential chaining and credential 
exchange such as in PeerTrust [13], PROTUNE [7] and RT10 [14]. Ontologies and 
Context-aware mechanisms are also soon introduced when developing credentials 
in the context of client-server systems [15] and Semantic Web [16]. 
3.3.1.3.  Policy Languages and Trust Languages 
It is necessary to design formalism for trust-related information, e.g. credentials 
and TMs in order to develop a trust system. This objective can be achieved by 
incorporating findings from logic to automate various kinds of reasoning, such as 
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the application of rules and policies or the relations of sets and subsets for the trust 
evaluation processes. Most researchers have used the Semantic Webs techniques 
such as semantic representation, policy languages, ontologies, and reasoning 
mechanisms to the trust evaluation. The issue is how to represent and express, trust 
information and trust knowledge. Some efforts have been made to create policy 
languages for trust as described in Table 2-1. 
Table 2-1: A Comparison of Policy based models. 
Research Trust Context Policy/Trust Language Features 
KAoS [17] 
Access Control 
for KAoS 
services 
KAoS Policy language with the ability of 
dynamic policy changes. 
Semantic 
Webs [18] 
For Security 
and Privacy 
Issues 
Use semantic representation and model for 
dynamic policy manipulation. 
Allow each object to set their own policy,  
Global 
Computing 
system [19] 
To replace key-
based security 
Include observation of trustee, recommendations 
from others and reference to other sources of the 
trustee. 
Use a formal policy language. Trust can be 
proved 
Web services 
[20] 
Specification 
and OASIS 
standard 
providing 
extensions 
to WS-Security 
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML). 
Trust is gained through proof of identity, 
authorization, and performance. 
To validate the security token. 
Global 
Computing 
system [21] 
For trust-based 
security 
mechanism 
Policy language that uses lattices of relative trust 
values. 
Allows fine-tuned control over trust decisions 
Cassandra 
[22] 
Role-based 
access control 
and Context-
based system 
for 
authorization 
Use a policy specification language based on 
Datalog with constraints from five special 
predicates. 
Trust is obtained after credentials exchanged. 
Open 
Distributed 
System, 
WWW [23] 
Trust-based 
access control 
for web 
resources 
Use ontology for representing trust negotiation 
policies. 
Rules are used to negotiate trust. 
Policy Maker 
[24] 
Trust-based 
authorization 
Ability to provide “proof of compliance” for 
request, credentials, and policies. 
Allow individual systems to have different trust 
policies. 
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KeyNote 
[25] [26]   
Trust-based 
authorization 
Same principles as PolicyMaker[24]: directly 
authorize actions (in accordance with credentials) 
instead of processing both authentication and 
access control. 
Require credentials and policies be written in a 
specific assertion language to work with 
KeyNote compliance checker. 
 
Policy based trust models often follow twofold approach for making trust decisions 
i.e. an object will be allowed or deny based on the credentials provided. Therefore, this 
type of models is more suitable for specifying who is allowed to access specific 
resources or services. One of the noticeable advantages of such mechanism is the 
absence of third parties to support the decision-making process. Hence, by design 
policy-based trust models show good resilient over privacy and credential leakage due 
to the involvement of third parties.  
In contrast, it is practically impossible to discover and implement every possible rule 
and hence, the trustworthiness of the trust model totally depend on the accuracy and 
completeness of the policy database. The process becomes more complex if there is an 
involvement of either context, time and task. Further, in policy-based systems, trustees 
don’t have the choice to select which information is allowed to disclose. That is, if the 
trustee cannot provide or not willing to provide the required credentials as they are not 
directly relevant to the expected service, policy-based trust model would still deny the 
request as the logic behind the model is based on the hard-coded rules.  
 Reputation-based Trust Evaluation Models 
A reputation-based trust model is used in trust evaluation for assessing trust score or 
trust level based on the history of interactions of related objects. The reputation 
information in this scenario could be either directly with the evaluator (direct 
reputation) or a a recommendation by other objects (indirect reputation, 
recommendation, or third-party information). As defined by [27] reputation is a 
measure that is derived from direct or indirect knowledge on earlier interactions of 
objects and is used to assess the level of trust an entity puts into another entity. For 
example, Figure 2-3 shows the reputation-based trust evaluation process between a 
trustee and trustee. After each interaction, each trustor records his satisfaction over the 
interaction and transmit it towards reputation system as a feedback. Then, the 
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reputation system accumulates all such feedbacks and generate one reputation value 
for the specific trustee and send it towards trustor for decision making.  
 
Figure 2-3. A high-level view of the reputation-based trust model. 
In recent years, most researchers have accepted that reputation is one important factor 
of trust, resulting in the dominance of reputation-based trust models compared to 
policy-based models. Some have tried to integrate both approaches in their trust 
models in order to leverage the advantages of them. Nevertheless, both credentials and 
reputations are the important information involving in the trust transitivity among 
objects, and each of them has its own pros and cons that have motivated researchers to 
work on. 
There are many parallel research works on both the reputation-based trust model and 
the reputation model. The confusion between a reputation system and a trust system 
should be clarified. Basically, a reputation system collects feedback from objects after 
an interaction incurs. This feedback will be combined and calculated using several 
mathematical models to get a reputed score. This reputed score is sometimes 
misunderstood as a trust level. Several reputation systems have been developed in the 
context of e-commerce systems and web services such as eBay [28] and Keynote [25], 
[26]. These systems use a centralized authority to get ratings and feedback from users 
after each transaction and then update the overall reputed score by using several 
mathematical models as mentioned above. In some distributed systems, each object 
establishes and maintains reputed scores of its neighbor s by using several heuristic 
algorithms like [29], [30].  
Reputation-based trust systems can be considered as a step forward compared to a 
reputation system in which a trust evaluation mechanism combines not only ratings or 
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feedbacks from objects but also trustor and trustee properties and preferences; and 
context information to calculate trust level. In this sense, the reputation system is a part 
of the trust system. There has been a large amount of effort to investigate the 
reputation-based trust model and to develop reputation-based trust systems in many 
types of network environments such as distributed systems, P2P networks, sensor 
networks, and grids. There are also some research works seeking to build a network of 
trust in which trust is established and maintained between any two objects over time, 
resulting in creating a “web of trust”. 
3.3.2.1.  Reputation-based Trust in Distributed and P2P Networks 
The trust models in this category are capable of establishing trust, calculating trust 
levels, and making trust decisions in the absence of a centralized authority. The 
contribution in this approach is how to create appropriate credentials, TMs, and 
TAs that are provided to each object to produce trust. Depending on the different 
purposes of applications in each network environment, reputation-based trust 
systems are utilized accordingly. For example, in a distributed system, many 
research works focus on the detection of malicious objects and the prevention of 
network attacks, while trust systems in P2P networks focus on guaranteeing the 
quality of data transfers. 
3.3.2.2. Reputation-based Web of Trust 
Reputation, in this scenario, is defined as a TM, and each object maintains 
reputation information on other objects, thus creating a “trust network” or “web of 
trust”. There are two approaches to trust systems in the web of trust. The first 
approach assumes that trust credentials and TMs already exist, and the trust 
systems are trying to propagate trust among objects, which may not have been 
evaluated for trust. The latter supposes that a web of trust is given, in which a link 
between two objects means the trust decision with a trust value. It does not matter 
how these links are made, just as long as the trust can be quantified. If there is no 
link between two objects, it means no trust decision has been made, and trust 
transitivity should be applied in this scenario. The summary and comparisons of 
reputation-based trust evaluation are briefly described in Table 2-2. 
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Table 2-2: A Comparison of Reputation based models. 
Research Trust 
Context 
Reputation-Related Features 
Distributed 
System [31], 
[32] 
Malicious 
Node 
detection 
Define Agent, Trust Relationships, Trust Value, and 
Trust Categories. 
Define first-hand knowledge as direct reputation and 
second-hand knowledge as a recommendation. 
Proposes a Recommendation protocol for trust 
propagation. 
Distributed 
System 
Social 
Network 
[33], [34], [35] 
Reputation 
Management 
Reputation information is obtained from external 
sources. 
Local objects calculate, maintains, and make trust 
decisions without a centralized trust management 
system. 
Sources, who provide reliable reputation information, 
are weighted accordingly.  
Social 
Networks 
Multi-agents 
system 
[36] 
Reputation 
System 
Analyze the reputation information by characterizing 
the indirect and direct information. 
Considers the social relation in calculating reputation 
score. 
Put the context information into account. 
Open 
Networks [37] 
Trust-based 
authentication 
The algorithm is capable of estimating the degree of 
trust in the presence of conflicting information. 
P2P Networks 
[38], [39] 
Webpages 
ranking 
PageRank algorithm is used to rank the web pages by 
the authority. As an example, the EigenTrust algorithm 
uses PageRank concepts to calculate a global reputation 
value for each object. 
P2P Networks 
[40] 
Reputation 
System 
Best object for a given resource is determined by a 
protocol called XRep, which is governed by the users’ 
feedbacks. 
Web of Trust 
[41], [42] 
TrustMail 
application 
Trust and reputation information is first categorized by 
ontologies and then this knowledge is used to quantify 
trust to make a trust decision about any two objects. 
Trust transitivity is considered as a credentials chain. 
Local reputation and Global reputation is also taken into 
account. 
Web of Trust 
P2P Network 
[43], [44] 
Trusted 
applications 
in Open 
Network 
The algorithm calculates a global reputation value 
considering both global opinions as well as local 
reports. Furthermore, it discriminates each object’s 
reputation reports based on their applicability to the 
context and reliability.  
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In reputation-based trust models, trustees’ trustworthiness will be evaluated based on 
the opinions from the objects who had previous interaction with the same trustee. 
Hence trust values or the rating scan have multiple levels in contrast to binary decision 
making in policy-based trust models. As the decision making is based on the 
accumulated trust value, honest and trustworthy objects will have more opportunities 
in the network and dishonest objects will be discouraged from future interactions. 
Further, it is not required to disclose credential information of the trustees to evaluate 
the trustworthiness, which prevents the risk of compromising private information.  
However, the whole system depends on the honesty of the feedbacks and fake 
reputations or threats discussed in Section 1.1.1.3.b can jeopardize the objective of the 
model completely. Hence it is important to validate the feedbacks before using them 
and encourage feedbacks from most trustworthy objects only. However, existing work 
lacks such mechanisms and have completely ignored unique properties of trust like 
subjective and context-dependent nature of trust.  
 Knowledge Based Trust Evaluation Models 
To understand trust, it is required to analyze the collected data from objects, extract 
the necessary information for trust; understand the information and then create the 
trust-related knowledge for the trust evaluation. Knowledge is the first party 
information provided by the trustee to evaluate its trustworthiness and composed by 
some TAs depending on services and objects.  It leverages the direct trust evaluation 
and is comprised of two major tasks: (i) specify a set of TAs for the trustee’s 
trustworthiness that reflects the trustor’s propensity and the environmental factors; and 
(ii) an aggregation mechanism to combine these TAs for deriving the direct trust as 
the Knowledge TM value. Notably, Husted [45]and [46] defines knowledge-based 
trust models as “Deals with the ability to predict the behavior of the trustee based on 
prior performance” and “The trust developed through repeated interactions that allow 
an individual to collect information about the other and develop an expectation that 
the other’s behavior is predictable” respectively. 
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Figure 2-4. A high-level view of the knowledge-based trust model. 
According to the above definitions, a high-level view of such model is shown in Figure 
2-4 [47]. The knowledge is accumulated by individuals or objects through data 
analytics over time. So far data processing, management and interpretation for 
awareness and understanding have been considered as fundamental processes for 
obtaining the knowledge. Upon obtaining knowledge, trust can be evaluated by 
connecting knowledge and expectations of the trustor as shown in Figure 2-4.  
Social interactions among objects disclose the valuable information of trust in relation 
to the sociological concept of human interactions based on trust relationships. In this 
regard, authors in [48] and [49] have developed a social model of cyber objects 
corresponding to their owner’s social behavior. In such models, objects interact with 
each other based on their trust relationships and reveal information in terms of trust as 
described in [50], [51]. Moreover, [52] and [53] discuss the trust assessment of a social 
network based on concepts such as a CoI, friendship, followers, as well as frequency, 
duration and behavior of the objects. In a similar manner, authors in [54] and [55] 
present a computational model for trust based on similarity, information reliability, 
and social opinions. 
In the aspects of knowledge extraction from web sources, [56] propose a new approach 
based on endogenous signals, which essentially describe the correctness of the factual 
information provided by the source; sources with few or no false facts are recognized 
as trustworthy sources. These endogenous signals are characterized by knowledge 
triples in the format of (subject, predicate, object) from web pages. A subject 
represents a real-world object, identified by an ID, and predicate defines a particular 
attribute of the object. Authors in [57] and [58] further expand upon the above research 
and compare several knowledge triples before estimating the final trust values.  
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On the other hand, Finite State Machines (FSM) are used to represent and store the 
knowledge about the present and past behaviors of the systems. Knowledge triple in 
an FSM is represented by a set of states, transitions, and actions. The advantage of 
using this method is the ability to detect abnormal behaviors without any training data 
or signatures. In this regard, authors in [59], [60] propose a protocol to detect attacks 
in ad hoc networks and [61] propose an algorithm to detect abnormalities in system 
calls.  
As already identified through the literature, knowledge-based trust models are work 
based on the actual knowledge of the facts that constantly obtaining from ongoing or 
immediately completed interactions. That makes such a model is less prone to 
fluctuations of biased and discriminative efforts by the malicious objects in the process 
of trust evaluation for example as in reputation systems. This motivated to carry out 
most of the work in this thesis based on the knowledge-based trust.  
However, irrespective of its capability to be a good candidate for trust evaluation, in 
the abundance of knowledge pool, current mechanisms are mot intelligently enough to 
filter correct and appropriate facts to evaluate trust while considering the trustor's 
subjective perception as well.  Moreover, evaluation of trust based on knowledge has 
already become a technical bottleneck, particularly in the distributed systems due to 
limited resources at the edge of things to process big amount of knowledge. Moreover, 
knowledge bases often contain privacy related information and accidental or 
intentional exposure of such knowledge may lead unexpected outcomes, ranging from 
uninvited advertisements to identity theft. Hence it is a must to implement mechanisms 
and regulations to up rise the trustworthiness of trust management platforms.  
2.3. Trust Management Platforms 
There have been many proposed trust management platforms for different types of 
networks such as mobile ad-hoc networks, wireless sensor networks, peer to peer 
networks and social internet of things. Authors in [62] first introduced the term “Trust 
Management” and identified it as a separate component of security services in 
networks and clarified that “Trust management provides a unified approach for 
specifying and interpreting security policies, credentials, and relationships”. 
Moreover, authors in [63] define trust management as “Collecting the information 
required to make a trust relationship decision; evaluating the criteria related to the trust 
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relationship as well as monitoring and evaluating existing trust relationships; and 
automating the process” which is one of the inspiration to design and implement trust 
management platform for IoT environment in Section 3.5. Furthermore, authors in [64] 
recognize several specific goals that a trust management in IoT should achieve as 
below:  
▪ Trust relationship and decision (TRD): trust management provides an effective 
way to evaluate trust relationships of any two entities and assist them to make 
a wise decision to communicate and collaborate with each other. 
▪ Data perception trust (DPT): data sensing and collection should be reliable in 
the trust management system. 
▪ Privacy preservation (PP): user privacy including user data and personal 
information should be flexibly preserved according to the policy and 
expectation of IoT users. This objective relates to the IoT system objective 
properties in general. 
▪ Data fusion and mining trust (DFMT): the huge amount of data collected in 
IoT should be processed and analyzed in a trustworthy way with regard to 
reliability, holographic data process, privacy preservation, and accuracy. 
▪ Data transmission and communication trust (DTCT): data should be 
transmitted and communicated securely in the IoT system. Unauthorized 
system entities cannot access private data of others in data communications and 
transmission. 
▪ Quality of services (QoS): Quality of services should be ensured. 
▪ System security and robustness (SSR): trust management should effectively 
counter system attacks to gain sufficient confidence of system users. 
▪ Generality (G): trust management for various systems and services is preferred 
to be generic that can be widely applied, which is a system objective property. 
▪ Human-Computer Trust Interaction (HCTI): trust management provides sound 
usability and supports human-computer interaction in a trustworthy way, thus 
can be easily accepted by its users. 
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▪ Identity trust (IT): The identifiers of system entities are well managed for the 
purpose of trustworthy. Scalable and efficient identity management in is 
expected. 
However, most of the trust management mechanisms discussed in the literature 
including the ones stated in [64], [65], [62], [66], [67], [68], [69], [70], and[71]are 
basically explain how trust can be modeled but not the actual process of trust 
management from data collection to trust information lifecycle management as stated 
in Section 3.5. Yet, depending on the nature of trust propagation trust management 
platforms can be classified as below.  
With heterogeneous applications and services in the IoT, one must give special 
attention to the architecture of the trust model with respect to trust propagation. 
According to the literature, studies on trust architectures can be mainly divided into 
three groups; centralized, decentralized and distributed approaches. Some properties 
of each approach are described in Table 2-3. 
Table 2-3: Comparison of Trust Propagation Methods. 
Property Centralized Decentralized Distributed 
Points of failure Single point of failure Finite number of failures  Infinite  
Maintenance Easy Moderate Difficult 
Stability Highly unstable Recovery possible Quite stable 
Scalability  Low Scalability  Low Scalability Infinite 
Development Less Complex Moderate Complex 
Diversity Low High High 
 
In the centralized approach, a centralized platform manages all aspects of trust 
management including the information about TMs, TAs, protocols, algorithms and 
mathematical models, and provides the service on demand as shown in Figure 2-5(b). 
On the other hand, in the distributed approach Figure 2-5(a), TAGs do all the necessary 
computation locally.  
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Figure 2-5: Centralized vs Decentralized vs Distributed Networks. 
However, for IoT applications, sticking to only one approach will not be sufficient as 
sometimes calculations have to be done locally and some remotely, depending on the 
resources’ availability. Therefore, the fully distributed model or the fully centralized 
version will not give satisfactory results and hence an alternative approach, which is 
in between the centralized and distributed approaches should be considered. In this 
regard, the decentralized model is shown in Figure 2-5(c) can be considered as an 
optimum model for the trust evaluation with the complexity of IoT services. 
 Centralized 
In this approach, each trust request and service will go through a centralized 
platform, which can be accessed by all other nodes in the domain. This platform is 
responsible for managing trust information including trust negotiation, calculation, 
and decision making and/or assisting users by providing the initial information 
required for trust evaluation.  
In general, centrality based rating systems are global rating systems. One of the 
most prominent areas where centralized trust evaluation has been deployed is in 
the social networks like Facebook™ and e-markets like Amazon™ and eBay™ 
[72], [73]. In these, reputation is a function of the cumulative ratings of users by 
others. Furthermore, [74] explains how the reputation system works in social 
networks using a mathematical model. It introduces the adjacency matrix, which 
represents ratings from node “i" to node “j”. Then a recursive based method is 
followed to solve this matrix and obtain the reputation score for each reputed user. 
A more evolved version of a reputation model called SPORAS, compared to 
eBay™ is developed by [75] in which only the most recent recommendations have 
       
 (a) Distributed           (b) Centralized        (c) Decentralized 
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been taken into the consideration. Here, the mechanism is built in such a way that 
the reputation update will affect low reputed users significantly and high reputed 
users minimally. The underlying core principle is based on the standard deviation 
of reputation values. In addition, the authors suggest a method to incorporate 
reputation mechanisms in online communities, to make it more reliable and more 
effective in the ways that users contribute to the community. In [76], trust 
evaluation based on a centralized cluster head is proposed. Initially, the cluster 
head is responsible for delivering trust values for every node in its domain. After 
that, each local node will combine locally calculated trust with the initially learned 
trust value from the cluster head. 
 Distributed   
In distributed trust evaluation methods, every node is supposed to calculate trust 
locally by observing and exchanging reports with the neighboring nodes. For 
example, a trustor node might estimate the final trust value of the trustee by 
comparing its own reports, based on either direct trust measurements, reports from 
the trustee or reports from other global peers. This is illustrated in Figure 2-6 as 
neighbor sensing, recommendation based trust, and hybrid trust.  
 
  
(a) Direct Trust : Neighbor  
Sensing 
(b) In-direct Trust: 
Recommendations 
(c) Hybrid Methods 
Figure 2-6: Distributed trust evaluation methods. 
Trust estimation based on direct trust as well as from neighbor reports is proposed 
in [77], in which a mathematical model is formed based on probability theory to 
determine optimum percentages from both objects. A direct trust evaluation 
method for wireless sensor nodes is proposed in [78] based on the confidence 
interval concept. Final trust value will be decided after observing the behavior of 
adjacent node over a considerable time. Here, trust is represented as the mean trust 
value and a conﬁdence interval about the mean. Then, based on the confidence 
interval, the trustor will proceed with the decision-making process, i.e. if the 
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confidence interval is sufficiently narrow enough. If not, the trustor will acquire 
more knowledge from the trustee before calculating the final trust value.  
In a situation where direct observation is not possible with a trustee node, 
trustworthiness can be calculated based on recommendations from the peer users, 
which have records about the trustee. However, relying on others’ 
recommendations involves a high level of risk compared to the direct trust method. 
This is because recommenders can falsely provide dishonest information, which 
can lead to a reduction in the trust value of honest users and improve the trust of 
malicious nodes. Therefore, other than calculating trust, validating them is also a 
key research area when direct trust information is not available.  
Concerning dishonest users, [79], [80] propose trust credibility evaluation methods 
based on threshold values and assigning lesser weights for the dishonest users in 
future transactions. After filtering out the false recommendation, the next step is to 
calculate the effectiveness of each honest recommendation. Authors in [81] 
proposed several methods to determine the credibility of trust by using fuzzy logic. 
A trust calculation method based on threat reports for MANETs is proposed in 
[82]. In this method, an alarm system is included in each node. Then every node 
listens to its adjacent nodes and generates a trust report based on their behavior. 
This will be broadcast to every node so that if any node generates a false report it 
can be detected by the alarm system. 
 Decentralized 
A decentralized trust mechanism is an alternative model to both distributed and a 
centralized architecture that combines the positive points from both the previous 
designs. In the centralized approach, the trust information can be computed on 
demand, whenever an object needs to rely on its cooperative objects and delivered 
to the requesting object at that moment. On the other hand, the distributed approach 
can compute trust on a regular basis and propagate this throughout the topology. 
However, it is a concern that an object itself in a large-scale network such as the 
IoT possibly lacks the knowledge to evaluate trust. It certainly needs help from 
others such as trusted authorities. Moreover, a real-time trust data flow would 
result in a communication overhead, detrimental to network performance as well 
as to a constrained object’s battery life. The traditional strategies for centralized 
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systems are unsuitable for solving trust issues in a large-scale distributed network 
like the IoT because of their poor scalability as well as center-dependence, leading 
to a single point of failure. Thus, we conclude that a decentralized system would 
be the best candidate for trust management in a diversified environment like the 
IoT. This is because it possesses desirable properties such as scalability, the ability 
to produce accurate global trust, efficient resource management, reduced network 
overhead, and dynamic adaptability.  
In this regard, the authors in [83], [84] propose a trust model based on grouping 
several nodes together depending on their capability level. Then, each group 
selects a cluster head and all the cluster heads are connected to the base station. 
Then based on the reports from neighbor s, the cluster head will determine the trust 
value of other cluster heads based on interactions and then forward all the 
information to the base station. Finally, the base station compares all of the reports 
from all of the cluster heads and calculates the final trust value and sends it back 
to the cluster heads if needed.  
Blockchain technology, which is one of the most famous decentralized systems, 
introduced by S. Nakamoto [85], is a strong candidate for implementing 
trustworthy decentralized systems. In this regard, Foutiou et al. [86] propose a 
decentralized secure access control mechanism with the help of blockchain 
concepts. Similarly, the authors in [87] propose a trust management system for 
authentication based on the blockchain technology and analyze its resilience over 
common network attacks. Therefore, it is certain that blockchain is very useful as 
a decentralized technology in the context of futuristic trust based applications in 
the IoT.  
2.4. Trust Aggregation Techniques 
Several research works have tried combining multiple models in order to leverage their 
advantage whilst attempting to mitigate their drawbacks. This idea has recently 
become more popular in the context of the IoT, where trust is more complex because 
many factors contribute to the trust establishment and trust evaluation. In such IoT 
environments, the history of interactions and behaviors of objects is not only for 
reputation information but also for trust-related knowledge extraction. The 
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combination of reputation information, knowledge, and relationships among objects 
in the IoT draws a very complicated picture of trust evaluation. 
Table 2-4: Summary of Trust Aggregation Techniques. 
Aggregation 
Techniques 
Important Features 
Weighted 
Sum 
[65], [88] 
Higher weight is assigned to objects with higher reputation or 
transaction relevance. Thus, objects with strong relationships to 
trustor have a higher weight. 
Use credibility or similarity as a weight for indirect trust 
aggregation. 
Fuzzy 
Logic-based 
[89], [90] 
Fuzzy Logic provides trust level in the form of vague terms such as 
“low-high”, “good-bad”, and “acceptable-unacceptable” rather than 
providing an exact trust value. 
Belief 
Theory 
[79], [91] 
Belief theory (evidence theory or Dempster-Shafer theory (DST)) 
deals with reasoning using uncertainty and has connections to other 
techniques such as probability, possibility, and imprecise probability 
theories. 
Used in trust computational model to compute the trust of agents in 
autonomous systems by modeling the trust by belief, disbelief, and 
uncertainty of an object to other objects.  
Bayesian 
Methods 
[92], [93] 
Trust can be considered as Bayesian interference and can be 
modeled as a random variable in the range of [0, 1] following Beta 
distribution in which Belief discounting can be applied to defend 
against malicious objects such as bad-mouthing attacks ballot-
stuffing attacks. 
Machine 
Learning 
[94], [95] 
Trust evaluation is formalized as a classification problem and a 
novel approach utilizing a machine learning method is presented. 
Firstly, the trust feature vector is constructed according to the trust 
related factors. Then by training with collected sample data which 
contains trust feature vectors and trust ratings, a trust classifier is 
established. 
TMs can be gained from sufficient TAs by using trust aggregation techniques, for 
example, TMs can be computed by using Weighted Sum [65], [88], Fuzzy-based 
algorithms [89],[90], Belief Theory [91],[79], or Bayesian mechanisms [92],[93]. On 
the other hand, the authors of [94] and [95] outline the requirements for robust 
probabilistic trust assessments using supervised learning and apply a selection of 
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estimators to a real-world dataset, in order to show the effectiveness of supervised 
methods. Another interesting work that applies ML techniques is found in  [96]. In this 
work, they propose to use neural networks in order to provide a global reputation 
model using the distributed reputation evaluations. The global reputation is determined 
by the neural network’s output unit, a two-class classiﬁcation in this case. Furthermore, 
authors in [97], [98] and [99] investigate more innovative models and solutions for 
privacy, security and data integrity based on statistical and Deep Learning (DL) 
concepts. Moreover, authors in [100] and [101] propose a regression based model 
which compares the variation of trustworthiness with respect to trust features in 
MANET and Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN). Recently, authors in [102], [103] and 
[104] have presented several trust management frameworks based on Reinforcement 
Learning (RL) and multiclass classification techniques. To calculate the overall trust 
score or trust level, a mechanism with one of the trust aggregation methods mentioned 
above is needed to combine those TMs. 
Note that trust aggregation is a dynamic process that heavily depends on context-aware 
information, service requirements, and trustor's preferences. Each trustor needs 
appropriate trust data, context data, and aggregation methods for producing an overall 
trust score that reflects the trustor’s perspective and context awareness. Specific 
trustors might use and define different trust aggregation techniques for dealing with 
their associated trust data. There is currently no complete trust aggregation mechanism 
that can deal with the personalized trust in a dynamic context-awareness environment, 
however, several researchers have proposed some solutions for particular contexts and 
services. The summary of such aggregation models is described in Table 2-4. The trust 
aggregation techniques are the crucial parts needed to investigate and develop in order 
to build a completed trust management platform in the IoT. 
2.5. Discussion  
Based on many existing works which have been analyzed above, there are many gaps 
that needed to be filled. Further, it can be observed that most of the existing solutions 
are concentrated on solving issues either in particular areas of applications like P2P 
networks, MANETs, WSNs, etc. or particular service aspects like authentication, 
security, access control, etc. Besides, some works incorrectly used the terms trust and 
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security interchangeably. In summary, Table 2-5 shows the gap of knowledge 
identified by the thesis.   
Table 2-5. Gap of knowledge of the research area. 
Research Gap of Knowledge 
▪ Trust definitions 
 
- Conflicting definitions and interpretations 
of trust 
Security as Trust [4], [5]  
Privacy as Trust [10], [105]  
Policy as Trust [17], [18]  
Reputation as Trust [28], [29] 
▪ Choose of metrics and attributes 
in trust modeling 
 
- Trust models mostly design to identify 
dependability issues 
 
- Trust estimation based only on limited 
features 
Availability : [77], [106]  
Reliability : [107], [108] 
Safety : [109], [110], [81], [111]  
Security : [85], [86], [87]  
▪ Target Environment  
- Mostly aligned with cyber-physical 
systems (CPS) 
 
- No comprehensive trust management 
platform defined for IoT 
P2P, WSN and MANET 
[112], [113], [38], [39], [40] 
 
Ad Hoc [100], [101] / M2M [102] / 
MANET [104] 
▪ Trust modeling and aggregation - Trust aggregation based on fixed 
weighting factors 
- Identification of trust boundaries based 
on predefined thresholds 
- Unsuitability of using predefined 
probabilistic distributions to represent the 
dynamic property 
Weighted sum [65], [88] 
Fuzzy logic [89], [90] 
Belief theory [79], [91] 
Bayesian [92], [93] 
▪ -AI in Trust prediction - Often based on synthesized data sets as 
there are no real data sets based on trust 
- Mostly depend on privacy, security and 
reputation data 
- Absence of model validation 
Support vector [94], [95] 
Neural networks [96] 
Deep learning [97], [98] 
 
34 
 
One of the most important gaps that we intend to discuss and go for doing research is 
the lack of using environment information to trust evaluation. In the IoT environment, 
physical devices are owned by human-related factors and inherently socially connected 
by the physical-cyber-social system. Moreover, trust evaluation methods also lack 
concerns about trustor’s subjective properties, in other words, the trust results are not 
reflected of personalized expectation. The solutions for this gap could be two-fold 
approaches: The first one is to develop the trust relationships among entities in the IoT, 
thus creating a reliability and readiness of the trust network, based on the existing 
social models in the network systems. The second one is to explore other social TMs 
such as trustor’s similarity and friendship behaviors, centrality, community of interest, 
and more appropriate reputation TM.  
Along with the two approaches, trustor preferences should be considered to reflect the 
personalized trust and to enhance the intelligence of trust. There are a large number of 
TMs depending on each context of IoT and services requirements such as honesty, 
cooperativeness, QoS, community of interest, etc. In order to explorer more TMs, it is 
needed to investigate the network environment ontologies and trust ontologies in 
which relationships among entities and the relationships’ properties are represented 
and clarified. Consequently, by using a reasoning mechanism or a machine learning 
technique, new trust information and trust knowledge could be extracted and help to 
enhance the effectiveness of trust evaluation. 
Another big gap in the area of trust evaluation is the trust aggregation methods and 
trust reasoning that have been stated in the chapter. This gap incurs in both situation 
in the trust evaluation procedure: when there are several distinct TAs needed to 
combine into one overall TM, and when there are several TMs needed to combine into 
the overall trust score or trust level. There are limited literature in this area as 
mentioned in Section 2.3.2 The most popular and simple method to deal with the trust 
aggregation and trust reasoning currently is to apply the use of static weighted sum for 
trust formation. However, this solution is not smart enough due to the complicated IoT 
environment. Thus, there is an urgent need for a novel research on the use of more 
effective trust formation methods including dynamic weighted sum, belief theory, 
fuzzy logic, and regression analysis. For example, an intelligent weighted sum method 
can dynamically adjust the weights associated with TA and TMs based on context 
awareness and user preferences. The weighted sum method can also use a regression 
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analysis that links context information with TA and TM and user preference so as to 
determine the best weight assignment 
The scope of existing standards on security and privacy need to be expanded to include 
trust issues in future IoT Infrastructures. As existing research and standardization 
activities on trust are still limited to the social trust among humans, trust relationships 
among humans and things as well as among cross domains of social cyber-physical 
worlds should also be taken into account for trustworthy autonomous networking and 
services in IoT environments.  
2.6. Chapter summary 
This chapter summarized the latest advances and applications of trust solutions for the 
IoT through the various types of references including scientific publications, 
textbooks, and online articles. The thesis identifies and categorizes existing work on 
trust into three main categories based on their approaches on realizing computational 
trust in a digitized environment as (i) Trust evaluation models; (ii) Trust management 
platforms; and (iii) Trust aggregation techniques. After that, positives, negatives, and 
gap of knowledge of current methods are investigated.  
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CHAPTER 3: TRUST EVALUATION AND 
MANAGEMENT 
3.1. Introduction 
The concept of the IoT, which has made many unthinkable inventions possible, has 
been a breakthrough in the past decade and many more are expected in the years to 
come. In an IoT infrastructure, billions of electronic devices are connected to the 
Internet and these devices are equipped with sensors that observe or monitor various 
aspects of human life in the real world for supporting more ubiquitous and intelligent 
services. A modern-day IoT ecosystem involves the networking among physical 
devices and cyber components as well as the social interactions of them. This is 
essentially a leap forward of CPS and the formation of CPSS to connect the Cyber-
Physical world with social world objects [1]. Based on the CPSS concept, the new IoT 
model, which incorporates social paradigms into the IoT ecosystem, is introduced to 
explain the social behavior of objects along with human interactions [2].   
However, this integration introduces new concerns for risks, privacy, and security at 
both the system and social levels because of heterogeneous interactions among humans 
and objects. Consequently, managing risks and securing IoT is broader in scope and 
pose greater challenges than the traditional privacy and security triad of integrity, 
confidentiality, and availability in the physical and cyber world. The aim of future IoT 
services is to make decisions autonomously without human intervention. In this regard, 
trust has been recognized as a vital key for processing and handling data, and for 
complying with the services, business, and customer needs. Accordingly, ITU-T has 
been developing related standards for trust provisioning after publishing the first 
recommendation [3] based on the activities of the Correspondence Group (CG) on 
Trust. For supporting trust, it is crucial to minimize unexpected risks and maximize 
risk predictability using a trust platform. This platform should help the IoT 
infrastructure to operate in a controlled manner and to avoid unpredicted conditions 
and service failures. 
There are several trust related frameworks that can be observed from the research 
literature, such as  [97] and [114] based on privacy, [5] and [21] based on reputation, 
and [115] and [116] based on social relationships. On the other hand, there are some 
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frameworks which are aiming at a particular application area like ad-hoc networks 
[117], P2P [118] or social networks [48]. However, these approaches lack generality 
in terms of the application domain and target area. Therefore, it is essential that trust 
mechanisms are designed and developed to look ahead to the future where many 
individual objects are interconnected with new vulnerabilities possibly being 
introduced into heterogeneous systems and application domains. 
Thus, this chapter first proposes a generic definition for trust to avoid any ambiguity 
on trust provisioning. Then it proposes a trust model and a trust management platform 
to find viable solutions to trust related problems in any environment including IoT.  
3.2. Trust in IoT 
 Trust Concept 
Typically, trust can be observed as a metric used to evaluate social actors in 
consideration of mutual benefits, coordination, and cooperation. Actors continuously 
update their trust on others in response to perception fluctuations due to direct 
interactions and based on beliefs and opinions of others who are around. Furthermore, 
trust also affects the decision of an object to transact with another object in an IoT 
ecosystem in which all participating objects must take decisions based on trust to 
provide/receive services to/from other objects.  
However, building trust in IoT is much more difficult due to the inability of machine 
objects to generate perceptions about other objects around them like humans. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to quantify the exact trustworthiness value of an object with 
a high accuracy. This is even harder when each object has a different interpretation 
and perception of the term “trustworthy”. Therefore, they may assign different 
trustworthiness values to a provider or a service. As an example, a service consumer 
object assigns “very trustworthy” to the provider for a specific transaction that it has 
performed. However, another consumer object might assign “untrustworthy” for a 
similar transaction from the same provider. These differences further increase the 
difficulty to determine the exact trustworthiness of a provider. 
Therefore, it is essential to establish a generic platform which defines the blueprint of 
a trust management process while keeping in mind the diversity of trust features and 
hence the flexibility given to objects to choose best and practical measures. To clarify 
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the ambiguities and definitions of trust, we use the following definition in the context 
of the IoT [119]: 
Definition 1. Trust  
It is a qualitative or quantitative property of a trustee, evaluated by a trustor as a 
measurable belief, in a subjective or objective manner, for a given task, in a specific 
context, for a specific time period. 
The term “trustor” is used to represent an object that is expected to initiate an 
interaction with another object and “trustee” as the second object that provides 
necessary information to the trustor upon its request. The first thing that we want to 
emphasize in the definition of trust is the nature of the measurement that can take either 
a quantitative or a qualitative form. Apart from the well-known numerical 
measurements like similarity, accuracy, etc., qualitative properties like motivation, 
awareness, and commitment can also be used to judge certain situations in the process 
of trust based decision-making. In addition, it is important to recognize trust as a belief 
even in the cyber world. That means, trust is a relative phenomenon and 100% belief 
is neither practical nor achievable in a diverse environment like the IoT. 
Moreover, the perception of trust can be either subjective or objective, depending on 
the requirement of the trustor and the availability of needed information. If the trustor 
wants TMs in a specific format that goes with the trustor’s profile of interest, then the 
measurements can be characterized as subjective. On the other hand, objective 
measures can be described as TAs collected without any profile based filtering. Lastly, 
it is very important to define trust specifically for a particular task, context and time 
frame. For example, one might trust another for their cloud storage services but not for 
online streaming services, i.e. task dependent trust. Furthermore, one might need the 
service of a cloud only for a limited duration and not for a lifetime, i.e. time-dependent 
trust. Moreover, a client might use different cloud services in different countries, as he 
does not trust the same provider globally, i.e. context dependent trust. Hence, trust is 
variable in nature and hence cannot be assigned permanently to measure every task 
and every context of a specific actor or object. Further, we need to emphasize that trust 
is a relative quantity between two or more objects as opposed to a measurement of 
individual objects.  
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 Key Characteristics of Trust 
With the above understanding of trust, the following characteristics further explain the 
nature of trust in an IoT ecosystem [120-122]. 
Trust is Dynamic: Validity of trust is dependent upon time and may change as time 
goes by. For example, for the past one year, Alice highly trusts Bob. However, today 
Alice found that Bob lied to her, consequently, Alice no longer trusts Bob.  
Trust is Context-dependent: Trust is context dependent and whenever the context 
change happens, trust must be recalculated accordingly. Additionally, the level of trust 
in diverse contexts is evaluated differently. For example, Alice may trust Bob to 
provide financial advice but not medical advice. 
Trust is not Transitive: That is trust cannot be passed from one to another and must 
be recalculated at each object. For example, Alice cannot simply trust Charlie, just 
because Bob, who is a trustworthy friend of Alice, trusts Charlie.   
Trust is Asymmetric: A trust relationship works only in one direction and it is not 
mutually reciprocal in nature. That means there is no guarantee that Alice trusts Bob, 
even though Bob trusts Alice.   
Trust is Implicit: It is always hard to explicitly calculate the trust with 100% accuracy. 
For example, Alice may trust Bob normally because they have known each other for a 
long time. However, sometimes, Alice’s estimated trust on Bob might not be 100% 
correct. Therefore, this might affect Alice in a negative way and would not be able to 
achieve expected results all the time.   
Antonymy: The trust assessed by different objects on the same service might not be 
essentially the same, it differs depending on each one’s perspective. For example, 
object Alice trusts Charlie in the context of teaching, however, Bob’s view on the same 
matter might be different from Alice’s.  
Asynchrony: The time period of a trusting relationship may be defined differently 
between the objects. For example, Alice has trusted Bob for three years, but Bob may 
think that their trust relationship has lasted only one year.  
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Gravity: The degree of seriousness in trust relationships may differ between the 
objects. For example, Alice may think that their trust relationship with Bob is 
important for her, however, Bob might think otherwise. 
3.3. Trust Evaluation Model 
Having stated the generic definition of trust and its features, the next step is to define 
the course of trust acquisition, aggregation, and representation in a conceptual setting.  
In the human world, one’s judgment on others is basically dependent on three factors; 
(i) How much the trustor knows about the trustee (i.e. Knowledge); (ii) Trustor’s 
previous experience with the trustee (i.e. Experience); and (iii) Public opinion on the 
trustee (i.e. reputation). Analogy to the human world, this work adopt these facts on 
the IoT environment and formulate a trust evaluation model called REK based on 
Reputation, Experience, and Knowledge as defined below and shown in Figure 3-1. 
Definition 2: Trust Evaluation Model 
The method used to identify, evaluate and create trust relationships among objects for 
calculating trust. It comprises three TMs: Knowledge, Experience, and Reputation. 
Each TM is a collective representation of several TAs. Each TA represents the 
trustworthiness feature of a trustee.  
 
Figure 3-1: A Generic Trust Evaluation Model. 
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 Knowledge based Trust Metric 
The knowledge based TM covers all aspects of direct trust evaluations, which provide 
a perception about a trustee before and during an interaction. To make this possible, it 
must provide relevant data to the trustor for its assessment. If a data feature can be 
represented using a quantitative measurement, then the result is a numerical value in a 
certain range. As an example, social relationships like co-location and co-work, 
credibility factors like cooperativeness, time-dependent features like the frequency and 
duration of interactions, and spatial distribution of relevant trustees compared to the 
trustor can be used as direct trust measurements. 
The main purposes of trust assessment are to facilitate more intelligent decision 
making and task delegation. In this regard, we further elaborate two more metrics, 
which come under the knowledge TM as non-social TMs and social TMs.  In non-
social trust, the idea is to find whether the trustor can rely on physical or cyber objects 
and social trust determines whether a trustor can depend on other social objects [14]. 
Let us consider a specific trustor A and a trustee B with respect to a particular goal g 
in the decision making process. Based on this setup the definitions of the attributes in 
Figure 3-1 are  [123]; 
(a) Social Attributes 
− Relationship: Mutual association on completing goal g 
− Willingness Trust: B shows no resistance over accomplishing the goal g 
− Persistence Trust: Consistency over time, conquering the task 
− Confidence Trust: Confident about B himself towards realizing g 
− Spatial Trust: Social proximity between A and B on realizing g  
(b) Non-social Attributes 
− Competence Trust: B is beneficial and capable of realizing g  
− Disposition Trust:  B actually performs the task 
− Dependence Trust: Achievement of goal g relies upon B 
− Fulfillment Trust: B’s contribution is necessary to achieve the task 
− Temporal Trust: Frequency and Duration of interactions between A and B 
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Under the social TAs, the relationship TAs in Figure 3-1 defines the mutual 
relationship between the trustor and a trustee. It is reasonable to assume that if two 
objects have a noble relationship between them, a higher trustworthiness can be 
expected between them. As an example, if the trustor and the trustee are operated in 
close proximity such as looking for a parking lot near a supermarket, then both benefit 
(e.g. getting a vacant, closest, easily navigable parking lot) from their relationship 
based on location similarity that we have identified as co-location TA. Likewise, if the 
two objects are in a working relationship like car sharing in which one needs to provide 
a service and other needs to get the service, both can support each other via their co-
work association.  
Furthermore, it is important to maintain knowledge about the consistency of 
trustworthy service provisioning. We discuss properties related to this issue under 
persistence. The features like cooperativeness under persistence represents the level of 
social cooperation from the trustee to the trustor. The higher cooperativeness means 
the higher trust level in an IoT ecosystem. A user can evaluate the cooperativeness of 
others based on social ties and select socially cooperative users. Additionally, we have 
introduced a rewarding system, which also comes under persistence, in order to track 
the history of misbehavior situations or unsuitable reactions originated by the trustee. 
A rewarding TA can be used to either encourage or discourage further interactions 
with a particular trustee based on its past character.  
Moreover, in an IoT ecosystem, service provisioning (discover, manage and terminate) 
is based on its social relationships without solely depending on the underlying system 
level information. Therefore, it is vital to identify TAs, which determine the social 
proximity of the objects in collaboration. In this aspect, we identify three properties 
under spatial TAs in as mutuality, centrality, and CoI as governing features that define 
the social positioning of a trustee. Mutuality measures the degree of profile similarity 
between the trustee and trustor in resemblance to what is used in social networking. 
The community-interest represents whether the trustor and the trustee have a close 
relationship in terms of social communities, groups, and capabilities. Two objects with 
a high degree of community-interest have more opportunities for interacting with each 
other, and this can result in a higher trust level. Centrality measures the importance of 
a trustee among other objects with respect to a particular task and context. 
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To capture the significance of time-related information to trustworthiness evaluation, 
TAs like the frequency and duration of the interactions, which come under temporal 
TAs, can be used. It is logical to assume that the higher the frequency and duration of 
interactions, the more trust is built up among the associating objects. On the contrary, 
the shorter time spent on each other, the less knowledge is gathered on each other’s 
behaviors and capabilities. As an example, in whitewashing attacks, a dishonest object 
can vanish for some time and rejoin the service in order to clear its reputation. 
However, if a trustor can keep a record of the consistency of the interested trustees 
then it can avoid such situations. 
 Experience based and Reputation based Trust Metrics 
After acquiring enough evidence about trustees through the knowledge TM, the trustor 
can initiate collaborations with selected trustees based on the perception that the trustor 
has already obtained. However, the result of these interactions might differ from the 
perception and hence it is critical to keep a record of each individual experience to be 
used in future interactions. For instance, the experience might be feedback from 
consumers after each transaction (as used in many e-Commerce systems), just a 
Boolean value (0/1) indicating whether a service transaction successfully operates (as 
in some reputation-based trust systems), etc. Then, by accumulating these experiences 
over time in relation to the corresponding contexts, tasks and times, the trustor can 
build up additional intelligence compared to the knowledge TM. 
To further enhance the perception of the trustor, other objects can share their 
experience in using the trustee, upon a request by the trustor, which we identify as 
reputation or the global opinion of the trustee. As an example, we have come up with 
a non-bias PageRank based model to calculate the reputation values of trustees in a 
distributed network as in [124]. In summary, the experience TM is a personal 
observation considering only interactions from a trustor to a trustee, whereas the 
reputation TM reflects the global opinion of the trustee. 
According to the above definitions, the formation of trust according to the three TMs 
is shown in Figure 3-2 for the objects who have just entered the IoT ecosystem. The 
first step of the trust assessment is to build to up the knowledge about the trustee who 
is about to receive/provide the service from/to the trustor. At this level, no information 
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can be generated in relation to experience or reputation as there have been no previous 
interactions among them.   
However, after just one transaction, both parties can start the process of obtaining 
experiences through their conversations. Generating trust scores based on experience 
is an iterative process and the more time spent with each other (Trustor and Trustee), 
the more they can learn about their own ability to provide accurate judgments. 
Likewise, a trustee might initiate or receive more interactions from other peers in the 
service domain. At this point onwards, peers can generate trust scores based on the 
reputation values for the trustee. Finally, accumulation of knowledge, experience, and 
reputation over time and context can be presented as the trust value of their relationship 
at this moment for applications like trust based decision-making or any other 
appropriate service as required.   
 
Figure 3-2: Direct and Indirect Trust Evaluation. 
 Trust Evaluation Process  
In the context of computer science, trust evaluation can be defined as the process of 
obtaining a quantitative value for trust (see Section 3.2) between at least two parties; 
a trustor and a trustee. In general, obtaining a final trust value is a dynamic process 
and relies upon many properties of the trustor, the trustee, the environment, and the 
aggregation methods. According to our proposed trust model in Section 3.3, we find 
hierarchical relationships among these properties as shown in Figure 3-3. 
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Figure 3-3: Aggregation of TAs and TMs towards Trust Value. 
According to the model, the first step of the trust evaluation is to estimate relevant 
TMs depending on the application. However, this information is not readily available 
and hence attributes, which define these TMs, must be obtained. There are numerous 
methods available to estimate these TAs ranging from numerical methods, 
probabilistic methods, belief theory to ML methods. In simple terms, the mathematical 
approach to find the trust value trustor i and trustee j can be represented as below.  
 𝐾𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼1𝐾1 + 𝛼2𝐾2 +⋯+ 𝛼𝑛𝐾𝑛 (3.1) 
 𝐸𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽1𝐸1 + 𝛽2𝐸2 +⋯+ 𝛽𝑛𝐸𝑛 (3.2) 
 𝑅𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾1𝑅1 + 𝛾2𝑅2 +⋯+ 𝛾𝑛𝑅𝑛 (3.3) 
 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 = 𝜃1𝐾𝑖𝑗 + 𝜃2𝐸𝑖𝑗 + 𝜃𝑛𝑅𝑖𝑗 (3.4) 
where ,,, and , are weighting factors that normalize each metric in between 0 and 
1. Kx, Ex and Rx represent the TMs-Knowledge, Experience, and Reputation, 
respectively.  
Note that equations (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3) denote an iterative process. To determine 
one TM, it might be necessary to examine several levels deep in the hierarchy, until a 
sufficient number of attributes are assessed to represent the relevant TM. Therefore, 
the dimensions of matrix TAx can vary from one to infinity depending on the use case. 
However, trust value does not need to be 100% correct, as we discussed in Section 3.2 
and hence the optimum number of dimensions must be considered based on the 
criticality of the requirement.  
46 
 
However, equations  (3.1) to (3.4) show the preliminary idea of trust evaluation and 
based on this, there are a number of trust evaluation methods found in the literature as 
discussed in Chapter 3, each with their positives and negatives. It is possible to 
characterize such methods into several categories as network architecture-based 
methods, policy based methods, reputation based methods, knowledge based methods, 
trust aggregation based methods, and those based on novel concepts like ML. 
3.4. Trust Management Platform  
Definition 2: Trust Management Platform 
It responds to various requests from many service objects, analyses the level of trust 
by tracing the accumulated data from various sources and make suitable decisions in 
order to establish reliable communication among objects. 
To achieve such goal, the required number of processes inside the platform can be 
vastly different from one application to other. However, it can be identified five must-
have processes in any generic trust management platform as Trust Data Collection, 
Trust Data Management, Trust Information Analysis, Dissemination of trust 
Information and Trust Information Lifecycle Management [125]. 
− Trust Data Collection 
The trust data collection process mainly involves two sub-processes planning 
to collect the trust data as well as collecting the trust data. In planning trust data 
collection, it is necessary to elaborate what and how much trust data should be 
collected. Entries of trust data should be related to the purpose of trust 
evaluation and be uncorrelated with each other for usability on trust evaluation 
processes. Trust data should also be collected as infrequently as possible due 
to the associated time and resource costs. Moreover, excessive trust data 
collection may cause privacy concerns within ICT infrastructures and services. 
The amount of trust data, which needs to be collected, shall also be considered 
in this process. Further, it is important to monitor and verify the process of data 
collection with respect to the expected requirements.  
− Trust Data Management 
To generate the information about trust, collected trust data must be processed 
in such a way that it gives a meaningful result. In this regard, the main concerns 
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in data management would be to consider the purpose of trust evaluation and 
the assurance that data collected will not cause any degradation of accuracy or 
waste resources (due to incorrect or polluted data) whilst creating trust 
information. Furthermore, this process is responsible for protecting collected 
data from abnormal access such as hacking or data leakage.   
− Trust Information Analysis 
The trust information analysis process extracts meaningful trust information 
from trust data and other trust information for objects in ICT infrastructures 
and services. Because trust is generated on the relationship between the trustor 
and the trustee, trust information should explicitly reflect the trust relationship 
using the objective and subjective manner. 
− Dissemination of Trust Information 
Trust dissemination is the mechanism used to distribute or broadcast trust 
information, which is created in the previous process. There are many ways of 
disseminating trust information in different domains. In the case of a social 
domain, recommendation and visualization methods are considered as the main 
approaches to disseminate trust information. Efficient, effective and suitable 
trust dissemination methods should be developed, that is, only trust 
information that concerns a trustor should be disseminated to trustors in ICT 
infrastructures and services. A trustor can determine the trustworthiness of a 
trustee with trust information with the subjective criteria.   
− Trust Information Lifecycle Management 
In previous processes, trust information is created and disseminated to ICT 
infrastructure and services. Because of the dynamic characteristic of trust, trust 
information should be re-established, updated, and abolished. The re-
establishment phase replaces components of trust information due to the 
change of an object or a service. The feedback of the trustor that receives trust 
information on the trustee also could be related to the replacement of 
components in the reestablishment phase. At the update phase, the value of 
trust information and trust data is updated, and trust information is re-
evaluated. Finally, if trust information of an object or a service is dispensed 
with, trust information can be abolished or reset.  
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According to the discussion above, the proposed trust management platform, which 
manages all aspect of trust data collection to trust lifecycle management in an IoT 
ecosystem is shown in Figure 3-4. The platform consists of several modules like TAG, 
Trust Broker (TB), Trust Data Access Object (DAO), DR, Application Programming 
Interface (API), TM Extractor (TME), AI Engine (AIE), Trust Information Analysis 
(TIA), Trust Modelling Algorithm (TMA), Trust Service Enabler (TSE), and Trust 
Lifecycle Management module (TLM). These modules will perform one or several 
tasks at a time to achieve the objectives discussed above.  
 
Figure 3-4: Trust Management Platform. 
− Trust Agent (TAG) 
The first step of the trust evaluation process is to collect appropriate data from 
all the sources, where applicable, including cyber, physical and social objects 
of relevant services or applications. Generally, TAG works similarly to client-
server application, in which objects and the central platform change their role 
depending on the direction of data flow. The data could be either information 
obtained directly from relevant parties, experience or opinions of objects as 
reputation or feedbacks from/to other objects, applications or services. 
Furthermore, depending on the available processing power, data filtering and 
data pre-processing will be carried out at the object itself, at the broker or at 
the centralized platform.  
− Trust Broker (TB) 
The information received from TAGs, and from other various types of 
applications, and services in the IoT ecosystem will be managed by the TB. 
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Essentially, we propose to implement the broker as a publish-subscribe system 
such that any service or application, which wants data for trust evaluation, must 
subscribe to the system using proper credentials to receive information from 
the broker, whenever this information is available. In this particular scenario, 
the trust management platform uses the TB to get direct as well as indirect 
information from various sources. 
− Data Repository (DR) 
Once the TAG, inside the platform acquired the data, it will be stored in the 
local repository, close to the platform to be used by other modules in the 
platform. Additionally, it stores information from the TME, TIA and through 
an API that connects to external trust data sources. 
− Trust Information Analysis (TIA) 
All the information acquired so far is analyzed inside this module with the 
support from an external AI engine. Depending on the availability of data, the 
attributes, which were identified by the TME, and the requirement of the 
analysis, the TIA module will utilize numerical, statistical, ML or ensemble 
approach to calculate the metrics. To support ML and ensemble base 
calculation, an external AIE is implemented to provide more robust and 
autonomic execution.  
− Trust Modelling Algorithm (TMA) 
The final trust value based on the calculated metrics from previous steps is 
generated inside based on the appropriate model for each application. For 
example, if the REK model is used, a trust value based on the knowledge, 
reputation and experience are generated. The TMA should essentially work 
together with the TIA to find the best possible metrics for each model in which 
some models will combine the metrics according to pre-defined rules or 
policies, while others will generate these rules and policies dynamically to suit 
the situation in the best possible way.  
− Trust Service Enabler (TSE)   
This is one of the most important modules in the platform, which collects trust 
information from the platform and other knowledge bases to take appropriate 
decisions based on trust. The service enabler is different from the service 
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provider in that the service enabler is concerned with the extraction of 
information and knowledge from the gathered lifecycle data and packaging or 
integrating them into suitable service content, whilst the service provider is 
responsible for providing services to customers and stakeholders by using the 
service enabler. 
The roles of the TSE can be identified as:  
a) collecting trust information and making decisions 
b) maintaining a persistent trust data/information database 
c) attention to access control during the service deployment  
d) presenting the results in an appropriate format to the customer (e.g. trust 
value, report, decision/action, consequences, etc.) [126].   
3.5. Discussion 
Firstly, this chapter formally defines the trust concept, its key characteristics, and 
features for a clear understanding of trust in the IoT. As discussed in Table 2-5, there 
are many definitions of trust resulting in difficulty in establishing a standard notation 
of trust in computer science. Such confusing definitions and blurred nature of trust 
itself make developers or researches to come up with stable and standardized trust 
evaluating mechanism similiter to well-known security mechanisms. Therefore, the 
concept of computational trust and definitions stated in this thesis are standardized 
with ITU-T and confidently it would help to avoid such ambiguities in the future. 
Then, a novel trust evaluation model based on three metrics called knowledge, 
experience and reputation are then proposed to evaluate trust. As this thesis pointed 
out in Section 2.2, there are a number of existing works can be found in the literature. 
However, most of these approaches consider only one-dimensional model and often 
ignore the characteristics of trust including its subjective nature. Because of that, they 
failed to evaluate trust in any given situation making it unreliable to consider for 
decision making process. On the other hand, policy based trust evaluation models 
discussed in Section 2.2.1. is totally dependent on the policies defined and any 
interaction outside these policies will lead to categorize the trustee as untrustworthy. 
Similarly, reputation-based trust models show weak performance again fake trust 
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information and highly sensitive for perceptions of the reputation generators and 
knowledge based trust evaluation models are suffered from humongous amount of 
information and inability to estimate a correct number of attributes required for trust 
evaluation.  However, the proposed trust evaluation model is based on three 
dimensions and hence it shows good resilient against hard-line decisions as it does not 
need to rely on one dimension like in policy based models, robust response for fake 
reputations as it can validate these responses through other dimensions like experience, 
and reduce complexity when evaluation TAs based on knowledge as the trust 
evaluation is supported by three dimensions which indeed helps to compromise some 
of the less relevant TAs.   
On the other hand, a noticeable drawback of existing trust management platforms is 
the absence of a functional description of the modules that required to evaluate trust. 
Even though most of the current work uses the term “Trust Management”, which is 
actually used it to emphasizes the trust evaluation techniques and there is only very 
limited work that describes the actual functions needed to evaluate trust from data 
collection trust information lifecycle management. Therefore, a trust management 
platform for trust evaluation and decision making for a trustworthy IoT Eco-system is 
proposed as a solution to such limitations, emphasizing key functionalities, 
requirements and standard interfaces for autonomic decision making based on trust. 
3.6. Chapter summary 
In this chapter, we discussed the importance of trust in achieving more futuristic, and 
trustworthy services in an IoT ecosystem. First, we identified the key challenges and 
necessity of trust in a hostile environment, where billions of objects from the social, 
cyber and physical worlds, with various ambitions, are interconnected. Then a 
formalized definition for computational trust is presented to avoid any 
misinterpretation of trust in future in the similar area of research. Then a trust 
evaluation model is presented to describe the process of TA identification, evaluation, 
and trust relationship entablement. Finally, a trust management platform is presented 
to address the issues from data collection to trust information lifecycle management in 
the trust evaluation process.  
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CHAPTER 4: REPUTATION BASED TRUST 
EVALUATION MODEL 
4.1. Introduction 
SIoT is a revolutionary idea, which combines traditional IoT models with social 
network paradigms. “Objects” in SIoT formulate social relationships with other 
“objects” according to the relationships, defined by their trustworthiness. Hence, in 
this section, thesis propose a reputation based TM assessment algorithm called RpR 
(Recommendations plus Reputations) that enables objects in SIoT to build associations 
in a trustworthy manner. Along with SIoT concepts, recommendations can be defined 
as the opinions of friends in the context of human social networks and reputations as 
the opinions of other global objects. 
The proposed algorithm here is an extended version of the popular PageRank™ (PR) 
algorithm, which ranks web pages according to their importance [127]. The PR 
algorithm discusses how the incoming and outgoing links of a web page can be used 
to evaluate the importance of that particular page compared to its neighbor s. However, 
the PR algorithm is not capable of assessing objects other than those directly 
connected, and it shows extremely weak performance in the case of fake reputations. 
With these issues in mind, we propose an algorithm, which evaluates 
recommendations and reputations and generates a collective trust value, which will be 
identified as RpR trust scores.  
The rest of the section is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the concept of 
trust corresponding to a SIoT environment. Section Error! Reference source not f
ound. presents the formulation of RpR algorithm while meeting the properties of a 
real-world scenario. Section 4.4 provides simulation results in order to validate and 
compare the desirable attributes and the performance enhancements.  
4.2. Background  
In SIoT, objects are linked with services that they can deliver and acquire. The key 
objectives of such a network are to discover reputed services, active resources and 
publish this information over the network to be used by interested parties. To achieve 
this kind of behavior, navigating through a social network is done based on the 
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relationship of objects rather than depending on typical internet discovery tools. Social 
relationships can be considered as human-human, human-objects, and objects-objects. 
Relationship based routing is a far more proficient technique for SIoT compared to 
standard routing methods, due to its requirements such as context awareness service 
delivery, trustworthiness, and scalability.  
Accordingly, we categorize relationships into four main categories depending on their 
trust level: namely Friendship, Ownership, Interaction, and Community interest. In 
Figure 4-1, we have shown an example scenario of this classification using a car 
sharing use case. As demonstrated in the example, each object has at least one owner 
and which may be a friend, a part of a transaction and/or a member of a specific 
community. Also, we identify the trustor and trustee relationship in which the trustor 
is responsible for evaluating the trust and trustee is responsible for providing the 
necessary information requested by the trustor. 
 
Figure 4-1: Associations in a SIoT system based on a car sharing use case. 
Being a friend is one of the strongest relationships in SIoT and it allows devices 
connected to friends to collaborate with each other more reliably compared to others. 
Likewise, there can be devices, which are operated to achieve certain goals or policies 
set by the community. Some examples are social networking, backbone services, 
security measures, and the communities who interfere with the goodness of the 
operation like cybercrime, spam, and any other rule violators. Furthermore, in a setup 
like SIoT, objects belonging to the same community are more likely to share 
information with their members as opposed to those who are not in the community. As 
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an example, a spam community might share information or mechanisms relevant to 
self-promoting, bad-mouthing, good mouthing within their community and work 
collaboratively to alter the normal behavior of the target system. Our use case example 
presented in Figure 4-1 is a car sharing system where people can rent a car for a period 
of time. Normally, a customer wants a reliable car for a reasonable service level and 
cost. At the same time, a car provider and a broker need to ensure that the customer is 
trustworthy. To meet these criteria, it is essential to have a system that provides 
assurance for every party who participates in the transaction, which is essentially 
establishing a view of trust among objects in SIoT. 
4.3. Evaluation of Reputation Based Trust  
The algorithm is specifically suitable for a distributed environment where every object 
keeps a record of its own trust value based on a particular set of friendly and third-
party estimations. We assume that if a particular object (Trustor) is already connected 
or in contact with another object (Trustee), there is a relationship with these two 
objects regardless of trustworthiness. We apply this property to generate a weighted 
directed graph where the vertices represent objects and edges represent the 
relationships between them. Figure 4-2 shows an example Car Sharing use case, where 
User 1 (“A”) has a friendly relationship with Service Provider 2 (“D”) and User 2 (“E”) 
provides some reputation on object “A” through object “B” based on their social 
relationship. 
Moreover, it is reasonable to believe that an object would have a higher trust score if 
many objects were directed towards it. However, if a particular object provides an 
excessively high number of opinions about its neighbor, one may suspect that this is a 
dishonest object trying to achieve some undesirable objective. Therefore, filtering out 
opinions is also critical to have a more trustworthy score. Keeping these factors in 
mind, we develop Recommendation and Reputation assessment algorithms and they 
will be combined later to formulate the final algorithm to calculate RpR trust scores. 
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Figure 4-2: A graph representation of the SIoT Model. 
 Recommendation Assessment 
In this section, we formulate an algorithm to assess recommendations for SIoT in 
comparison to PR for the web. Since our goal is to build the algorithm based on 
relationships but not on web links, multi-graphs and self-promoting links are ignored. 
Let us consider an object vi which has a friendly relationship with object vj as shown 
in Figure 4-3. Since the number of incoming relationships corresponds to the 
recommendation level of a target object, we can express the recommendation value of 
vi as 𝑅rec(𝑣𝑖) =  ∑ 1
𝑁
𝑗=1 , for N number of total directly connected objects of relevance 
to a particular context. Note that the value of each relationship between i and j is 
assumed as one at the initial stage. However, if the recommender has many outgoing 
links, it is an indication that it is a friend of many other objects and hence a 
recommendation score for each target object must be equally distributed along the 
links as shown in equation (4.1). In order to simplify the computational overhead and 
the algorithm, the factor 1/O(vj) is represented in matrix form as in equation (4.2)[127]. 
Here the function O(-) represents the number of outgoing links.  
vivj vn
 
Figure 4-3: An example of recommendation flow. 
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𝑅rec(𝑣𝑖) =  ∑
1
𝑂(𝑣𝑗)
𝑁
𝑗=1
 (4.1)  
where O(vj) is equivalent to a number of direct links from vj. 
 
𝑇𝑖𝑗 = {
0
1
𝑂(𝑣𝑗)
     
𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
𝑖𝑓(𝑣𝑗, 𝑣𝑖) ∈  𝜖
 
 
(4.2) 
 
where Tij represents the transition probability from object “j” towards “i” in the directed 
graph. 
 
𝑅rec(𝑣𝑖) =  ∑𝑇𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
 (4.3) 
As the objects are distributed, the final recommendation score of each object can be 
calculated recursively as in (4.4). 
 
𝑅rec(𝑣𝑖) =  ∑𝑇𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑅rec(𝑣𝑗) (4.4) 
The equivalent matrix form is: 
 𝑹rec
𝑡+1 = 𝑻 𝑹rec
𝒕  (4.5) 
where 𝑹rec
𝑡+1 is the predicted recommendation score, 𝑇 is the transition matrix, 𝑹rec
𝒕  is 
the current score and t+1 denotes the current time stamp.    
Equation (4.5) represents the numerical model for the SIoT environment comparable 
to PR for web links. Moreover, this is developed based on the assumption that there 
are no dishonest objects present and the initial recommendation values are uniformly 
distributed over the entire network. In a real environment, this is not the case and we 
discuss a solution for these issues in this section. First, it is essential to filter out 
untrustworthy objects from good objects as we assume that good objects often 
recommend reliable objects and dishonest objects recommend unreliable objects. This 
is in relation to human behavior and this thesis adopt that concept here to develop our 
model discussed in equation (4.5) furthermore as described below.  
Let us consider object A in Figure 4-2. It can be observed that object “A” provides 
more outgoing links to other objects, i.e. “A” has a good relationship with many other 
57 
 
objects. If a third party user is connected to object A, that user can reach three other 
friends of “A” easily in order to get some information or services. Following this 
approach, if we can distinguish objects like “A”, which is well connected with other 
objects, we can reasonably filter out dishonest objects from the environment. To 
identify such objects we adopt the inverse version of the PR algorithm discussed in 
[128]. In the PR model, a rank score depends on how many inwards links there are 
from adjacent objects. The higher the number of inward links, the greater the rank 
score of the target object will be.  
Accordingly, an inverse graph of Figure 4-2 is shown in Figure 4-4. Now that the graph 
is inverted, PR gives the ranking scores based on most outgoing links in contrast to the 
original PR algorithm, which is based on inward links. We define inverse transition 
matrix U as in equation (4.6) where I(vj) are the input relationships. 
A
B C
D
E
 
Figure 4-4: An Inverse Graph of the SIoT Model. 
 
 
𝑈𝑖𝑗 = {
0
1
𝐼(𝑣𝑗)
     
𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
𝑖𝑓(𝑣𝑖, 𝑣𝑗) ∈  𝜖
 (4.6) 
Note that TT≠U. Then the inverse rank scores of each object can be calculated by 
substituting (4.6) in to (4.5) as shown in (4.7). 
 𝒕𝒓+𝟏 = 𝐔 𝒕𝒓 (4.7) 
Equation (4.7) provides an idea about which object has the highest number of outgoing 
links. As this equation is obtained from the inverse matrix, it also implies the highest 
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number of incoming links in the original matrix. According to our assumption, more 
incoming links means the object is well worth visiting and hence the most trustworthy. 
However, it is required to define a threshold value () to select the most trustworthy 
objects “k” from total “N” objects. After identifying the most trustworthy objects, we 
can distribute initial rank values among these specific objects, making others zero. 
Let us say that the modified vector is tr where k number of objects have a positive value 
and N-k number of objects are zero. Then, we combine the trust vector tr with (4.5) as 
in (4.8). 
 𝑹rec
𝑡+1 =   𝑻 𝑹rec
𝒕  + β 𝐭𝑟 (4.9) 
Now, the model is biased and hence the trustor can get more updates from most 
trustworthy objects instead of uniformly as before. Here,  and β are decay parameters 
which bring the final scores in between zero and one.  
 Reputation Assessment 
Reputations are the opinions from objects other than friends in our proposed SIoT 
model. One such illustration is shown in Figure 4-5, where object vk  gives its opinion 
of vi through object vj. More clearly, this can be a situation where User 1 in Figure 4-2 
has a relation with D through C when the direct link from A-D is not present. 
vivj
vk
vn
 
Figure 4-5: An example of Reputation Flow. 
In graph theory, the power of the transition matrix determines the paths from non-
directly connected objects towards a particular object, having an edge count equal to 
the power of the matrix. Based on this property, we can find a number of indirectly 
connected relationships, which contribute to the final reputation score. However, as 
the networks grow, there can be a large number of such paths, which are not closely 
associated with the targeted object to provide valuable opinions in order to calculate a 
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final reputation value. Hence, the number of hops that one object can pass the 
reputation score towards another object is restricted to a pre-defined value. 
Furthermore, we observe through simulations that after three levels deep in the graph, 
the effect of the reputation score is negligible. Based on these grounds, reputation 
value from vk towards vi can be modeled as in (4.10). 
 
𝑅rep
𝑘→𝑖(𝑣𝑖) =  ∑𝑇𝑘𝑗𝑇𝑗𝑖
𝑁
𝑗=1
. 𝑅rep(𝑣𝑘) 
(4.10) 
where 𝑇𝑘𝑗 is the transition matrix from vk towards vj and 𝑇𝑗𝑖 is the transition matrix 
from vj towards vi.  However, according to graph theory, the product of the above two 
transition matrixes gives the equivalent of 2-length transition matrix as in (4.11). 
 
∑𝑇𝑘𝑗𝑇𝑗𝑖
𝑁
𝑗=1
= 𝑻2 (4.11) 
Substituting (4.11) in to (4.10), matrix representation of tier-2 reputation scores can be 
calculated as in (4.12). 
 𝑹𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝑘→𝑖(𝑣𝑖) =  𝑻
𝟐𝑹𝑟𝑒𝑝(𝑣𝑘) (4.13) 
Similarly for an n-length graph, 
 𝑹rep
𝑡+1 =  𝑻𝑛 𝑹rep
𝑡        n>1 (4.14) 
where n is the depth level and limited to three consecutive objects as in Figure 4-6, in 
order to reduce the computational overhead as well as due to their negligible effect.  
 
Figure 4-6. Depth level that Reputation scores are collected. 
 Aggregated Assessment 
Combining the two scenarios (Recommendation and Reputation), discussed in (4.9) 
and (4.14) the final algorithm, which aggregates recommendation and reputation 
scores is shown in (4.15). 
viLevel 1Level 2Level 3
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 𝑹RpR = 𝑹rec +  𝑹rep (4.15) 
where Rrec represents the recommendation scores from friends and Rrep denotes the 
reputation scores which had interactions with the target object in the past.  Again,  
and  are normalization factor which satisfies the condition +=1, in order to 
maintain the final RpR score of each object in between 0 and 1. 
1. function RpR* 
2. input 
3.  N   number of objects 
4.  T  transition matrix 
5.  U  inverse transition matrix 
6.    threshold value for good recommendations 
7.    decay factor of recommendations 
8.  β  decay factor of trustworthy roots 
9.     decay factor of  reputations 
10.  m  number of iterations 
11. output 
12.  tr  trustworthy roots 
13.  Rrec   recommendation scores of each object  
14.  Rrep  reputation scores of each object 
15.  RRpR  RpR trust scores 
16. begin 
17. //discover trustworthy objects 
18.           𝒕𝑟(⋯) 
19. //evaluate recommendation scores 
20.           𝑹rec
𝒕 = 𝒕𝒓 
21.           for i=1 to m do 
22.                     𝑹rec
𝑡+1 =   𝑻 𝑹rec
𝒕  + β 𝒕𝑟 
23.           return Rrec 
24. //evaluate reputation scores 
25.           𝑹rep
𝒕 =
𝟏
𝑵
 
26.           for i =1 to m do 
27.                     𝑹rep
𝑡+1 =  𝑻𝒏 𝑹𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝒕                    1 < 𝑛 < 4 
28.           return Rrep 
29. //joint RpR scores 
30.           return 𝑹RpR = 𝑹rec +  𝑹rep 
31. end 
Figure 4-7: The Algorithm that Calculates RpR Trust Scores.  
The function RpR, shown in Figure 4-7, computes the RpR trust scores for the model 
obtained for a SIoT environment in (4.15). The first step of the algorithm is to find the 
most trustworthy objects by calling the function tr (⋯). This will create a vector in 
which initial scores are positive only for most trustworthy objects where scores are 
greater than the threshold value requested by the context. In the second step, 
Recommendation scores are calculated in a recursive manner as in (4.9) where initial 
conditions are set as described by trust vector tr. Similarly, Reputation scores are 
calculated where opinions are collected from objects up to the third tier, i.e. 1<n<4. 
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Finally, the two scores are combined after normalizing with decay factors , β, , and 
. 
4.4. Experiments and Results 
In order to evaluate the model, we have conducted a simulation using MatLab and 
based on the illustration in Figure 4-2. The experiments are carried out on a PC which 
consists of 8 CPU cores (Intel Core i7-2600, 3.4GHz) and 8GB RAM. At the beginning 
of the experiment, a network of five objects created randomly using MatLab. Then the 
algorithms described in Figure 4-7 and Figure 4-10 are executed to find the RpR, PR 
and ID scores respectively. Once these scored are stored separately, the network is 
expended by adding five more objects randomly at a time until it reaches a hundred 
objects.  At each step RpR, PR and ID are calculated and stored for later analysis.  
However, we observed that the algorithm described in Figure 4-7, is capable of 
handling tens of thousands of nodes due to the simplicity of the calculation model just 
like in the PR method. The complexity of the model is constrained by the n-value, 
which determines how far the algorithm goes to collect the reputation values, and by 
limiting the number of recursive iterations to preserve an accuracy up to 10-5.  
With these adjustments, the algorithm converges quickly with only about six iterations 
as shown in Figure 4-8 compared to the PR algorithm. The horizontal axis of Figure 
4-8 represents the number of iterations and the vertical axis denotes the error between 
the predicted score and the current score.  
 
Figure 4-8: Convergence Rate of the Algorithm. 
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Figure 4-9: Distribution of RpR Scores. 
The RpR ranking scores obtained for the five object model is shown in Figure 4-9 to 
clarify the correctness of the algorithm. The area of the circles is proportional to the 
trustworthiness score of a particular object. It is obvious that “B” has gained a higher 
score compared to others as it does have many incoming and outgoing relationships 
with friendly neighbor objects. On the other hand, object “A” received the minimum 
score, as it only got one recommendation from “B” while it tried to reach three others. 
“C” and “D” have obtained a nearly equal rank, as both have two incoming 
recommendations and one outgoing link. 
1. function PR* 
2. input 
3.  N   number of objects 
4.  d   probability of random surfer 
5. Output  
6.   PR(N) PageRank matrix 
7. Begin 
8. //Let PR be an array of N elements 
9. for i=1 to N-1 do 
10.   PR[i]=1/N  
11. end 
12. Repeat 
13.   J=PR 
14.   for i=1 to N-1 do 
15. // Let Oj be the number of outgoing 
edges 
16.     PR[i]=(1-d)+ d.PR[j}/Oj 
17.   end 
18.   If PR-J<error 
19.     Return PR 
20. End 
1. function ID* 
2. input 
3.  N   number of objects 
4. Output  
5.   ID(N) Indegree matrix 
6. Begin 
7.   ID[i]= Number of inward edges 
8.   Return ID 
9. End 
Figure 4-10. Pseudocode algorithms of PR and indegree algorithms. 
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Another view of the same example is shown in Figure 4-11, where RpR scores in each 
individual object are compared with the PR model and with In Degree (ID). 
Pseudocode algorithms of PR and indegree models are shown in Figure 4-10. It shows 
that the RpR model is more sensitive to detect trustworthy or untrustworthy objects 
compared to others. As an example, when the trend is increasing, RpR assigns a 
reasonably high score for the most trustworthy objects. Similarly, when the trend is 
decreasing, RpR assigns a lower value compared to others, which makes the model 
more sensitive to dishonest behaviors as shown in Figure 4-12. It can be observed that 
RpR is always a good candidate for the detection of suspicious behavior in comparison 
to the PR model. In this experiment, objects, which have the lowest ID, have been 
taken as the dishonest objects. That is, after estimating their ID values, they are sorted 
according to their values in a descending order. Then, the first 20% of the objects are 
taken as trustworthy objects and the remaining 80% are considered as untrustworthy.  
 
Figure 4-11: Comparison of Distribution of Scores with five Objects. 
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Figure 4-12: Dishonest Object Detection. 
One important property of a good ranking system is that it must be unbiased in extreme 
conditions like when the network size is small or big. We implement this scenario in 
our simulation and it can be observed that neither PR nor ID algorithms were able to 
fulfill this with the growth in the number of objects. In this, we checked whether the 
algorithm is capable of detecting objects, which are in the best 20% of trust scores as 
shown in Figure 4-13. RpR always showed a consistent performance irrespective of 
the network size while PR performance was heavily degraded with the increase in the 
object count as PR/ID models are heavily dependent on opinions from old objects.  
 
Figure 4-13: Detection of top 20% of trustworthy Objects. 
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To observe this effect more clearly, we have calculated the Kendall correlation 
coefficient of both PR and RpR methods compared to ID, as it is the basis for both 
methods. According to Figure 4-14, the PR method always shows a higher correlation 
compared to RpR as the effect of inward relationships plays a more dominant role in 
the PR method to rank objects. That means the score generated by both PR and ID 
algorithms are heavily dependent on the number of incoming links without considering 
the credibility of the recommender. On the other hand, RpR is not dependent only on 
inward links but also recommendations from trustworthy objects, reputations from 
unfriendly objects and the ability to detect the least trustworthy objects.  
In the model described in Figure 4-2, we assumed that there are no hanging objects, 
which have only inward relationships, but no outgoing edges, in order to avoid 
accumulation of all the trust scores towards one object during the process of iteration. 
However, these types of objects should have good scores as several friends recommend 
them. Therefore, to be fair with hanging objects, we suggest replacing the column of 
the dangling object with equally distributed values. In this way, the importance of the 
object would be equally redistributed among the other objects at the beginning, instead 
of being lost and at the end of the iteration, the true value will be transported back to 
the object. Furthermore, the objects, which do not have any incoming links will be 
ignored from the index, as no object would prefer to get any service from these type 
of objects 
 
Figure 4-14: Kendall Correlation with ID. 
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4.5. Discussion 
The typical reputation models like the ones stated in Section 2.2.2. , often suffer from 
biased or discriminative recommendations. To avoid such malicious intentions, 
proposed approach identifies two types of reputations depending on trustors social 
proximity with its surrounding objects. The first category represents reputation 
received from friends (named as recommendations) who represent a more trustworthy 
cluster and the second category represent more generic reputations from all other 
objects who are away from the close circle. According to social IoT concept, friends 
tend to be more honest than foreign objects and hence more reliable feedback can be 
expected in contrast to typical reputation systems. Nevertheless, proposed model 
filters objects who provide an extremely high number of reputations towards others 
without having a good score for them self. This is particularly useful in e-commerce 
systems like eBay and Amazon [129] where sellers with malicious intentions try to 
improve the reputation of their services through fake reputations. Further, the proposed 
model is based on the PR algorithm and which in fact has proven to be a reliable 
solution to scalability issues when ranking millions of web pages. Hence, inarguably 
the proposed model is a prospective candidate to assess reputation in large networks 
where millions of objects interact with each other.   
4.6. Chapter summary 
In this chapter, we have proposed an algorithm called RpR to assess recommendations 
and reputations provided by the objects in a distributed SIoT environment. First, we 
have separated and identified the meanings of reputation and recommendations in 
SIoT and their importance when it comes to trust evaluation. Then, we have applied 
these concepts to the possible use case scenario and numerically assessed the 
trustworthiness of each object in the environment. After that, we formally examined 
the key properties like convergence, accuracy, and resilience against deceitful 
activities through a simulation. We observe that the proposed model provides a robust 
method to compute trust within a few iterations for thousands of objects accurately, 
especially with the downgrading feature for the untrustworthy objects over time. 
Finally, we demonstrated the effectiveness and performance of our algorithm over 
other well-known ranking systems like [38], [39]. 
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CHAPTER 5: KNOWLEDGE BASED TRUST 
EVALUATION MODEL 
5.1. Introduction 
Trust is a crucial fact that affects the appetite of an object to consume a particular 
service or product offered by another object. Typically, trust can be seen as a metric 
used to evaluate social actors in consideration of mutual benefits, coordination, and 
cooperation. Stakeholders continuously update their trust data on others in response to 
the variations of perceptions, generated by direct interactions and based on the 
opinions of others who are around (indirect observations). Often, this can be observed 
in our everyday life where trust decisions are made.  
In this chapter, we address the issue of understanding and evaluating knowledge that 
is an important TM in the trustworthiness evaluation process in social networks. First, 
we identify and define several TAs, which directly affect the knowledge acquisition of 
a particular interaction. Then, a numerical model is derived, which is built on many 
aspects such as object relationships, spatial and temporal properties of objects, and 
their behavioral history. Based on the outputs of this model, a final trust level is 
predicted using regression analysis. Finally, the effectiveness of our model is 
investigated through simulations. 
5.2. Knowledge based Trust Metrics 
The knowledge TM covers all aspects of direct trust evaluations, which provide a 
perception about a trustee before and during an interaction. To make this possible, it 
must provide relevant data to the trustor for its assessment. If a data feature can be 
represented using a quantitative measurement, then the result is a numerical value in a 
certain range. As an example, social relationships like co-location and co-work, 
credibility factors like cooperativeness, time-dependent features like the frequency and 
duration of interactions, and spatial distribution of relevant trustees compared to the 
trustor can be used as direct trust measurements. The TAs, which we evaluate are 
shown in Figure 5-1.   
The relationship TAs defines the mutual relationship between the trustor and a trustee. 
It is reasonable to assume that if two objects have a noble relationship between them, 
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a higher trustworthiness can be expected between them. As an example, if the trustor 
and the trustee are operated in close proximity such as looking for a parking space near 
a supermarket, then both benefit (e.g. getting a vacant, close, easily navigable parking 
space) from their relationship based on location similarity that we have identified as 
co-location TA. Likewise, if the two objects are in a working relationship like car 
sharing in which one needs to provide a service and other needs to get the service, both 
can support each other via their co-work association.  
 
Figure 5-1: Composition of Knowledge TM based on TAs. 
Furthermore, it is important to maintain knowledge about the consistency of 
trustworthy service provisioning. We discuss properties related to this issue under 
credibility. The cooperativeness under credibility represents the level of social 
cooperation from the trustee to the trustor. The higher cooperativeness means a higher 
trust level in an IoT ecosystem. A user can evaluate the cooperativeness of others based 
on social ties and select socially cooperative users. Additionally, we have introduced 
a rewarding system in order to track the history of misbehavior situations or unsuitable 
reactions originated by the trustee. Rewarding a TA can be used to either encourage or 
discourage further interactions with a particular trustee based on its past character.  
To capture the significance of time-related information to trustworthiness evaluation, 
TAs like the frequency and duration of the interactions can be used. It is logical to 
assume that the higher the frequency and duration of interactions, the more trust is 
built up among the associating objects. On the contrary, the shorter time spent on each 
KNOWLEDGE
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Co-Location Co-Work
CREDIBILITY
Cooperativeness Rewards
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69 
 
other, the less knowledge is gathered on each other’s actions and capabilities. As an 
example, in whitewashing attacks, a dishonest object can vanish for some time and 
rejoin the service in order to clear its reputation. However, if a trustor can keep a record 
of the consistency of the interested trustees then it can avoid such situations. 
Moreover, in an IoT ecosystem, service provisioning (discover, manage and terminate) 
is based on its social relationships without solely depending on the underlying system 
level information. Therefore, it is vital to identify TAs, which determine the social 
proximity of the objects in collaboration. In this aspect, we identify three properties 
under spatial TAs in Figure 5-1 as mutuality, centrality, and CoI as governing features 
that define the social positioning of a trustee. Mutuality measures the degree of profile 
similarity between the trustee and trustor in resemblance to what is used in social 
networking. The community-interest represents whether the trustor and the trustee 
have a close relationship in terms of social communities, groups, and capabilities. Two 
objects with a high degree of community-interest have more opportunities for 
interacting with each other, and this can result in a higher trust level. Centrality 
measures the importance of a trustee among other objects with respect to a particular 
task and context. 
5.3. Evaluation of Knowledge Based Trust  
Even though an IoT environment produces a large amount of data, it is questionable 
how much of it can be directly used for the trustworthy evaluation process. Therefore, 
it is vital to extract trust features by scanning social and system level interaction logs 
and store them in a DR for further analysis. Hence, a numerical model that can extract 
basic features discussed in Section 5.2 is addressed here.  
We define the assessment of knowledge (K) towards an object j by an object i at time 
t as Kxij(t), where x represents one of the features: Co-location relationship (CLR), Co-
work relationship (CWR), Mutuality and Centrality (MC), Cooperativeness-
Frequency-Duration (CFD), and Reward. Note that a trust assessment is always 
between two or more objects. 
 Co-Location Relationship (CLR) 
An IoT ecosystem enables users to share their resources, ideas, situations, and services 
with nearby devices. In such a situation, if both the trustor and the trustee are in close 
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proximity and they have subscribed to a DR in the platform, the trustor can 
conveniently get the required information from the selected trustee who is trustworthy 
in terms of the physical location compared to other objects far away from the scenario. 
However, in an IoT model, objects are always in relationship with their owner (Owner 
Object Relationship-OOR) and hence the static or dynamic nature of the OOR always 
affects the CLR [2]. In order to avoid objects leaving the physical location, a decision 
boundary based on the distance from the trustor (e.g. based on GPS data) and the time 
spent within this decision boundary are taken into consideration as shown in Figure 
5-2. Then the objects, which are within this distance boundary and exceed the 
minimum time threshold inside the region, are selected as prospective candidates for 
a trustee. Once the candidates are filtered, their CL relationship with the trustor can be 
calculated as in (5.1).  
 
𝐾𝑖𝑗
CLR  (𝑡) =
1
𝐝𝐢𝐬𝐭(𝑖, 𝑗)
GiGj
‖Gi‖‖Gj‖
  (5.1) 
Here, g𝑖  and g𝑗 are the GPS coordinates of the trustor i and trustee j, respectively. The 
symbol “‖.‖” defines the norm of an element. The second term GiGj/‖Gi‖‖Gj‖ in the 
equation (5.1) is the cosine similarity between the two objects and it is normalized by 
the geo distance factor 𝐝𝐢𝐬𝐭(𝑖, 𝑗) which can be calculated as in [130]. The application 
of the geo distance factor is important here as it provides a value with respect to an 
actual surface distance of the earth in contrast to a linear distance. 
 Co-Work Relationship (CWR) 
The objects that are collaborating in common IoT applications can be characterized as 
CWR. In such a situation, more focus would be on a working relationship in a 
Dist(pi,pj)
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Figure 5-2: Decision Boundary for Objects in Close Proximity. 
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particular service domain rather than physical proximity. To measure CWR as a 
numerical value, we compare the multicast interactions between a trustor and a trustee, 
as calculated below: 
 
𝐾𝑖𝑗
CWR (𝑡) =
|𝐜𝑖𝑗
MI|
|𝐜𝑗
MI|
  (5.2) 
where cij
MI is the vector of multicast interactions (MI) between trustor i  and trustee j, 
and cj
MI is the vector of MI originated at j. The symbol “|. |” represents the determinant 
of a vector. KCWRij(t) represents a relative measurement of shared multicast messages 
to total messages originated at the trustee.  
 Cooperativeness, Frequency, and Duration (CFD) 
In a collaborative environment, it is important that every object fulfill its commitment 
to improving the level of the outcome of the whole service provision process. As an 
example, consider a malicious agent that provides fake ratings for a specific service. 
In this case, it is obvious that this agent deliberately tries to manipulate the genuineness 
of the information on the service and does not have any intention to use it. Therefore, 
the cooperativeness TA is vital to maintaining the above-mentioned content stability 
and thereby to provide a trustworthy service to the trustor upon its request. 
Furthermore, it can be anticipated that the more frequent and longer the interactions 
among objects, the more collaboration from each party can be expected. Based on this, 
a numerical model for cooperativeness, frequency, and duration is derived. 
Let us consider a set of interactions, c1, c2... cn over some period in which the trustor 
is interested. A trust level between trustor i and trustee j is calculated below: 
 
𝐾𝑖𝑗
CFD (𝑡) = ∑
c𝑚 
t𝑚
𝐸(𝑐𝑚)
𝑛
𝑚=1
  (5.3) 
Here, n is the number of interactions, indicating how frequently they interact with each 
other. For the mth successful interaction, c𝑚 is the length of an interaction between the 
trustor and the trustee, tm is the total interaction length by the trustee. The factor cm/tm 
assesses the duration property, in which the trustee interacts with the trustor, relative 
to the total activity time of the trustee. 𝐸(c𝑚) is the binary entropy function which 
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measures the balance in the interaction or the cooperativeness which can be calculated 
as follows [51]:  
 𝐸(c𝑚) = −𝑝 log 𝑝 − (1 − 𝑝)log (1 − 𝑝)  (5.4) 
where p is the fraction of the interactions between the trustor and the trustee. E(cm) 
follows a binary distribution as stated in [131]. It is obvious that the maximum entropy 
(i.e. 𝐸(c𝑚)=1) is reachable only when p=0.5 that is 50% contribution from each party.  
 Reward System (RS) 
An essential component of any service provisioning system needs to have a reward 
and punishing mechanism or a feedback model in order to assess the historical service 
experiences between a trustor and a trustee. It is always critical to maintaining the 
social relationships at the maximum trustworthy level and hence we use the 
exponential downgrading formula shown in equation (5.5) for this purpose.  
 
𝐾𝑖𝑗
RS(𝑡) =
‖𝑛‖ − ‖𝑛p‖
‖𝑛‖
𝑒
(−
‖𝑛p‖
‖𝑛‖
)
 (5.5) 
Here, n is the total number of interactions that have taken place during a period t, 
and np is the total number of unsuccessful or suspicious interactions. To punish 
misbehavior situations more severely, the slope of the distribution is increased by a 
factor of 𝑛p, compared to the standard exponential distribution. Hence, a higher 
number of malicious interactions will result in a lower reward value. 
 Mutuality and Centrality (MC) 
In an IoT ecosystem, service discovery and provisioning largely depend on the social 
relationship among the participating objects. In this regard, the mutuality and the 
centrality TAs define the location of a trustee with respect to a trustor in a social world. 
On the other hand, it is very intuitive to assume that a higher number of mutual objects 
imply a higher similarity between their social profiles. However, mutuality alone 
cannot be used as a TA due to the number of mutual friends being proportional to the 
number of friends of each individual object. That is, an object with a higher number 
of friends gets an additional advantage compared to an object that has recently joined 
the network but has higher trustworthiness. In order to avoid such circumstances, a 
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relative measurement of mutuality compared to the total number of friends is 
considered. If Mij represents the set of common friends between i and j, and Ni is the 
set of trustee’s friends, then the centrality property can be calculated as below:  
 
𝐾𝑖𝑗
MC(𝑡) =
|𝑀𝑖𝑗|
|𝑁𝑖|
 (5.6) 
 Community of Interest (CoI) 
Objects in an IoT environment usually collaborate with at least one community. As an 
example, a person is registered as a frequent customer of a car sharing community 
while being a member of several other communities like online markets, social 
networking groups, etc. If another person is also a member of the car-sharing 
community, this shows the resemblance between both persons’ interests. Similarly, if 
the trustor and the trustee share common interest groups, that is an indication of the 
degree of the common interest or similar capabilities of the trustee compared to the 
trustor. Mathematically, let us define Mij
coi as the set of communities where both the 
trustor and the trustee are involved in, and Nij
coi
 as the set of communities with each 
including the trustee as a member. Please note that both the trustor and the trustee can 
be a member of several communities and hence the trust level of the trustee based on 
CoI is calculated in (5.7). 
 
𝐾𝑖𝑗
CoI(𝑡) =
|𝑀𝑖𝑗
CoI|
|𝑁𝑖
CoI|
 (5.8) 
 Assessing Final Trust Value 
After modeling the TAs using equations (5.1), (5.2), (5.3), (5.4), (5.5), (5.6), and (5.8), 
the next step is to calculate the final trust value of the trustee. A well-known approach 
is to combine each TA through a linear equation with weighting factors as shown in 
(5.8). 
𝐾𝑖𝑗(𝑡) = 𝐾𝑖𝑗
CLR(𝑡) + β𝐾𝑖𝑗
CWR(𝑡) + 𝐾𝑖𝑗
CFD(𝑡) +  ε𝐾𝑖𝑗
RS(𝑡) + 𝐾𝑖𝑗
MC(𝑡) + 𝐾𝑖𝑗
CoI(𝑡) (5.9) 
However, there are many drawbacks in this approach, including (i) lack of information 
and an infinite number of possibilities when it comes to estimating a weighting factor, 
(ii) unsuitability of a threshold based system to detect the trustworthiness of a 
74 
 
particular trustee, and (iii) inability to identify which TA has the most influence on 
trust in a particular context. Thus, we propose the Multiple Regression (MR) based 
methods to evaluate the future trust level based on knowledge as in equation 
(5.10)[132].  
 
𝐾𝑖𝑗(𝑡) =  𝑏0 +∑𝑏𝑙𝐾𝑖𝑗(𝑡) +  𝜖
𝑛
𝑙=1
(𝑡) (5.10) 
where Kij(t) is the series under investigation, and n is the order (length) of the model 
and b0 is the estimated constant and bi is the prediction coefficient of the i
th independent 
variable (attribute).  (t) is the error term and ignored for the simplicity in the 
simulation model which gives an estimated model.  
Based on the above discussion, the overall principle of the assessment of the 
knowledge based trust metric is shown in Figure 5-3. It specifies three major tasks: (i) 
identify set of TAs that can be used to evaluate trustees’ trustworthiness; (ii) model 
each of the TA based on the available data; and (iii) an aggregation mechanism to 
combine all the TAs to derive numerical value for knowledge based TM.   
 
Figure 5-3. Overall principle of the assessment of the knowledge. 
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5.4. Experiments and Results 
 Experiment Setup 
To evaluate our model, we would need traces of many objects. However, we find they 
are not publicly available for SIoT at least at the time of preparing this research. Hence, 
we have used traces taken at the SIGCOMM-2009 conference which is available in 
CRAWDAD [133], [134]. These traces contain the information on device proximity, 
activity logs, friendship information, interested groups, application level message logs, 
and data layer transmission logs which are acquired through the MobiClique mobile 
app as shown in Figure 5-4 [133]. We map the information to match with the IoT 
concepts described in [9]. In other words, we define a set of features, CWR, CFD, RS, 
MC, and CoI, related to IoT based on raw data found in the data set. Therefore, our 
experiment can be repeated with any real world IoT data set for further experiments 
without any ambiguity. This leads to the parameter settings and scenario of our 
simulation, as detailed in Table 5-1. Among 76 nodes, each pair of them (Trustor and 
Trustee) with at least a single interaction between them are considered as objects to 
match with the IoT concepts.  
 
Figure 5-4. System architectures of the experiment. 
Table 5-1: Parameters of the data set. 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
Nodes 76 Interactions 18226 
Objects 5776 Communities 711 
Messages 899 Message Type (UC/MC/BC) 266/57/576 
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 Simulation Results 
In this section, we present the simulation performance of our model discussed in 
Section 5.3. The simulation complexity is based on the number of interactions among 
objects and the number of nodes. For our model, around 18,000 interactions among 
5,776 object pairs are used. The results based on the numerical models are shown in 
Figure 5-5 and Figure 5-6. Distribution of Trustworthiness Relative to a Specific 
Object.. The numerical result obtained for Kij
CLR using Equation (5.1) is shown in 
Figure 5-5(a). The X-axis shows the Trustor (1st number) – Trustee (2nd number) pairs 
and Y-axis shows how the trust level changes based on the CLR. As the data set is 
based on the conference location, the CLR value is quite similar in each object pair as 
they are created in close proximity. Consequently, Figure 5-5(b) shows the effect of 
CWR which is based on the MC conversations analogy to data layer multicast 
messages. It can be observed that significantly fewer pairs are willing to create co-
work relationships among them.  
Figure 5-5(c) shows how the trust changes with cooperativeness among objects and 
also the frequency and duration of their conversations. It is visible that cooperativeness 
is distributed in the middle of the graph as often RF communication is limited to 
asymmetric as well as the short duration of message exchanges. Similarly, we have 
evaluated the trust level based on CoI and the centrality of the trustee object for the 
trustor as shown in Figure 5-5(d) and Figure 5-5(e). However, Figure 5-5(f) shows that 
most of the penalty coefficients are distributed at the low end of the graph i.e. low level 
of trustworthiness. This is mainly due to the unsuccessful interactions or misbehaviors 
occurring in the past conversations.    
Similarly, Figure 5-6 shows the distribution of trustworthiness for each object 
(Trustees) with respect to one specific object (Trustor). For example, let us consider 
Figure 5-6 (d) in which trust variation with respect to object “45”  is analyzed. This 
figure clearly shows the interpretation of the trustor’s view on other adjacent objects 
with respect to the features we have discussed in Section 5.3. As an example, trustee 
object “34” shows high CLR with the trustor (“45”) compared to other features while 
MC, CFD, and Reward is around 0.4, 0.15 and 0.16 respectively. Therefore, it is 
possible that the trustor will engage in location-based services with the trustee in future 
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interactions but limit its interactions related to collaborative services, as the MC and 
CFD values are low. 
As a final part of our numerical model, we have performed a multiple regression 
analysis in order to predict future trust levels based on the values of current attributes 
as an alternative to simple weighted summation. To show the result clearly, the impact 
of penalty (or the reward) and centrality on trust is shown in Figure 5-7. Based on this, 
the trustor can predict what would be the next possible success rate for specific values 
of attributes, or the values, which must be satisfied to achieve a certain level of trust 
via direct observations. 
5.5. Discussion  
In contrast to the literature work discussed in Section 2.2.3. , this chapter proposes 
three main contributions, (i) a rational way to identify TAs which represent both social 
and non-social domain of an environment; (ii) a numerical way to model the TAs for 
trust evaluation; and (iii) feasibility of using a non-linear trust aggregation technique 
compared to linear summation. The first contribution basically is a leap forward for 
the existing systems in which both dependable and social properties are considered 
together to model knowledge TM. For example existing work like [77], [106], [107], 
[108], [109], [110], [81], [111] are mostly concentrated to represent knowledge based 
trust on dependable properties in which subjective nature of trust is completely 
ignored. On the other hand, research like [112], [113], [38], [39], [40] propose 
solutions which are specific to particular environments like p2p, MANET, WSN, etc 
ignoring the social aspect of trust as in SIoT. However, the proposed research in this 
section, consider subjective, social and dependable aspects of trust in the process of 
knowledge based trust modeling which in fact provide a more holistic view about the 
situation in the decision-making process.  
On the other hand, there is some work in the literature which propose a numerical 
approach to model certain TAs as in [66], [77], and [135]. However, the experiments 
in these work quite biased towards assessing non-social properties that are even with 
synthesized data sets. On the contrary, the proposed numerical models are capable of 
assessing social trust aspects of knowledge and it shows promising performance 
against detecting malicious objects in a real-world environment in contrast to 
synthesized data. Further, the thesis proposes multiple regression based trust 
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aggregation algorithm in place of existing methods like [65], [88], [89], [90] in which 
nonlinear nature of trust aggregation is ignored. Additionality to the process of 
aggregation, such method enables the decision-making system to predict future trust 
values based on the current knowledge. 
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(a) CLR (b) CWR (c) CFD 
   
(d) CoI (e) MC (f) RS 
 
Figure 5-5: Impact of TAs on Knowledge TM. 
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(a) Relative to Object “9” (b) Relative to Object “25” (c) Relative to Object “34” 
   
(d) Relative to Object “45” (e) Relative to Object “61” (f) Relative to Object “74” 
Figure 5-6. Distribution of Trustworthiness Relative to a Specific Object. 
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Figure 5-7: Prediction of Trust using MR. 
5.6. Chapter summary 
This chapter focused on evaluating “knowledge” which is a vital TM in trust 
assessment in SIoT. First, this work identifies several TAs after careful consideration, 
which directly affects the knowledge TM. Then, based on the SIoT concepts we 
present a numerical approach to estimate individual TAs. To demonstrate the 
usefulness of our model, we have considered a real-world scenario and analyzed the 
impact of each parameter on knowledge in a simulation environment. Finally, we 
propose a prediction technique in order to find future values of knowledge based on 
the multiple regression method that is an effective alternative to a weighted summation 
of attributes. 
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CHAPTER 6: MACHINE LEARNING BASED TRUST 
EVALUATION MODEL 
6.1. Introduction 
As we described in Chapter 3, there is a number of trust modeling techniques that can 
be observed in the literature. However, the influence of a particular TA on trust is often 
determined by a weighting factor, but the assessment of a proper weight is a complex 
task due to the fact that trust is a varying quantity which depends on many factors, e.g. 
expectations of a trustor, time and context. Thus, schemes that are more intelligent are 
required to find these weighting factors and a threshold that defines a trustworthy 
boundary.  
Even though complex characteristics of trust make it challenging for traditional 
analysis, but ideal for the application of artificial intelligence, ML techniques, and big 
data analytics. The objective of AI for trust is to investigate the very large volumes of 
data produced by various components in the IoT ecosystem and transform this data 
into meaningful outputs such as trust-based decision making, fault detection, service 
composition and generate ultimate wisdom.  
 
Figure 6-1: Steps for Trust evaluation based on ML techniques. 
A generic process of trust assessment using ML techniques is shown in Figure 6-1. 
The overall process consists of five-sub process, namely, data collection, feature 
extraction, model training, trust prediction, and trust network buildup. The Data 
Collection module retrieves necessary data records from the IoT ecosystem and the 
Feature Extraction module generates a trust feature vector for each record. They serve 
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as the data preparation and preprocessing components of the model. Then, the Training 
module trains the classification model and the Trust Prediction module infers the trust 
level among users based on the training model. The overall process until this point is 
illustrated in Figure 6-2. Finally, the Trust Network buildup module filters distrustful 
relationships and creates a trustworthy network based on the estimated trust values of 
each object which is beyond the scope of this research.  
 
Figure 6-2. Principle of the machine learning based trust model 
6.2. Machine Learning Based Trust Model 
To overcome the weakness of the TA aggregation and make the trust assessment 
mechanism autonomous, we propose an ML based model to analyze the TAs extracted 
in Chapter 5 and predict the trustworthiness of prospective transactions based on a 
trained model. In order to achieve this, we first use an unsupervised learning algorithm 
to identify two different clusters or labels, namely trustworthy and untrustworthy. The 
main reason to use an unsupervised learning method over a supervised method is due 
to the unavailability of a labeled training set based on trustworthiness relationships.  
Then a multi-class classification technique such as SVM is used to train the ML model 
in order to identify the best threshold level that separates trustworthy interactions from 
others. In this chapter, our main objective is to differentiate malicious interactions from 
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trustworthy interactions with maximum boundary separation and minimum outliers 
rather than classification itself. Therefore, it is not necessary to go for other algorithms 
like Random Forest, especially with a low dimensional dataset compared to its sample 
size used in this work. However, depending on the data set, dimensionality, a number 
of classifications required and noise levels of the samples, a model comparison can be 
performed to find out the best possible algorithm for each individual case. A well-
trained model like this can differentiate an incoming interaction between two or more 
objects much more efficiently than linear weighting methods [77], [136] and is much 
more beneficial in the decision-making process. 
Let us define the number of features considered in the model as n and the length of the 
training set as m. We use the features defined in Chapter 5, i.e. CWR, CFD, RS, MC, 
and CoI to train our model. They are expressed as a feature matrix X(i)(j) where i denotes 
the ith training sample and j signifies the jth feature among the n features. Moreover, 
the label of each training sample i is denoted by y(i). However, training labels are not 
readily available and a method for labeling will be discussed in Section 6.2.1.  This 
allows us to identify each training set as (X(i)(j), y
(i)) for i=1,2,…,m and j=1,2,…,n. In 
the following subsections, we break down our main algorithm into two parts and 
explain it separately in Section 6.2.1, and 6.2.2. respectively. 
 Clustering and Labelling 
In this section, we develop an algorithm based on the K-means clustering technique, 
which is specified in detail in Algorithm 6-1, in order to group interactions based on 
the aforementioned features and thereby label each interaction as trustworthy or 
untrustworthy [137]. As our main objective is to differentiate malicious interactions 
from trustworthy interactions with maximum boundary separation and minimum 
outliers, the model comparison is omitted here. However, depending on the data set, 
dimensionality, number of classifications required and noise levels of the samples, a 
model comparison can be performed to find out the best possible algorithm for each 
individual case.  
The K-means algorithm needs to define two initial conditions: number of clusters (k) and initial 
centroid positions () that each interaction is assigned to. As there is no way to find out these values at 
the beginning of the algorithm, we randomly assign initial centroid locations for a range of cluster 
sizes, e.g. from k=1 to k=5. After that, steps 4-9 in Algorithm 6-1Algorithm 6-1. Data Clustering and 
Labelling. 
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 are executed until the cluster points “” are not changing any further (i.e. until the 
convergence). Then, the Elbow method is used to find out the optimum cluster size 
which gives the lowest value for the K-mean cost function J(c,) where c is the index 
of a cluster centroid and  is the coordinates of cluster centroids with the dimension 
of k [137].  
Note that initial inputs to the algorithm were normalized between [0, 1] in which “0” 
represents untrustworthy and “1” represents trustworthy. Hence, it is logical to label 
points close to “0” as untrustworthy and vice versa after the cauterization step. 
Therefore, after the step 13 of the algorithm, the clusters close to the origin (i.e. all 
zero point) of the N-dimensional space are marked as “0” or untrustworthy and the 
cluster away from the origin is identified as a trustworthy region. To check the 
influence of all n features at once, the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) algorithm 
based on Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) is applied to reduce the N dimensions 
to two dimensions for visualization purposes as in Algorithm 6-2, before applying 
Algorithm 6-1[138]. Even though it is possible to extend Algorithm 6-1 for n features 
with regularization, we observe that the PCA method is more efficient with respect to 
the computational complexity of unsupervised learning with regularization. 
1. Input: X       Output: y 
2. Initialize cluster centroids 1, 2,… ,k n 
3. for k=1 to 5 do 
4.     Repeat until convergence: { 
5.         for i=1 to m do 
6.             c(i):=arg minj||X(i)- k||2 
7.             k := Average of points assigned to cluster k 
8.         end for 
9.     }  
10.     J(k)(c,):=arg mink J(c,) 
11. end for 
12. Optimum k  Elbow method  plot J(k) vs k  
13. for i=1 to m do 
14.     if c(i) close to (0,0) 
15.         y(i) = 0 
16.     elseif 
17.         y(i) = 1 
18.     end if 
Algorithm 6-1. Data Clustering and Labelling. 
1. Compute dot product matrix  :  =XTX 
2. Compute eigenvectors   : [U,S,V]=SVD(XTX) 
3. Specify the required dimension ,d : Ud=[u1,…ud] 
4. Compute d(=2) features  : Z= UdTX      
Algorithm 6-2. Principal Component Analysis. 
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The first step of the PCA algorithm is to calculate the covariance matrix  that has the 
dimension of n x n. In step two, principal components U and V are calculated using 
the SVD function, each having the same dimension as  [138]. As our intention here 
is to reduce the dimensions from five to two, dimensions (d) of the principal matrix U 
is set to two. Finally, step four calculates the two-dimensional feature vector Z 
corresponding to the five-dimension vector X.  
 Classification Model 
Having obtained the completed data set (X(i)(j), y
(i)) via Algorithm 6-1, the next step is 
to train an algorithm based on an SVM technique which can identify the nonlinear 
boundaries of trustworthy and untrustworthy interactions. In order to obtain the 
maximum accuracy of the learning algorithm, the training set is divided into two parts 
in such a way that the training set occupies 80% of the data and 20% for the cross-
validation data set which is denoted as (X(i)val, y
(i)
val) for i=1,2,…, ⌊0.2*m⌋ and 
j=1,2,…,n. This is important to avoid overfitting data through the regularization 
parameter and variance.  
In Algorithm 6-3, we use a Radial Basis Function Kernel (RBFK) due to the smaller 
number of features (n) compared to the training set samples (m) as the authors in [139] 
have claimed. Furthermore, in order to optimize the computational resources, the 
LIBSVM library is used to run the RBFK kernel [140]. First, we run the RBFK kernel 
over multiple instances of regularization parameters and variances in order to find 
optimum parameters for the learning algorithm as shown in steps 4-7 in Algorithm 6-3. 
As an example, both c (regularization parameter) and  (variance) are varied as a 
geometric series (e.g. 0.01, 0.03, 0.09… 30) to save the time and computational 
resources. Then the parameters that give the minimum error in the prediction step are 
chosen as the optimum factors for the SVM model. It is essential to improve the 
accuracy of the final ML model and suppress any noise generated by the previous 
clustering algorithm. Hence, we use regularization techniques to avoid such issues 
during the training process in Algorithm 6-3.  
After estimating best parameters for c and , the algorithm is trained for all the training 
data samples using Algorithm 6-3 and model parameters are recorded to estimate 
future trust values based on the incoming feature statistics. The function svmtrain is 
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defined in the LIBSVM library (MatLab environment) and calculates the decision 
boundaries based on the RBFK kernel as per the SVM technique. Similar to Algorithm 
6-1, first we consider two trust features at a time and investigate the trust boundaries. 
After that, features derived through the PCA algorithm are considered to investigate 
the effect of all five features on the trust boundaries.  
1. Input: X, y, Xval, yval 
2. Output: Weights and Decision boundary 
3. //Find best parameters for c and  
4. for c, =0.01 (multiple of 3) 30 do 
5.     model=svmtrain(y,X,RBFK,c, ) 
6.     prediction=svmpredict(yval, Xval ,model) 
7.     error [c, ]= predictions ≠ yval 
8. end for 
9. Choose c,   minimum [error] 
10. [weights, accuracy, decision values]= svmtrain(y,X,RBFK,c, ) 
Algorithm 6-3. Classification Model. 
6.3. Experiments and Results 
 Simulation Setup 
For simulation, we use the same feature set which is already modeled in Section 5.3. 
After obtaining the trust feature vector Xj for each node pair, they are organized as 
shown in (6.1) to generate the m training samples. We have deliberately omitted the 
results from CLR as the data set itself was obtained when all objects were within very 
close proximity and it is not meaningful to test location-based trust in this scenario. 
The dimension of the training sample matrix is in the order of m×n, where m=5776 
(node pairs) and n=5. The notation [.]T is used to denote the transposition of a vector 
and has the dimension of m×1. Note that feature normalization is not required here as 
each feature value is in the range of 0 and 1.   
[𝑿]𝑚×𝑛 = [
⋮
[𝐶𝑊𝑅]T
⋮
⋮
[𝐶𝐹𝐷]T
⋮
⋮
[𝑅𝑆]T
⋮
⋮
[𝑀𝐶]T
⋮
⋮
[𝐶𝑜𝐼]T 
⋮
] (6.1) 
For the multiclass calcification problem, 4620 samples (i.e. 80% of the total samples) 
are chosen as the training set, and 1156 samples (i.e. around 20% of the total data set) 
are used as cross-validation samples to avoid the data-overfitting problem.  For both 
ML experiments, two features out of five are selected at a time for the sake of 
demonstration purposes, as it is not feasible to show a five-dimension vector. 
However, it is critical to analyze five features at the same time and evaluate their 
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influence on the final trust value. Therefore, we then consider all the five features 
together and generate numerical results. However, to demonstrate the results, the PCA 
method is used to reduce the dimensions from five to two and generate the graphical 
results [141]. Note that PCA not only simplifies the visualization but also the algorithm 
complexity that makes our model more practical in the case of a large number of 
features even though we use around five dimensions in this research to prove the 
effectiveness of our model in trust evaluation. Here, feature normalization is used to 
bring the new data samples, obtained through PCA, into the range of zero and one.  
 Algorithm I: Clustering and Labelling 
With the successful abstraction of the trust features, the next step is to investigate how 
to combine each of them to generate a final trust value. To filter out most trustworthy 
interactions from untrustworthy interactions, the algorithm explained in Algorithm 
6-1. Data Clustering and Labelling. 
 is applied and the results obtained are shown in Figure 6-3. In order to determine the 
optimum number of clusters, the Elbow method is used as shown in Figure 6-4. In 
certain feature combinations, the algorithm is capable of categorizing interactions into 
three groups: trustworthy, neutral, and untrustworthy. Instances, where the Elbow 
method gives K=3 represent such situations. The results clearly show the boundaries 
of separation from the untrustworthy interactions as marked in Figure 6-3.   
As an example, let us consider Figure 6-3(a) which shows the distribution of trust 
values compared to the centrality and community interest. It can be observed that the 
region above MC=0.6 and CoI=0.6 is the trustworthy region with respect to these two 
features. Similarly, Figure 6-3(b) to Figure 6-3(g) show a clear boundary between the 
trustworthy and untrustworthy regions. However, Figure 6-3(h) and Figure 6-3(i) show 
slightly different results compared to others. In both figures, the trustworthiness 
boundaries are learned with one common feature: the reputation. Hence, it is noticeable 
that the algorithm finds a lower trust value when the reputation value is low, even with 
higher trustworthiness values for CFD or CWR. This is one of the interesting results 
as reputation is one of the critical factors when it comes to the trustworthiness 
evaluation process.  
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Note that we first run the algorithm pairwise to generate visual results and then 
combine all five features to find out the trustworthy region as shown in Figure 6-3(j) 
where PCA is used to reduce the feature dimensions from 5D to 2D for visualization 
purposes. To bring the new dimensions into the range of 0 and 1, feature normalization 
is implemented. It can be clearly observed that values around 0.5 on the 1st dimension 
and values around 0.7 on the 2nd dimension show the boundary between trustworthy 
and untrustworthy interactions. 
  
(a) MC and CoI (b) MC and CFD 
  
(c) MC and RS (d) CoI and CFD 
  
(e) CoI and CWR (f) CoI and RS 
  
(g) CFD and CWR (h) CFD and RS 
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(i) CWR and RS (j) Features obtained via PCA 
Figure 6-3: K-means clustering on different pairs of features 
 
(a) k=2 
 
(b) k=3 
Figure 6-4: Elbow method: To decide the optimum number of clusters-k. 
 Algorithm II: Classification Model 
Having investigated which interactions belong to the trustworthy region, we have used 
this information to label the data set. As an example, let us consider the same case in 
Figure 6-3(a). The points around the cluster centroid of the untrustworthy region are 
labeled as untrustworthy or “0” in the label vector “y”, whereas the points outside the 
untrustworthy centroid are labeled as trustworthy or “1”.  
Then, with the labeled data, we train a model that can clearly identify whether 
incoming interactions are trustworthy. To estimate the optimum boundary, it is 
important to calculate the best regularization parameters “C” and “gamma” for each 
scenario mentioned above to avoid the data overfitting. For that, we have used part of 
the training samples as a cross-validation set and the results obtained via the trained 
model are shown in Figure 6-5, which clearly illustrates the decision boundary 
between the trustworthy and untrustworthy regions.  
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Furthermore, Figure 6-5(j) shows the result after applying the dimensionality reduction 
for all five features. For instance, let us consider Figure 6-5(a) in which the CoI and 
MC are in consideration. Now it is a matter of applying this model to the new data 
stream to distinguish which interactions fall into the trustworthy region and vice versa 
without any weight or threshold calculation. This not only reduces the calculation 
complexity and redundant work but also saves processing time.  
  
(a) MC and CoI (b) MC and CFD 
  
(c) MC and RS (d) CoI and CFD 
  
(e) CoI and CWR (f) CoI and RS 
  
(g) CFD and CWR (h) CFD and RS 
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(i) CWR and RS (j) Features obtained via PCA 
Figure 6-5: Application of Algorithm II on different pairs of features. 
 Performance Analysis 
With these proven results, it is evident now that the system does not need to rely on 
conventional weighting factors and thresholds to decide the region of trustworthiness. 
Furthermore, the reduced complexity of the algorithms makes the system more 
lightweight while producing efficient results. However, the main assumption of this 
research is the centralized nature of the trust management platform. Particularly, we 
assume that every object under consideration is subscribed to a centralized database 
for publishing its data so that the trust management platform can access the data, train 
a model, and publish the trust values back into the data repository, which can be used 
by trustors. However, with the availability of powerful data centers, this issue of 
storing and computing can be solved without much difficulty to allow end devices to 
work efficiently without heavy burdens.  
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method over the most common 
methods like the linear aggregation of TAs, a confusion matrix method is considered. 
Classification accuracy often gives misleading results and hides the details needed to 
diagnose the performance of the model especially when the number of observations in 
each class varies as in the dataset. On the other hand, the confusion matrix shows at 
which point the algorithm makes errors and importantly the types of errors made, 
which is critical for the investigation of algorithm applicability over expected results.  
As a comparison, we consider the linear algorithms described in [77] and [136] and a 
nonlinear algorithm based on multiple regression described in Chapter 5. The obtained 
results are shown in Table 6-1. In the matrix, trustworthiness is considered as true 
positive conditions and untrustworthiness as true negative conditions. Furthermore, 
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predicted trustworthiness and untrustworthiness metrics are considered as predicted 
positive conditions and predicted negative conditions respectively. Based on the 
results from Table 6-1, parameters that define the performance of the two algorithms 
are shown in Table 6-2.  
In classification, Recall gives an important insight about classification performance 
relative to the number of wrong predictions. According to results, the proposed 
algorithm shows 100% Recall or True Positive Rate (TPR) compared to 98.13% by 
the linear methods. As the data set is relatively small, a 1.87% performance 
improvement in the proposed algorithm will be very critical in real-world application 
deployment where billions of transactions happen in each second. This is again 
confirmed by the false negative rate (FNR) where the proposed algorithm shows 0% 
false negative predictions in comparison with 1.8% false predictions by liner methods. 
Note that TPR is similar in both proposed and nonlinear methods, as the nonlinear 
method only replaces the second part of the proposed algorithm. But, the proposed 
method outperforms the nonlinear approach as it gives a lower false positive rate (FPR) 
and a higher true negative rate (TNR) in contrast to the multiple regression, indicating 
that the proposed method shows compelling performance against untrustworthy 
objects. 
Table 6-1: Algorithm Comparison with Confusion Matrix. 
 Trustworthy Untrustworthy 
Trustworthiness Prediction 
Proposed 105 12 
Linear 105 2 
Nonlinear 105 19 
Untrustworthiness Prediction 
Proposed 0 2862 
Linear 2 2874 
Nonlinear 0 2855 
 
Table 6-2: Parameters Derived from Confusion Matrix. 
 TPR/Recall FPR Precision 
Proposed 1 0.004175 0.897436 
Linear 0.981308 0.000695 0.981308 
Nonlinear 1 0.006611 0.846774 
Proposed 0 0.995825 
 
Linear 0.018692 0.999305 
Nonlinear 0 0.993389 
 FNR TNR 
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Further, there are infinite possibilities when aggregating multiple TAs using a linear 
weighted summation method. However, in this comparison, the same weighting 
factors given by the cauterization algorithm are used in the liner algorithm to calculate 
the final score. Due to this reason, both proposed and multiple regression methods give 
a comparatively low score in contrast to the linear method. However, in a realistic case, 
it is difficult to estimate these weighting factors without a proper cauterization 
algorithm as discussed in this work and hence precision will severely degrade 
compared to our proposed method. On the other hand, the regularization factor used 
to manage the overfitted data and the optimization algorithm used to find the optimum 
parameters for the features could have a significant effect on this cause. Thus, the 
precision of both models can be increased by observing the learning curve while 
tweaking this regularization factor depending on the data set and using advanced 
methods of optimization as described in [142], [143]. 
Moreover, the algorithms described in this paper can be clustered so that the end 
devices can perform a fraction of the analysis and obtain the same results as before. 
To establish a distributed platform and address scalability issues, methods like map-
reduction and data parallelism are strong candidate technologies. This is quite 
beneficial in an environment like IoT where scalability and collaboration are 
prominent factors.  
6.4. Discussion 
The ML algorithm discussed here basically propose following contributions; (i) 
Taking both social and non-social features in to consideration to train the ML model; 
(ii) TA aggregation technique in contrast to linear summation; (iii) Labeling 
interactions based on their trustworthiness; and (iv) Usage of real-world dataset to 
investigate the performance of the algorithm in contrast to synthesized data.  
Authors in [144], [98] and [145] investigate more innovative models and solutions for 
preserving privacy, security and data integrity based on statistical and deep learning 
concepts. Moreover, authors in [146] and [101] propose a regression-based model 
which compares the variation of trustworthiness with respect to trust features in mobile 
ad-hoc networks (MANET) and WSN. However, they have investigated a limited 
number of trust features, which only represent the system level information like packet 
forwarding ratio, Quality of Service, energy-sensitivity, capability-limitation, and 
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profit-awareness. This motivates us to present a generic algorithm that represents 
features from both social level as well as system level data as in 1st contribution.  
Recently, authors in [147], [103] and [104]  present several algorithms based on 
reinforcement learning and multiclass classification techniques which lay the 
foundation for the algorithms considered in this work especially in relation to the 3rd 
contribution. Even though these research achievements show some prominent results 
by applying ML techniques, they still lack the potential of being a generic algorithm 
in relation to 1st, 2nd, and 4th contributions.   
6.5. Chapter summary 
A novel algorithm is proposed in this chapter as opposed to traditional weighted 
summations to determine whether an incoming interaction is trustworthy, based on 
several trust features corresponding to an IoT environment. First, a method for labeling 
the data depending on their trustworthiness is realized based on unsupervised ML 
techniques, which is the vital first step for any system to identify which interactions 
are trustworthy. Following this labeling process, a trust prediction model, which can 
correctly identify the trust boundaries of any interactions and learn the best parameters 
to combine each TA to obtain a final trust value, is proposed based on the SVM model. 
Our simulation results have shown promising outcomes including the ability and 
accuracy of the algorithm with respect to identifying trustworthiness interactions. 
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CHAPTER 7: DATA TRUST EVALUATION  
7.1. Introduction 
The most common method of assessing trust in IoT applications is to estimate the trust 
level of the end objects (object-centric) relative to the trustor. In these systems, the 
trust level of the data is assumed to be the same as the trust level of the data source. 
However, most of the IoT based systems are bassed on multiple data streams and 
operate in dynamic environments, which need immediate actions without waiting for 
a trust report from end objects. Furthermore, having trustworthy source objects is not 
always prominent but the trustworthy data. As an example, reliable, up to date and 
location, sensitive information about weather, traffic, safety warnings and transport 
information from a smart city application are more important than the facts about 
objects who are actually generating them. The other common misinterpretation is that 
the assumption of having OT would guarantee DT, which is in fact significantly 
different in various aspects such as the validity of data, timeliness, and other properties 
unique to data, which are often ignored in calculating trust for end objects.  
Nevertheless, information is the governing factor for any IoT system and is generated 
from the data by combining it (data) with the context. Hence, if there is a Data Quality 
(DQ) problem, it would eventually lead to an Information Quality (IQ) problem [22]. 
In other words, once the right data item is delivered to the desired object at the precise 
time in a clear, usable, and meaningful manner, IQ is guaranteed. Therefore, we 
address this challenge in this chapter by extending our previous approach on trust 
establishment for objects based on their reputation, experience, and knowledge, as 
described in Chapter 2. 
7.2. Data Trust Evaluation 
To the present day, evaluation of trust in data is assumed to be identical to trust 
estimation of end objects. However, this is not entirely true and in fact, most IoT 
systems rely highly on several data streams and these systems often do not care about 
the integrity and quality of who is generating them but the integrity of the data itself. 
For an example, let’s consider a situation where it is impossible to obtain the required 
factors to access the trustworthiness of objects, for example, a cloud service. In this 
case, cloud service user (Trustor) has no way to access the trust between him and the 
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cloud server (Trustee) as often information of the servers is not visible to its’ 
customers. However, it is unquestionable that user needs to find good cloud service 
that matches with his requirements in terms of trustworthiness in addition to 
performance metrics. In such a case, the proposed model provides an alternative way 
to evaluate trust of the data, coming from the server without worrying about the factors 
that determine the trustworthiness of the object itself (i.e. cloud server). Another 
example is where the interactions happened for a short duration without any prior 
relationship with the trustee. In such situations, it can be disadvantageous to calculate 
trust between objects due to time-critical nature of the application. As an example, 
obtaining accurate information about certain accident situations from less trustworthy 
objects like taxi drivers and passengers are more important than waiting for a report 
from a police officer, who is considered more trustworthy than a taxi driver for 
requesting quick attention from medical authorities and other relevant parties. 
To address these challenges, we propose a data trust evaluation model and the extended 
version of the trust management platform, which can analyze both data trust as well as 
object trust separately or in a collective manner.  
 Data Trust Attributes 
Alongside the REK model, we first consider a separate set of TAs, which essentially 
define the properties of data. Many research papers on DQ show that the six parameters 
(e.g., completeness, uniqueness, timeliness, validity, accuracy and consistency) 
provide prominent insight for assessing the DQ matters as in [148-150]. With respect 
to the notion of trust, we can consider these properties as trustworthiness attributes. 
We also consider two additional attributes, “success” and “cost”, which characterize 
experience and reputation DTM calculation, in addition to the aforementioned 
attributes stated in Chapter 4. We consider these eight DT Attributes (DTA) as the core 
dimensions in finding the trust between a data item and the trustor. Thus, we model 
these properties as below: 
− Success (𝑇𝐵
𝑠𝑢): the probability that B will successfully execute the task 
− Cost (𝑇𝐵
𝑐𝑡) : the probability that the cost of executing the task by B is not more 
than expected 
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− Completeness (𝑇𝐵
𝑐𝑚): the probability of  complete data records over total data 
records 
− Uniqueness (𝑇𝐵
𝑢𝑞
): the probability of expected records over total records noted  
− Timeliness (𝑇𝐵
𝑡𝑚): the difference between last update and the current one 
− Validity (𝑇𝐵
𝑣𝑙): the validity of data type, syntax and range 
− Accuracy (𝑇𝐵
𝑎𝑐): the probability of  accurate data records over total data records 
− Consistency (𝑇𝐵
𝑐𝑛): the probability of  valid, accurate and unique records over 
total data records 
 Data Trust Evaluation Model 
In this section, we extend our object based trust model discussed in Chapter 3 to 
comply with the data based trust as shown in Figure 7-1 and explain how each DTA is 
combined to generate data trust as discussed in Section 3.3.3.  . For that, we identify 
completeness, uniqueness, timeliness, validity, accuracy, and consistency as DTAs, 
which represent knowledge TM as it conveys trustworthiness information about the 
trustee. On the other hand, “success” DTA and “cost” DTA represent the experience 
DTM of the trustor after each task. Finally, reputation DTM can be considered by 
aggregating opinions of other trustees if there are any. Based on this, basic DT 
assessment towards B by A (𝑇𝐴𝐵
𝑥 ) over x DTM can be numerically modelled as below:  
− Knowledge DTM (𝑇𝐴𝐵
𝐾 ) 
 𝑇𝐴𝐵
𝐾 = 𝛼𝑇𝐵
𝑐𝑚 + 𝛽𝑇𝐵
𝑢𝑞
+ 𝛾𝑇𝐵
𝑡𝑚 + 𝛿𝑇𝐵
𝑣𝑙 +  𝜀𝑇𝐵
𝑎𝑐 + 𝜖𝑇𝐵
𝑐𝑛 (7.1) 
where ,,,,, and  are weighting factors such that +++++=1. However, 
calculating these weighting factors is computationally costly and not practical due to 
the infinite number of possibilities. Hence, the thesis suggest applying an ML 
technique to combine all the TAs, which we have discussed in our previous work 
[151]. 
− Experience DTM (𝑇𝐴𝐵
𝐸 ) 
 𝑇𝐴𝐵
𝐸 =  𝜎𝑇𝐵
𝑠𝑢 + 𝜑
1
𝑇𝐵
𝑐𝑡    
(7.2) 
where  and  are weighting factors such that + =1 and 𝑇𝐵
𝑐𝑡 > 0. The ML method 
discussed in [151] is preferable for the TA combination in this case as well. 
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− Reputation DTM (𝑇𝐴𝐵
𝑅 ) 
 𝑇𝐴𝐵
𝑅 = 𝑇1𝐵
𝑅 + 𝑇2𝐵
𝑅 +⋯+  𝑇𝑛𝐵
𝑅  
(7.3) 
where 𝑇𝑛𝐵
𝑅  represents the reputation towards data source B by its previous users n. A 
mechanism that computes reputation based on the PageRank algorithm is presented in 
our previous research [152].  
After releasing the main DTMs, the next objective is to combine them in order to 
produce a final DT value (𝑇𝐴𝐵
𝑑 ) for each data source based on DTAs as below: 
  𝑇𝐴𝐵
𝑑 = 𝜌𝑇𝐴𝐵
𝐾 + 𝜏𝑇𝐴𝐵
𝐸 + 𝜔𝑇𝐴𝐵
𝑅   
(7.4) 
where ,, and  are weighting factors based on the trustor’s preference on each TM. 
In here, we suggest two mechanisms to combine each TM either based on the ML 
approach we followed in [151] or applying the rule based reasoning mechanism 
explained in [153]. 
 
Figure 7-1: Data Trust Evaluation Model. 
 Data Trust Management Platform  
The platform consists of several important modules such as Trust Computation, 
Prediction and Decision Making (TCPD), TAG, Trust Data Access Object 
(TrustDAO), Data Repository, Trust Computation, and decision-making module, 
Trust Service Enabler and API as shown in Figure 7-2. Once the TCPD identifies the 
requirement of the data, it asks the TAG via TrustDAO to collect necessary 
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information and pre-process it for trust evaluation. Then, this pre-processed data is 
stored in the DR to be used by other modules including external platforms through 
TCPD API.  
Afterward, a TM extraction module estimates the necessary TAs based on the 
requirements. These attributes can be categorized either as attributes that define data 
trust as explained in Section 7.2.1. or attributes that define trust of object as described 
in Chapter 2. Next, all the attributes are combined based on the REK model with the 
assistance of the trust computation module, which is capable of performing the 
calculation based on either numerical methods or an artificial intelligence approach. 
Finally, the decision-making and delegation module uses the predicted trust values in 
order to complete the decision process, perhaps with the support of a service enabler 
who actually performs the judgment made by the decision module. In the following 
sections, we explain the data based TA estimation, DT computation, and DT prediction 
in detail. 
 
 
 Data Trust Prediction Algorithm 
Once the trust values based on DTA are collected, the next step is to find the trust 
relationship among data sources and the trustors who have not had prior encounters. 
For that, we use the concepts of the CF technique to predict the unknown trust values 
between the user and specific data source, with respect to six different data-centric 
Figure 7-2: Data trust management platform. 
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features (e.g., completeness, uniqueness, timeliness, validity, accuracy, and 
consistency). Now the prediction is solely based on the properties of data, it is 
unnecessary to rely on the trustworthiness of the data source as in traditional methods 
anymore. Among various methods of recommendation techniques, we chose a variant 
of the multifaceted CF model for our application, due to its unique properties that 
match with our DT model. Such properties include an emphasis on the concept of 
social contribution (where everyone’s contribution matters), the capability to capture 
weak signals in the overall data, ability to detect strong relationships between close 
items and competence in avoiding overfitting  [154].   
Table 7-1: The Input Matrix of Users  Items  Features for the CF Algorithm. 
 Trustors (Users) Features 
Trustees (DS) u1 u2 … unu T
cm Tuq Ttm Tvl Tac Tcn 
i1 
⁞ 
jnm 
◬  ◬  ◈ ◈ ◈ ◈ ◈ ◈ 
 ◬  ◬ ◈ ◈ ◈ ◈ ◈ ◈ 
 ◬ ◬  ◈ ◈ ◈ ◈ ◈ ◈ 
First, we define the inputs to our algorithm as the number of trustors or users (nu), 
number of Trustees or DSs (nm) and the six features, as shown in Table 7-1. Users who 
already have a trust relationship with DSs are noted with “◬” symbol which actually 
represents some trust value between [0,1], calculated using equation (7.4) and the 
blank spaces denote the missing information, which is to be predicted. Formally, if 
user j and item i already have a trust relationship, then r(i,j)=1 otherwise r(i,j)=0, 
otherwise. Moreover, the DT value given by user j to DS i is denoted by y(i,j). The 
symbol “◈” represents the values of all six features in between 0 and 1.  
The next step of our algorithm is to find a parameter that describes the profile of users 
involved in a certain situation. For now, let’s assume this parameter is denoted by (j) 
for a particular user j and the feature vector for DS i is denoted by T(i). Then the 
predicted DT value Tdpij between the trustor and the data can be calculated as shown 
in equation (7.5). The symbol (.)T represents the transposition of the vector.  
 
 
 
𝑇𝑖𝑗
𝑑𝑝
= (𝜽(𝑗))
𝑇
(𝑻(𝑖)) 
(7.5) 
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The basic but essential requirement of the predicted trust value is that it must provide 
the closest possible prediction for each trust value that is already calculated by each 
user. Based on this assumption, we can use the Mean Square Error (MSE) method to 
find the distance between the actual trust values and predicted ones. The parameter (j) 
which gives minimum error would be our best-predicted trust value. This idea is 
formulated as below for trustor j:  
 min
(𝑗)
1
2
∑ ((𝜽(𝑗))
𝑇
(𝑻(𝑖)) − 𝑦(𝑖,𝑗))
2
𝑖:𝑟(𝑖,𝑗)=1 +
λ
2
∑ (θk
(j)
)26k=1   
(7.6) 
In the first part of the equation, the MSE is calculated over all the records, where the 
trust value is already available through preliminary calculation. The second part of the 
equation is used to regularize the minimization process thereby avoiding overfitting 
issues. The k denotes the number of features. Similarly, we can find the best parameter 
for each trustor as shown below: 
 
 
min
𝜽(1),𝜽(2),…,𝜽(𝑛𝑢)
J( 𝜽(1), 𝜽(2), … , 𝜽(𝑛𝑢)) 
(7.7) 
where J(.) denotes the cost function as described in equation (7.6). In order to minimize 
the cost function, this work simply adopt the gradient descent method and solve for 
the best parameter (j)k  as shown below [155]: 
 
𝜃𝑘
(𝑗)
=
{
 
 
 
 𝜃𝑘
(𝑗)
− 𝛼 ∑ ((𝜽(𝑗))
𝑇
(𝑻(𝑖)) − 𝑦(𝑖,𝑗))
2
𝑖:𝑟(𝑖,𝑗)=1
𝑇𝑘
(𝑖)
 , 𝑘 = 0 
𝜃𝑘
(𝑗)
− 𝛼( ∑ ((𝜽(𝑗))
𝑇
(𝑻(𝑖)) − 𝑦(𝑖,𝑗))
2
𝑖:𝑟(𝑖,𝑗)=1
𝑇𝑘
(𝑖)
+  𝜆𝜃𝑘
(𝑗)
) , 𝑘 ≠ 0
 
(7.8) 
Once the parameter (j) is estimated through equation (7.7), and (7.8) predicted trust 
value between user j and item i will be given by the equation (7.5). Please note that 
this process is an iterative process and that more users who have experience with 
similar DSs would make the system more accurate and trustworthy.  
7.3. Implementation of Trust Model 
In this section, we propose a possible implementation scenario of our findings based 
on an air pollution crowd sensing use case, aimed at collecting and monitoring 
pollution data. The air pollution sensing requires active citizen participation by 
carrying wearable sensors as they traverse the city based on an opportunistic crowd 
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sensing application [156]. However, monitoring such air pollution via crowd sensing 
requires the data provided to be trustworthy and relied upon by the city authority or 
government to make an immediate decision. The air pollution crowd sensing 
application will take advantage of citizens’ smartphones and smart cities’ air 
pollution/environment sensors. The data collected from the air pollution sensors are 
delivered to the IoT Cloud, hosting the TCPD proposed in this paper. Thus, a mobile 
app for trusted air quality data monitoring can be developed on top of this platform 
integrating data collected from low-cost environment sensors for temperature, 
humidity, CO, CO2 NO2, SO2, as well as compounds including benzene and lead 
(VOCs), etc. The sensors’ readings will be transmitted via either an Android or iOS 
app to the proposed system for assessing and predicting the trust of the data before it 
is sent to the IoT Cloud. Such data can then be visualized along with its trust level by 
interested individuals, government, city administrators etc. via a web application. 
 
Figure 7-3: High-level Implementation Architecture of the proposed System. 
For the above use case to profit from the proposed solution, we have proposed a 
distributed publish-subscribe architecture such as  CoreDX distributed publish-
subscribe middleware [157] whereby interested parties can subscribe via a broker to 
environmental data of interest in a specific location of their choice as illustrated in 
Figure 7-3. The TCPD section of the figure implements appropriate components of the 
platform as shown in Figure 7-2, for providing trusted data to the interested parties. 
This is a typical publish-subscribe system whereby publishers publish the sensor data 
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to the broker and subscribers receive notifications matching their subscriptions from 
the broker. As illustrated in Figure 7-2, the TCPD can communicate with the IoT 
platform via an edge server that implements the IGetTrustData and IProvideTrustData 
interfaces. Also, the TCPD can receive data from the IoT platform for predicting the 
trust of such received data.  
Finally, Figure 7-4 illustrates an example of a scaled down sequence of interactions 
between some important stakeholders of an implementation instance of the system. 
Anytime a new environment sensor is available, it registers its presence with the 
sensing broker, which in turn informs the platform of the new available sensor. The 
new sensor can then publish its data to the broker. The broker notifies the TCPD to 
predict the trust of the received data. Similarly, whenever a new subscriber joins the 
system, its subscription is submitted to the broker via the TCPD system. If a 
subscription matching at least one of the subscriptions of the new subscriber is 
available, the broker notifies the TCPD system to deliver the data to the subscriber 
along with the trust level of the data. 
 
Figure 7-4: Interactions between various stakeholders and the proposed platform. 
7.4. Discussion 
Presently, data is the key governing factor with respect to service provisioning and 
decision-making process in IoT. Hence, the assurance of DQ and IQ are utmost 
important for trustworthy interactions. In this regard, authors in [149], [158] and [159] 
discuss various techniques and metrics that can be considered for DQ and IQ 
measurement. The framework proposed by Askham et al. [148] is one of the most 
prominent and widely accepted model for DQ assessment due to its generic nature. 
Hence, this thesis adopts most of the concepts from this work even though it doesn’t 
explain how these attributes can be used to assess data trust as proposed by this thesis. 
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Moreover, authors in [160] and [161] argue a data-centric trust model for vehicular 
networks based on several techniques like Bayesian inference and Dempster-Shafer 
theory. However, these mechanisms do not model trust explicitly but use cross-
checking mechanisms to check the trustworthiness of the data coming from various 
sources. In contrast the proposed model use metrics from three dimensions according 
to REK model in order to evaluate data trust and hence it does not need to rely on the 
number of sources which send the same information.  
In contrast to traditional means, there are quite a few works on trust prediction based 
on collective methods where numerically assessed trust metrics are analyzed through 
an intelligent algorithm like supervised and unsupervised learning. In this regard, a 
model to improve trust prediction accuracy by combining user similarity rating and the 
traditional trust is proposed in [162] and [163]. Furthermore, Xiang et al. propose a 
model based on unsupervised learning algorithm to estimate relationship strength from 
interaction activities like tagging, communication, and interference [164]. However, 
none of these have addressed the issue of evaluating trust when there are no previous 
encounters between trustor and trustee. However, the proposed method in this thesis 
uses the ability of collaborative systems to estimate unknown relationships through the 
known relationships.  
7.5. Chapter summary 
In this work, we argue that the traditional means of trust evaluation for objects does 
not necessarily guarantee the trustworthiness of data that they generate. Hence, we 
propose a hybrid trust computational platform, which is capable of assessing both data 
trust as well as traditional object-based trust. Furthermore, we provide a model to 
compute individual DTA and the main DTM by combining numerical models with 
ML algorithms. Afterward, a DT prediction scheme based on CF is proposed to find 
the DT between trustors and data sources who do not have prior encounters, which 
avoids using data from potentially malicious actors. Finally, a possible implementation 
scenario is discussed based on a crowd sensing use case. Similarly, our algorithm 
would be beneficial to filter out malicious data and data sources to maintain the 
integrity and quality of the outcomes that any crowd sensing application produces. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
8.1. Conclusion 
To the present day, existing approaches for trust evaluation are quite specific to the 
cyber-physical domain and show a weak performance against SIoT models. To the 
best of our knowledge, there is no model available, which is implemented in the 
platform layer and utilizes TMs from all other layers in the IoT stack. Therefore, it is 
important to investigate trust realization methods when dealing with billions of service 
requests and to effectively mitigate overlay threats including self-promoting, good 
mouthing/bad-mouthing and other possible vulnerabilities in CPSS. While defending 
from these threats, it is also important to investigate resilient and autonomous 
approaches to enhance the trustworthiness among objects and improve the service 
provisioning capabilities. As a solution, this research proposes a trust management 
platform that cooperates with applications and services to automatically evaluate all 
aspects of trust among any objects in the IoT environment and to realize trustworthy 
services and experiences.  
First, a generalized explanation for trust in the IoT ecosystem is formularized, which 
can be used as the baseline definition for any system, avoiding any ambiguities caused 
by existing definitions on trust. However, to use trust as an input in the decision-
making process, it should be modeled in a quantifiable manner. This is another area 
where existing solutions struggle and often the solutions are biased towards specific 
application areas. To overcome this issue, a generic trust evaluation model is proposed 
that can be used to obtain the trust profile of any system based on three TMs: 
knowledge, experience, and reputation. These represent direct information which is 
obtained after having at least one interaction with the trustee, to calculate trust; and 
opinions collected from global objects, who had previous encounters with the trustees 
respectively.  
It is also important to figure out how this model can be used to evaluate trust using 
these three TMs. Therefore, a novel trust management platform is proposed, which 
identifies the must-have components and modules in such a platform. The functions, 
usability, and the place of each of these modules is then defined so that this platform 
can be used as a standard for future developments. Furthermore, it can be argued that 
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the traditional means of trust evaluation for objects does not necessarily guarantee the 
trustworthiness of data that they generate. Hence, a hybrid trust management platform, 
which is capable of assessing both data trust as well as traditional object-based trust, 
is proposed by extending our trust platform for objects towards data. 
Based on the above grounds, specific solutions are proposed according to the defined 
trust evaluation model to acquire trust using the three TMs. First, a novel algorithm, 
which analyzes the opinions and experiences based on reputations and 
recommendations, is proposed. Then an algorithm that models direct trust information 
is designed, which combines multiple numerical models together. Each of these 
numerical models represents a certain feature of trust; for example, reputation, 
experience, relationship, spatial distance, credibility, and consistency. Depending on 
the requirement, each of these features is further broken down into sub-TAs in the 
process of numerical modeling.  
However, there is very limited existing work on combining such models together to 
represent the final value of trust. Often, the existing proposals suggest the use of linear 
methods with predefined weighting factors, which essentially do not represent the true 
nature of the requirements of prospective services, who expect to invest in trust values. 
Thus, there is an urgent need for more effective trust aggregation methods, which 
might be based on intelligent ML techniques as discussed before. In this regard, several 
intelligent approaches are presented based on unsupervised, supervised, and CF 
algorithms to label incoming interactions and predict future relationships based on 
their trustworthiness.  
From a standardization point of view, until now, a number of standards focusing on 
network-security and cyber-security technologies have been developed in various 
standardization bodies including IETF and ITU. The scope of these standards needs to 
be expanded to take into consideration trust issues in future ICT infrastructures. There 
are few preliminary activities taking place, for instance in Online Trust Alliance 
(OTA) and Trusted Computing Group (TCG). However, existing standardization 
activities on trust are still limited.  
Hence, this thesis has provided several inputs including a computational definition for 
trust, a trust evaluation model targeting both object and data trust,  and platform to 
manage trust evaluation process under ITU-T SG 13 [165]. Further, the thesis has 
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contributed to developing a technical report containing definitions, use cases, 
functional classifications as well as challenges and technical issues related to trust 
including overall strategies of standardization for trust provisioning. As the lead group 
of trusted networking infrastructure, ITU-T SG13 successfully published the 
recommendation Y.3052 on trust in March 2017 [119]. Recently Question 16/13 
“Knowledge-centric trustworthy networking and services” has focused on basic issues 
and key features on trust. Q16/13 is now mainly focusing on the development of core 
technical solutions for trust provisioning for ICT infrastructures and services. Q16/13 
also plans to consider technology deployment as well as new services and business 
aspects on trust-based networks and eco-platforms.  
Our proposals provided a strong suggestion to improve the current standardization 
activities on trust in ITU-T SG13 towards a hybrid model based on the concepts of OT 
and DT. Among them, a trust relationship model described in this work elaborates on 
some important factors when it comes to trust based decision making, which is a vital 
part of the standardization process. On the other hand, trust evaluation via ensemble 
methods, which is by combining numerical, ML and recommendation algorithms, 
provides a robust perception about trust compared to traditional one-dimensional trust 
calculation techniques. 
In summary, the novel contributions presented in this thesis are outlined below. 
− Development of a trust evaluation model and a trust management platform that 
describes a complete trust provisioning lifecycle.  
− A computational model to estimate indirect trust attributes.  
− A computational model to estimate direct trust attributes.  
− A machine learning based trust assessment, aggregation, and prediction model.   
− An extended version of the trust evaluation model and the trust management 
platform towards evaluating the trust of data. 
− A trust prediction model for data trust based on collaborative filtering. 
− An implementation scenario of the trust platform based on the crowd sensing 
use case in a distributed environment. 
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8.2. Future work 
The work contained in this thesis provides a novel and promising approach on trust 
evalaution in IoT systems. However, there are a number of ways that this work could 
be further improved and address new challenges accordingly to enhance the 
performance of the discussed platform. Hence, an overview of such possible 
extensions and considerations is presented here.  
Our research plan includes designing an autonomous trust decision-making algorithm 
for dynamically changing IoT environments. In this regard, different decision 
mechanisms can be observed in the literature with different techniques. A promising 
approach to handle such dynamics is self-adaptation that can be realized by a MAPE-
K feedback loop as shown in Figure 8-1 [166]. There are many such techniques that 
can be observed in the literature as in [167]. Based on these concepts, it is vital to 
investigate such systems’ capabilities to generate decisions and manage the platform 
adaptively according to dynamic requirements of the ecosystem.  
 
Figure 8-1: MAPE-K feedback loops for adaptive TAGs. 
To support these characteristics, autonomics through feedback loop control under 
dynamic conditions is required and recent advances like fog computing or edge 
computing can be a possible solution for distributed and localized trust-based decision-
making. Thus, the IoT platforms should be equipped with tools that allow intelligent 
services to be composed as data-driven microservices. The rationale is to address the 
weaknesses of the current monolithic Cloud-based AI services, which cannot meet the 
requirements of real-time and ultra-low delay sensitive IoT applications. Rather than 
shipping the trust data to the cloud data centers where AI algorithms are applied to 
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incorporate intelligent decision-making capabilities into IoT applications. These AI 
algorithms can be implemented and deployed closer to the sources of the IoT Data and 
users, by factoring the AI functionality into smaller functions that can be implemented 
as distributed microservices as shown in Figure 8-2. 
 
Figure 8-2 : Distributed AI Architecture for Trusted Services. 
One of the ultimate objectives of trust provision is that IoT systems should organize 
themselves, under the constraints and guidance of external inputs, to meet the goals of 
their participants. In this regard, the idea of a Knowledge Plane (KP) must be 
considered in parallel to management and data planes, to supervise network dynamics, 
participants, and relationships between the objects, and thereby manage and connect 
information within the system in each event or activity. With the above properties, our 
target is to design a distributed KP architecture providing necessary functionalities to 
gather information from reasoning mechanisms, TAGs, and brokers while providing 
its service to trust management processes. Alternatively, a KP may support the 
acquisition of high-level goals, understand current system conditions, storage and 
propagation of knowledge information among trusted parties, identify constraints and 
finally assist the decision-making process perceptively. 
As compared to network security, it is essential to investigate whether trust validation 
methods can effectively defend against different attacks including self-promoting and 
good mouthing/bad mouthing attacks. While defending from attacks, it is also 
important to investigate resilient self-healing approaches to enhance trust recovery 
after a successful attack. Furthermore, the effectiveness of trust management solutions 
when it comes to billions of devices and applications should be studied carefully. One 
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possible direction is to investigate trust management with concepts like big data and 
RL. Essentially employing trust capabilities should minimally compromise the 
performance and process of the IoT as many devices have limited resources. A possible 
research direction is the investigation of intelligent trust-based routing protocols, 
which are more reliable while consuming minimum energy and reducing traffic 
overhead. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
112 
 
REFERENCES 
 
[1] F. Y. Wang, “The Emergence of Intelligent Enterprises: From CPS to CPSS,” 
IEEE Intelligent Systems, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 85-88, 2010. 
[2] L. Atzori, A. Iera, G. Morabito, and M. Nitti, “The Social Internet of Things 
(SIoT) – When social networks meet the Internet of Things: Concept, 
architecture and network characterization,” Computer Networks, vol. 56, no. 
16, pp. 3594-3608, 2012. 
[3] A. Sheth, P. Anantharam, and C. Henson, “Physical-Cyber-Social Computing: 
An Early 21st Century Approach,” IEEE Intelligent Systems, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 
78-82, 2013. 
[4] P. Bonatti, and P. Samarati., “Regulating service access and information 
release on the web,” in Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Computer 
and communications security, Athens, Greece, 2000, pp. 134-143. 
[5] N. Li, and J. Mitchell, “RT: A Role-based Trust-management Framework,” in 
DARPA Information Survivability Conference and Exposition (DISCEX), 
Washington D.C, 2003, pp. 201-212. 
[6] R. Gavriloaie, W. Nejdl, D. Olmedilla, K. E. Seamons, and M.Winslett, “No 
Registration Needed: How to use declarative policies and negotiation to access 
sensitive resources on the semantic web,” in 1st European Semantic Web 
Symposium (ESWS), Berlin, Heidelberg., 2004, pp. 342-356. 
[7] P. A. Bonatti, and D. Olmedilla, “Driving and monitoring provisional trust 
negotiation with metapolicies,” in IEEE 6th International Workshop on 
Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks (POLICY), Stockholm, Sweden, 
2005, pp. 14-23. 
[8] M. Winslett, K. E. S. T. Yu, A. Hess, J. Jacobson, B. S. R. Jarvis, and L. Yu, 
“Negotiating trust on the web,” IEEE Internet Computing, vol. 6, no. 6, pp. 30-
37, 2002. 
[9] J. Kohl, and B. C. Neuman, "The Kerberos network authentication service," 
IETF RFC 1510, 1993. 
[10] W.H.Winsborough, K. E. Seamons, and V. E. Jones, “Automated trust 
negotiation,” in Proceedings of the DARPA Information Survivability 
Conference, Hilton Head, SC, USA,, 2000, pp. 88-102. 
[11] M. W. T. Yu, “Policy migration for sensitive credentials in trust negotiation,” 
in Proceedings of the 2003 ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic 
Society (WPES 03), New York, USA, 2003, pp. 9-20. 
[12] M. W. T. Yu, K.E. Seamons, “Interoperable Strategies in Automated Trust 
Negotation,” in Proceedings of the 8th ACM Conference on Computer and 
Communications Security, New York, USA, 2001, pp. 146–155. 
[13] W. Nejdl, D. Olmedilla, and M. Winslett, “Peertrust: automated trust 
negotiation for peers on the semantic web,,” in Workshop on Secure Data 
Management, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2004, pp. 118–132. 
[14] N. Li, W. H. Winsborough, and J. C. Mitchell, “Distributed credential chain 
discovery in trust management,” Journal of Computer Security, vol. 11, no. 1, 
pp. 35-86, 2003. 
[15] C. D. J. J.-M. Seigneur, “Trust enhanced ubiquitous payment without too much 
privacy loss,” in Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Symposium on Applied 
Computing, New York, USA, 2004, pp. 1593–1599. 
113 
 
[16] N. M. S. F.L. Gandon, “Semantic web technologies to reconcile privacy and 
context awareness,” in UbiMob ’04: Proceedings of the 1st French-speaking 
Conference on Mobility and Ubiquity Computing, New York, USA, 2004, pp. 
123–130. 
[17] A. Uszok, J. Bradshaw, R. Jeffers, N. Suri, P. Hayes, M. Breedy, L. Bunch, M. 
Johnson, S.Kulkarni, and J. Lott, “KAoS policy and domain services: toward a 
description-logic approach to policy representation, deconfliction, and 
enforcement policy,” in IEEE 4th International Workshop on Policies for 
Distributed Systems and Networks, Lake Como, Italy, 2003, pp. 93-96. 
[18] L. Kagal, T. W. Finin, and A. Joshi, “A policy-based approach to security for 
Semantic Web,” in Proceedings of the 2nd International Semantic Web 
Conference, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2003, pp. 402–418. 
[19] M. Nielsen, and K. Krukow, “Towards a formal notion of trust,” in 
Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Principles and Practice of 
Declaritive Programming (ACM SIG PLAN), Uppsala, Sweden, 2003, pp. 4-7. 
[20] OASIS, "WS-Trust 1.4," Available : http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust 
/v1.4/ws-trust.html, 2012. 
[21] M. Carbone, M. Nielsen, and V. Sassone, “A formal model for trust in dynamic 
networks,” in Proceedings of 1st International Conference on Software 
Engineering and Formal Methods, Queensland, Australia, 2003, pp. 54-61. 
[22] M. Y. Becker, and P. Sewell, “Distributed access control policies with tunable 
expressiveness,” in Proceedings of 5th IEEE International Workshop Policies 
for Distributed Systems and Networks, orktown Heights, NY, USA, 2004, pp. 
159-168. 
[23] T. Leithead, W. Nejdl, D. Olmedilla, K. E. Seamons, M. Winslett, T. Yu, and 
C. C. Zhang, “How to exploit ontologies for trust negotiation,” in In ISWC 
Workshop on Trust, Security, and Reputation on the Semantic Web, Hiroshima, 
Japan, 2004. 
[24] M. Blaze, J. Feigenbaum, and J. Lacy, “Decentralized trust management,” in 
Proceedings of IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Oakland, CA, USA, 
1996, pp. 164-173. 
[25] M. Blaze, J. Feigenbaum, J. Ioannidis, and A. Keromytis, “The KeyNote Trust 
Management System,” in International Workshop on Security Protocols, 
Berlin, Heidelberg, 1999, pp. 59-63. 
[26] L. Xiong, and L. Liu, “A Reputation-based Trust Model for Peer-to-Peer E-
Commerce Communities,” in IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce 
Technology (CEC), Newport Beach, 2003, pp. 275-284. 
[27] K. Aberer, and Z. Despotovic, “Managing trust in a peer-2-peer information 
system,” in Proceedings of the tenth international conference on Information 
and knowledge management, Atlanta, Georgia, USA, 2001, pp. 310-317. 
[28] P. Resnick, K. Kuwabara, R. Zeckhauser, and E. Friedman, “Reputation 
Systems,” Communications of the ACM, vol. 43, no. 12, pp. 45-48, 2000. 
[29] Y. Liu, W. Xue, K. Li, Z. Chi, G. Min, and W. Qu, “DHTrust: A Robust and 
Distributed Reputation System for Trusted Peer-to-Peer Networks,” in 2010 
IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference (GLOBECOM), Miami, FL, 
USA, 2010, pp. 1-6. 
[30] T. Roosta, M. Meingast, and S. Sastry, “Distributed Reputation System for 
Tracking Applications in Sensor Networks,” in 3rd Annual International 
Conference on Mobile and Ubiquitous Systems: Networking & Services, San 
Jose, CA, USA, 2006, pp. 1-8. 
114 
 
[31] A. Abdul-Rahman, and S. Hailes, “A distributed trust model,” in The New 
Security Paradigms Workshop, Langdale, Cumbria, United Kingdom, 1997, 
pp. 48–60. 
[32] A. Abdul-Rahman, and S. Hailes, “Using recommendations for managing trust 
in distributed systems,” in Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on 
Communication, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 1997. 
[33] B. Yu, and M. P. Singh, “A social mechanism of reputation management in 
electronic communities,” in International Workshop on Cooperative 
Information Agents, London, UK, 2000, pp. 154–165. 
[34] B. Yu, and M. P. Singh, “An evidential model of distributed reputation 
management,” in Proceedings of the 1st International Joint Conference 
onAutonomousAgents and Multiagent Systems, New York, USA, 2002, pp. 
294–301. 
[35] B. Yu, and M. P. Singh, “Detecting deception in reputation management,” in 
AAMAS ’03: Proceedings of the Second International Joint Conference on 
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, New York, USA, 2003, pp. 73–
80. 
[36] J. Sabater, and C. Sierra, “Reputation and social network analysis in multiagent 
systems,” in Proceedings of the First International Joint Conference on 
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, New York, USA, 2002, pp. 475-
482. 
[37] T. Beth, M. Borcherding, and B. Klein, “Valuation of trust in open networks,” 
in Proceedings of the 3rd European Symposium on Research in Computer 
Security, Berlin, Heidelberg, 1994, pp. 1-18. 
[38] S. Brin, and L. Page, “The anatomy of a large-scale hypertextual Web search 
engine,” Computer Networks, vol. 56, pp. 3825-3833, 1998. 
[39] S.D.Kamvar, M. T. Schlosser, and H. Garcia-Molina, “The eigentrust 
algorithm for reputation management in P2P networks,” in 12th International 
Conference on World Wide Web, New York, NY, USA, 2003, pp. 640-651. 
[40] E. Damiani, D. C. d. Vimercati, S. Paraboschi, P. Samarati, and F. Violante, 
“A reputation-based approach for choosing reliable resources in peer-to-peer 
networks,” in 9th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications 
Security, New York, NY, USA, 2002, pp. 207-216. 
[41] J. Golbeck, and J. Hendler, “Accuracy of metrics for inferring trust and 
reputation,” in Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on 
Knowledge Engineering and Knowledge Management, Berlin, Heidelberg, 
2004, pp. 116-131. 
[42] J. Golbeck, and J. Hendler, “Inferring reputation on the semantic web,” in 
Proceedings of the 13th International World Wide Web Conference, NY, USA, 
2004. 
[43] P. Massa, and P. Avesani, “Controversial users demand local trust metrics: an 
experimental study on epinions.com community,” in 25th American 
Association for Artificial Intelligence Conference, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 
2005, pp. 121-126. 
[44] P.-A. Chirita, W. Nejdl, M. Schlosser, and O. Scurtu, “Personalized reputation 
management in P2P networks,” in Proceedings of the Trust, Security and 
Reputation Workshop Held at the 3rd International Semantic Web Conference, 
Hiroshima, Japan, 2004. 
[45] B. W. Husted, “The Ethical Limits of Trust in Business Relations,” Business 
Ethics Quarterly, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 233-248, 2015. 
115 
 
[46] D. Hongwei, L. Albert, and W. Jiming, "Trust in Electronic Commerce: 
Definitions, Sources, and Effects," Encyclopedia of E-Business Development 
and Management in the Global Economy, L. In, ed., pp. 65-74, Hershey, PA, 
USA: IGI Global, 2010. 
[47] ITU-T, "Trust Provisioning for future ICT infrastructures and services," 
Technical Report, 2016. 
[48] L. E. Holmquist, F. Mattern, B. Schiele, P. Alahuhta, M. Beigl, and H.-W. 
Gellersen, “Smart-Its Friends: A Technique for Users to Easily Establish 
Connections between Smart Artefacts,” in Proceedings of the 3rd international 
conference on Ubiquitous Computing, Atlanta, Georgia, USA, 2001, pp. 116-
122. 
[49] L. Atzori, A. Iera, and G. Morabito, “From "smart objects" to "social objects": 
The next evolutionary step of the IoT,” IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 
52, no. 1, pp. 97-105, 2014. 
[50] S. Nepal, W. Sherchan, and C. Paris, “Strust: A trust model for social 
networks,” in IEEE 10th International Conference on Trust, Security and 
Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom), 2011, pp. 841-846. 
[51] S. Adali, R. Escriva, M. K. Goldberg, M. Hayvanovych, M. Magdon-Ismail, 
B. K. Szymanski, W. A. Wallace, and G. Williams, “Measuring behavioral 
trust in social networks,” in IEEE International Conference on Intelligence and 
Security Informatics (ISI), Vancouver, BC, 2010, pp. 150-152. 
[52] Y. Hu, D. Wang, H. Zhong, and F. Wu, “SocialTrust: Enabling long-term 
social cooperation in p2p services,” Springer P2P Networking and 
Applications, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 525-538, 2014. 
[53] M. Nitti, R. Girau, L. Atzori, A. Lera, and G. Morabito, “A Subjective Model 
for Trustworthiness Evaluation in the Social IoT,” in IEEE Intl. Symposium on 
Personal Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications, PIMRC, Australia, 2013, 
pp. 18-23. 
[54] J. Zhan, and X. Fang, “A novel trust computing system for social networks,” 
in IEEE Third International Conference onPrivacy, Security, Risk and Trust 
(PASSAT) and Social Computing (SocialCom), Boston, MA, USA, 2011, pp. 
1284-1289. 
[55] G. Yin, F. Jiang, S. Cheng, X. Li, and X. He, “Autrust: A practical trust 
measurement for adjacent users in social networks,” in Second International 
Conference on Cloud and Green Computing (CGC), 2012, pp. 360-367. 
[56] X. L. Dong, E. Gabrilovich, K. Murphy, V. Dang, W. Horn, C. Lugaresi, S. 
Sun, and W. Zhang, “Knowledge-based trust: Estimating the trustworthiness 
of web sources,” Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment, vol. 8, no. 9, pp. 938-
949, 2015. 
[57] X. L. Dong, E. Gabrilovich, G. Heitz, W. Horn, K. Murphy, S. Sun, and W. 
Zhang, “From data fusion to knowledge fusion,” Proceedings of the VLDB 
Endowment, vol. 7, no. 10, pp. 881-892, 2014. 
[58] X. Li, X. L. Dong, K. Lyons, W. Meng, and D. Srivastava, “Truth finding on 
the deep web: Is the problem solved?,” in Proceedings of the VLDB 
Endowment, 2012, pp. 97-108. 
[59] Y. Ping, J. Xinghao, W. Yue, and L. Ning, “Distributed intrusion detection for 
mobile ad hoc networks,” Journal of Systems Engineering and Electronics, vol. 
19, no. 4, pp. 851-859, 2008. 
[60] R. Sekar, A. Gupta, J. Frullo, T. Shanbhag, A. Tiwari, H. Yang, and S. Zhou, 
“Specification-based anomaly detection: a new approach for detecting network 
116 
 
intrusions,” in Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and 
communications security, Washington, DC, USA, 2002, pp. 265-274. 
[61] F. Yu, C. Xu, Y. Shen, J.-y. An, and L.-f. Zhang, “Intrusion detection based on 
system call finite-state automation machine,” in IEEE International 
Conference on Industrial Technology (ICIT), Hong Kong, China, 2005, pp. 63-
68. 
[62] M. Blaze, J. Feigenbaum, and J. Lacy, “Decentralized trust management,” in 
Security and Privacy,  Proceedings., IEEE Symposium on, 1996, pp. 164-173. 
[63] T. Grandison, and M. Sloman, “A survey of trust in internet applications,” 
IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 2-16, 2000. 
[64] Z. Yan, P. Zhang, and A. V. Vasilakos, “A survey on trust management for 
Internet of Things,” Journal of Network and Computer Applications, vol. 42, 
pp. 120-134, 2014. 
[65] F. Bao, and I. R. Chen, “Trust Management for the Internet of Things and Its 
Application to Service Composition,” in IEEE International Symposium on a 
World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks, San Francisco, USA, 
2012, pp. 1-6. 
[66] I. R. Chen, F. Bao, and J. Guo, “Trust-based Service Management for Social 
Internet of Things Systems,” IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure 
Computing, vol. PP, no. 99, pp. 1-1, 2015. 
[67] I. R. Chen, and J. Guo, "Dynamic Hierarchical Trust Management of Mobile 
Groups and Its Application to Misbehaving Node Detection." 
[68] W. Conner, A. Iyengar, T. Mikalsen, I. Rouvellou, and K. Nahrstedt, "A trust 
management framework for service-oriented environments." pp. 891-900. 
[69] Z. Movahedi, M. Nogueira, and G. Pujolle, "An autonomic knowledge 
monitoring scheme for trust management on mobile ad hoc networks." pp. 
1898-1903. 
[70] Z. Yan, and R. MacLaverty, "Autonomic Trust Management in a Component 
Based Software System," Autonomic and Trusted Computing: Third 
International Conference, ATC 2006, Wuhan, China, September 3-6, 2006. 
Proceedings, L. T. Yang, H. Jin, J. Ma and T. Ungerer, eds., pp. 279-292, 
Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2006. 
[71] M. Firdhous, O. Ghazali, and S. Hassan, “Trust Management in Cloud 
Computing: A Critical Review,” Advances in ICT for Emerging Regions 
(ICTer), vol. 04, no. 2, pp. 24-36, 2012. 
[72] G. Barbian, “Trust Centrality in Online Social Networks,” in in European 
Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference (EISIC), Athens, Greece, 
2011, pp. 372-377. 
[73] W. Yan, L. Lei, and L. Ee-Peng, “Price Trust Evaluation in E-service Oriented 
Applications,” in E-Commerce Technology and the Fifth IEEE Conference on 
Enterprise Computing, E-Commerce and E-Services, , Washington DC, USA, 
2008, pp. 165-172. 
[74] L. Mui, “Computational models of trust and reputation : agents, evolutionary 
games, and social networks,” Ph.D. Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, 2003. 
[75] G. Zacharia, and P. Maes, “Collaborative Reputation Mechanisms for Online 
Communities,” Ph.D. Thesis, Dept. of Architecture, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, 2005. 
[76] S. S. Park, J. H. Lee, and T. M. Chung, “Cluster-based trust model against 
attacks in ad-hoc networks,” in IEEE Third International Conference on 
117 
 
Convergence and Hybrid Information Technology (ICCIT), Busan, South 
Korea, 2008, pp. 526-532. 
[77] F. Bao, and I.-R. Chen, “Dynamic trust management for internet of things 
applications,” in Proceedings of the 2012 international workshop on Self-
aware internet of things, 2012, pp. 1-6. 
[78] M. J. Probst, and S. K. Kasera, “Statistical trust establishment in wireless 
sensor networks,” in Parallel and Distributed Systems, 2007 International 
Conference on, Hsinchu, Taiwan, 2007, pp. 1-8. 
[79] A. Jøsang, R. Ismail, and C. Boyd, “A survey of trust and reputation systems 
for online service provision,” Decision Support Systems, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 618-
644, 2007. 
[80] C. Dellarocas, “Immunizing online reputation reporting systems against unfair 
ratings and discriminatory behavior,” in Proceedings of the 2nd ACM 
Conference: Electronic Commerce, Minnesota, USA, 2000, pp. 150-157  
[81] N. Iltaf, A. Ghafoor, U. Zia, and M. Hussain, “An Effective Model for Indirect 
Trust Computation in Pervasive Computing Environment,” Wireless Personal 
Communications, vol. 75, no. 3, pp. 1689-1713, 2014/04/01, 2014. 
[82] L. Zhaoyu, A. W. Joy, and R. A. Thompson, “A dynamic trust model for 
mobile ad hoc networks,” in 10th IEEE International Workshop on Future 
Trends of Distributed Computing Systems (FTDCS), Suzhou, China, 2004, pp. 
80-85. 
[83] A. Boukerche, and Y. Ren, “A security management scheme using a novel 
computational reputation model for wireless and mobile Ad hoc networks,” in 
Proceedings of the 5th ACM symposium on Performance evaluation of wireless 
ad hoc, sensor, and ubiquitous networks, Vancouver, British Columbia, 
Canada, 2008, pp. 88-95. 
[84] B. Lagesse, M. Kumar, M. Wright, and J. M. Paluska, “DTT: A distributed 
trust toolkit for pervasive systems,” in IEEE International Conference on 
Pervasive Computing and Communications, Galveston, TX, USA, 2009, pp. 1-
8. 
[85] S. Nakamoto, “Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system,” 2008. 
[86] N. Fotiou, and G. C. Polyzos, “Decentralized name-based security for content 
distribution using blockchains,” in IEEE Conference on Computer 
Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS), San Francisco, CA, 
USA, 2016, pp. 415-420. 
[87] N. Alexopoulos, J. Daubert, M. Mühlhäuser, and S. M. Habib, “Beyond the 
Hype: On Using Blockchains in Trust Management for Authentication,” in 
IEEE Trustcom/BigDataSE/ICESS, Sydney, NSW, Australia, 2017, pp. 546-
553. 
[88] F. Bao, and I.-R. Chen, “Dynamic Trust Management for the Internet of Things 
Applications,” in International Workshop on Self-Aware Internet of Things, 
San Jose, USA, 2012, pp. 1-6. 
[89] D. Chen, G. Chang, D. Sun, J. Li, J. Jia, and X. Wang, “TRM-IoT: a trust 
management model based on fuzzy reputation for Internet of Things,” 
Computer Science and Information Systems, vol. 8, pp. 1207-1228, 2011. 
[90] N. B.Truong, T.-W. Um, and G. M. Lee, “A Reputation and Knowledge Based 
Trust Service Platform for Trustworthy Social Internet of Things,” in 
Innovations in Clouds, Internet and Networks (ICIN), Paris, France, March 
2016. 
118 
 
[91] A. Jøsang, “A logic for uncertain probabilities,” International Journal of 
Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems, vol. 9, pp. 279– 311, 
June 2001. 
[92] F. Bao, I. R. Chen, and J. Guo, “Scalable, Adaptive and Survivable Trust 
Management for Community of Interest Based Internet of Things Systems,” in 
11th International Symposium on Autonomous Decentralized System, Mexico 
City, Mexico, 2013, pp. 1-7. 
[93] I. R. Chen, and J. Guo, “Dynamic Hierarchical Trust Management of Mobile 
Groups and Its Application to Misbehaving Node Detection,” in International 
Conference on. Advanced Information Networking and Applications, Victoria, 
Canada, 2014, pp. 49-56. 
[94] S. Hauke, S. Biedermann, M. Mühlhäuser, and D. Heider, “On the Application 
of Supervised Machine Learning to Trustworthiness Assessment,” in 12th 
IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing 
and Communications, Melbourne, VIC, Australia, 2013, pp. 525-534. 
[95] K. Zhao, and L. Pan, “A Machine Learning Based Trust Evaluation Framework 
for Online Social Networks,” in 13th IEEE International Conference on Trust, 
Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications, Beijing, China, 
2014, pp. 69-74. 
[96] S. Weihua, and V. V. Phoha, “Neural network-based reputation model in a 
distributed system,” in IEEE International Conference on e-Commerce 
Technology (CEC), Beijing, China, 2004, pp. 321-324. 
[97] F. Fei, S. Li, H. Dai, C. Hu, W. Dou, and Q. Ni, “A K-Anonymity Based 
Schema for Location Privacy Preservation,” IEEE Transactions on Sustainable 
Computing, vol. PP, no. 99, pp. 1-1, 2017. 
[98] F. Jiang, Y. Fu, B. B. Gupta, F. Lou, S. Rho, F. Meng, and Z. Tian, “Deep 
Learning based Multi-channel intelligent attack detection for Data Security,” 
IEEE Transactions on Sustainable Computing, vol. PP, no. 99, pp. 1-1, 2018. 
[99] J. Shen, D. Liu, D. He, X. Huang, and Y. Xiang, “Algebraic Signatures-based 
Data Integrity Auditing for Efficient Data Dynamics in Cloud Computing,” 
IEEE Transactions on Sustainable Computing, pp. 1-1, 2017. 
[100] Y. Wang, Y.-C. Lu, I.-R. Chen, J.-H. Cho, A. Swami, and C.-T. Lu, 
“LogitTrust: A Logit Regression-based Trust Model for Mobile Ad Hoc 
Networks,” in Proceedings of the 6th ASE International Conference on 
Privacy, Security, Risk and Trust Cambridge, MA, 2014, pp. 1-10. 
[101] Z. Li, X. Li, V. Narasimhan, A. Nayak, and I. Stojmenovic, “Autoregression 
Models for Trust Management in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks,” in IEEE Global 
Telecommunications Conference (GLOBECOM ), Kathmandu, Nepal, 2011, 
pp. 1-5. 
[102] F. Boustanifar, and Z. Movahedi, “A Trust-Based Offloading for Mobile M2M 
Communications,” in Intl IEEE Conferences on Ubiquitous Intelligence & 
Computing, Toulouse, France, 2016, pp. 1139-1143. 
[103] W. Li, W. Meng, L.-F. Kwok, and H. Horace, “Enhancing collaborative 
intrusion detection networks against insider attacks using supervised intrusion 
sensitivity-based trust management model,” Journal of Network and Computer 
Applications, vol. 77, pp. 135-145, 2017. 
[104] A. Bolster, and A. Marshall, “Analytical metric weight generation for multi-
domain trust in autonomous underwater MANETs,” in IEEE Third 
Underwater Communications and Networking Conference (UComms), Lerici, 
Italy, 2016, pp. 1-5. 
119 
 
[105] T. Yu, and M. Winslett, “Policy migration for sensitive credentials in trust 
negotiation,” in Proceedings of the 2003 ACM Workshop on Privacy in the 
Electronic Society, New York, USA, 2003, pp. 9-20. 
[106] M. J. Probst, and S. K. Kasera, "Statistical trust establishment in wireless 
sensor networks." pp. 1-8. 
[107] A. Boukerche, and Y. Ren, "A security management scheme using a novel 
computational reputation model for wireless and mobile Ad hoc networks." pp. 
88-95. 
[108] B. Lagesse, M. Kumar, M. Wright, and J. M. Paluska, "DTT: A distributed 
trust toolkit for pervasive systems." 
[109] J. Audun, R. I. smail, and C. Boyd, “A survey of trust and reputation systems 
for online service provision,” Decis. Support Syst., vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 618-644, 
2007. 
[110] C. Dellarocas, “Immunizing online reputation reporting systems against unfair 
ratings and discriminatory behavior,” Proceedings of the 2nd ACM 
Conference: Electronic Commerce, pp. 150, 10/17/, 2000. 
[111] L. Zhaoyu, A. W. Joy, and R. A. Thompson, “A dynamic trust model for 
mobile ad hoc networks,” in Distributed Computing Systems, 2004. FTDCS 
2004. Proceedings. 10th IEEE International Workshop on Future Trends of, 
Suzhou, China, 2004, pp. 80-85. 
[112] A. Rajaram, and D. S. Palaniswami, “A Trust Based Cross Layer Security 
Protocol for Mobile Ad hoc Networks,” International Journal of Computer 
Science and Information Security, IJCSIS, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 165-172, 2009. 
[113] L.-H. Vu, M. Hauswirth, and K. Aberer, “QoS-Based service selection and 
ranking with trust and reputation management,” in Proceedings of the 
Confederated international conference on "On the Move to Meaningful 
Internet Systems", Berlin, Heidelberg, 2005, pp. 466-483. 
[114] T. Jim, “SD3: a trust management system with certified evaluation,” in 
Proceedings 2001 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy S&P, 2001, pp. 
106-115. 
[115] L. Xiong, and L. Liu, “A reputation-based trust model for peer-to-peer e-
commerce communities,” in IEEE Intl. Conference on E-Commerce,CEC., 
Newport Beach, 2003, pp. 275-284. 
[116] M. Blaze, J. Feigenbaum, J. Ioannidis, and A. Keromytis, "The KeyNote Trust-
Management System Version 2," RFC Editor, 1999. 
[117] M. A. Azer, S. M. El-Kassas, A. W. F. Hassan, and M. S. El-Soudani, “A 
survey on trust and reputation schemes in ad hoc networks,” in Third 
International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, ARES 
Barcelona, Spain, 2008, pp. 881-886. 
[118] G. Suryanarayana, and R. N. Taylor, “A survey of trust management and 
resource discovery technologies in peer-to-peer applications,” ISR Technical 
Report UCI-ISR-04-6, University of California, 2004. 
[119] ITU-T, "Overview of trust provisioning for information and communication 
technology infrastructures and services," Recommendation Y.3052, 2017. 
[120] I. Pranata, G. Skinner, and R. Athauda, “A Holistic Review on Trust and 
Reputation Management Systems for Digital Environments,” International 
Journal of Computer and Information Technology, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 44-53, 
2012. 
120 
 
[121] E. Chang, F. K. Hussain, and T. S. Dillon, “Fuzzy nature of trust and dynamic 
trust modelling in service oriented environments,” in Workshop on secure web 
services, Fairfax, USA, 2005, pp. 75-83. 
[122] E. Chang, T. Dillon, and F. K. Hussain, "Technologies for building business 
intelligence and consumer confidence," Trust Reputation for Service-Oriented 
Environments, West Sussex, England: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2006. 
[123] C. Castelfranchi, and R. Falcone, “Principles of trust for MAS: Cognitive 
anatomy, social importance, and quantification,” in International Conference 
on Multi Agent Systems, Paris, France, 1998, pp. 72-79. 
[124] U. Jayasinghe, N. B. Truong, G. M. Lee, and T.-W. Um, “RpR: A Trust 
Computation Model for Social Internet of Things,” in Smart World Congress , 
Intl IEEE Conferences on Ubiquitous Intelligence & Computing, Toulouse, 
France, 2016, pp. 930-937. 
[125] G. M. Lee, U. Jayasinghe, N. B. Truong, and C.-h. Cho, “Features, Challenges 
and Technical Issues,” in The Second Bright ICT Annual Workshop on Bright 
ICT 2016, Dublin, Ireland, 2016. 
[126] X. Yang, P. Moore, and J. S. Pu, “Service Enabler: A Software Agent using 
Lifecycle Data to Enable Knowledge-Intensive Services,” in Third 
International Conference on Semantics, Knowledge and Grid, Shan Xi, China, 
2007, pp. 519-522. 
[127] S. Brin, and L. Page, “Reprint of: The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual 
Web Search Engine,,” Computer Networks, vol. 56, pp. 3825-3833, 2012. 
[128] J. Fei, Y. Yang, J. Shuyuan, and X. Jin, “Fast Search to Detect Communities 
by Truncated Inverse Page Rank in Social Networks,” in IEEE International 
Conference on Mobile Services (MS), New York, USA, 2015, pp. 239-246. 
[129] F. L. Dragomir, “Models of Trust and Reputation in eCommerce,” Acta 
Universitatis Danubius. Œconomica, vol. 12, no. 6, 2017. 
[130] M. T. Ltd. "Calculate distance, bearing and more between Latitude/Longitude 
points,"  2016;  [Online] Available:  http://www.movable-type.co.uk/scripts/lat 
long.html. 
[131] D. J. MacKay,“Information theory, inference and learning algorithms,” 
Cambridge university press, 2003. 
[132] MathWorks. "Interpret Linear Regression Results,"  2016;  [Online] Available:  
https://uk.mathworks.com/help/stats/understanding-linear-regression-outputs. 
html. 
[133] A.-K. Pietil, E. Oliver, J. LeBrun, G. Varghese, and C. Diot, “MobiClique: 
middleware for mobile social networking,” in Proceedings of the 2nd ACM 
workshop on Online social networks, Barcelona, Spain, 2009, pp. 49-54. 
[134] P. Anna-Kaisa, and D. Christophe. "CRAWDAD dataset thlab/sigcomm2009 
(v. 2012-07-15),"  [Online] Available:  http://crawdad.org/thlab/sigcomm 
2009/20120715. 
[135] K. Govindan, and P. Mohapatra, “Trust computations and trust dynamics in 
mobile adhoc networks: A survey,” IEEE Communications Surveys & 
Tutorials, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 279-298, 2012. 
[136] M. Nitti, R. Girau, and L. Atzori, “Trustworthiness management in the social 
internet of things,” IEEE Transactions on knowledge and data engineering, 
vol. 26, no. 5, pp. 1253-1266, 2014. 
[137] X. Amatriain, and J. M. Pujol, "Data Mining Methods for Recommender 
Systems," Recommender Systems Handbook, pp. 227-262, Boston, MA: 
Springer, 2015. 
121 
 
[138] S. Zafeiriou. "Notes on Implementation of Component AnalysisTechniques,"  
2015;  [Online] Available:  https://ibug.doc.ic.ac.uk/media/uploads/doc 
uments/notes_implementation_component_analysis.pdf. 
[139] C. W. Hsu, C. C. Chang, and C. J. Lin, “A practical guide to support vector 
classification,” Tech. rep., Dept. Computer Science, National Taiwan 
University, 2003. 
[140] C. Chih-Chung, and L. Chih-Jen, “LIBSVM : A library for support vector 
machines,” ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology, vol. 2, 
no. 3, pp. 27:1-27:27, 2011. 
[141] I. Jolliffe,“Principal component analysis,” New York: Wiley Online 
Library,2002. 
[142] M. D. Zeiler, “ADADELTA: an adaptive learning rate method,” arXiv preprint 
arXiv:1212.5701, 2012. 
[143] D. C. Liu, and J. Nocedal, “On the limited memory BFGS method for large 
scale optimization,” Mathematical Programming, vol. 45, no. 1, pp. 503-528, 
August 01, 1989. 
[144] F. Fei, S. Li, H. Dai, C. Hu, W. Dou, and Q. Ni, “A K-Anonymity Based 
Schema for Location Privacy Preservation,” IEEE Transactions on Sustainable 
Computing, 2017. 
[145] J. Shen, D. Liu, D. He, X. Huang, and Y. Xiang, “Algebraic Signatures-based 
Data Integrity Auditing for Efficient Data Dynamics in Cloud Computing,” 
IEEE Transactions on Sustainable Computing, 2017. 
[146] Y. Wang, Y.-C. Lu, I.-R. Chen, J.-H. Cho, A. Swami, and C.-T. Lu, 
“LogitTrust: A Logit Regression-based Trust Model for Mobile Ad Hoc 
Networks,” in Proceedings of the 6th ASE International Conference on 
Privacy, Security, Risk and Trust, Cambridge, MA, 2014, pp. 1-10. 
[147] F. Boustanifar, and Z. Movahedi, “A Trust-Based Offloading for Mobile M2M 
Communications,” in Intl IEEE Conferences on Ubiquitous Intelligence & 
Computing, Advanced and Trusted Computing, Scalable Computing and 
Communications, Cloud and Big Data Computing, Internet of People, and 
Smart World Congress  (UIC/ATC/ScalCom/CBDCom/IoP/SmartWorld), 
Toulouse, France, 2016, pp. 1139-1143. 
[148] N. Askham, D. Cook, M. Doyle, H. Fereday, M. Gibson, U. Landbeck, R. Lee, 
C. Maynard, G. Palmer, and J. Schwarzenbach, “The six primary dimensions 
for data quality assessment,” Technical report, DAMA UK Working Group, 
2013. 
[149] Y. W. Lee, D. M. Strong, B. K. Kahn, and R. Y. Wang, “AIMQ: a methodology 
for information quality assessment,” Information & management, vol. 40, no. 
2, pp. 133-146, 2002. 
[150] P. R. Benson, "ISO 8000 Data Quality," The Fundamentals Part, 2009. 
[151] U. Jayasinghe, G. M. Lee, T.-W. Um, and Q. Shi, “Machine-Learning-based 
Trust Computational Model for IoT Services,” IEEE Transactions on 
Sustainable Computing, vol. Accepted for Publication, 2018. 
[152] U. Jayasinghe, N. B. Truong, G. M. Lee, and T.-W. Um, “RpR: A Trust 
Computation Model for Social Internet of Things,” in 2016 Intl IEEE 
Conference on Smart World Congress, Toulouse, France, 2016. 
[153] N. B. Truong, H. Lee, B. Askwith, and G. M. Lee, “Toward a Trust Evaluation 
Mechanism in the Social Internet of Things,” Sensors, vol. 17, no. 6, pp. 1346, 
2017. 
122 
 
[154] Y. Koren, “Factorization meets the neighborhood: a multifaceted collaborative 
filtering model,” in Proceedings of the 14th ACM SIGKDD international 
conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining, Las Vegas, Nevada, 
USA, 2008, pp. 426-434. 
[155] Y.-x. Yuan, “Step-sizes for the gradient method,” AMS IP Studies in Advanced 
Mathematics, vol. 42, no. 2, pp. 785, 2008. 
[156] A. Jian, G. Xiaolin, Y. Jianwei, S. Yu, and H. Xin, “Mobile crowd sensing for 
internet of things: A credible crowdsourcing model in mobile-sense service,” 
in IEEE International Conference on Multimedia Big Data (BigMM), Beijing, 
China, 2015, pp. 92-99. 
[157] Twin Oaks Computing Inc. "CoreDX Distributed Publish-Subscribe System," 
03/05/2017;  [Online] Available:  http://www.twinoakscomputing.com/core 
dx/develop. 
[158] L. L. Pipino, Y. W. Lee, and R. Y. Wang, “Data quality assessment,” Commun. 
ACM, vol. 45, no. 4, pp. 211-218, 2002. 
[159] B. Heinrich, M. Kaiser, and M. Klier, “How to measure data quality? A metric-
based approach,” 2007. 
[160] S. Mazilu, M. Teler, and C. Dobre, "Securing vehicular networks based on 
data-trust computation." pp. 51-58. 
[161] M. Raya, P. Papadimitratos, V. D. Gligor, and J.-P. Hubaux, "On data-centric 
trust establishment in ephemeral ad hoc networks." pp. 1238-1246. 
[162] P. Borzymek, M. Sydow, and A. Wierzbicki, "Enriching trust prediction model 
in social network with user rating similarity." pp. 40-47. 
[163] N. Korovaiko, and A. Thomo, “Trust prediction from user-item ratings,” Social 
Netw. Analys. Mining, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 749-759, 2013. 
[164] R. Xiang, J. Neville, and M. Rogati, "Modeling relationship strength in online 
social networks." pp. 981-990. 
[165] ITU-T SG13. "Future networks, with focus on IMT-2020, cloud computing 
and trusted network infrastructures,,"  [Online] Available:  https://www.itu.int/ 
en/ITU-T/studygroups/2017-2020/13/Pages/default.aspx. 
[166] IBM Corporation, “An architectural blueprint for autonomic computing,” 
Autonomic Computing White Paper, 2005. 
[167] M. Maggio, H. Hoffmann, A. V. Papadopoulos, J. Panerati, M. D. 
Santambrogio, A. Agarwal, and A. Leva, “Comparison of Decision-Making 
Strategies for Self-Optimization in Autonomic Computing Systems,” ACM 
Trans. Auton. Adapt. Syst., vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 1-32, 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
123 
 
 APPENDIX A: CRAWDAD Data Set 
The dataset contains data collected by an opportunistic mobile social application, 
MobiClique. The application was used by conference attendees during SIGCOMM 
2009 conference in Barcelona, Spain. The data sets include traces of Bluetooth device 
proximity, opportunistic message creation and dissemination, and the social profiles 
(friends and interests) of the participants [133], [134]. 
A.1.  Participants 
Format: csv: user_id;key;value 
List of participants and basic social profile including home city, country, and 
affiliation. The user_ids run from 1 to 76 (inclusive). Each user carries a single device 
that is identified by the same user_id. The 'key' is one of ['institute','city','country'] and 
the values are anonymized to simple integer ids. 
A.2.  Interests1 
Format: csv: user_id;group_id 
List of initial interest groups of the participants based on their Facebook groups and 
networks. The list contains also three pre-configured common groups for each 
participants (ids 1,2,3). 
A.3.  Friends1 
Format: csv: user_id;friend_user_id 
List of friends of the participants based on their Facebook friends. 
A.4.  Interests2 
Format: csv:  user_id;group_id;timestamp 
The MobiClique application lets users to discover and join existing interest groups, 
and create new interest groups at any time. Hence, the interest lists are changing over 
time. 
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A.5.  Friends2 
Format: csv: user_id;friend_user_id;timestamp 
Similarly, to the interest groups, the MobiClique application lets users to discover and 
friend other MobiClique users upon opportunistic encounters with them. Hence, the 
friendship graph is changing over time. 
A.6.  Activity 
Format: csv: user_id;start;end 
A device is active when it is collecting data. The inactivity periods occur due to 
batteries running out, at night time when the device is turned off, and due to some 
software problems. 
A.7.  Proximity 
Format: csv: timestamp;user_id;seen_user_id;seen_device_major_cod;seen_device_ 
minor_cod 
The trace records all the nearby Bluetooth devices reported by the periodic Bluetooth 
device discoveries. 
A.8.  Messages 
Format: csv: msg_id;src_user_id;created;type;dst 
This file lists the application level messages created by the users during the 
experiment. MobiClique allowed messaging between friends or among members of an 
interest group. In addition, MobiClique contained an epidemic voting application that 
allowed users to give rankings (1 to 5 stars) to the talks of the conference and see the 
real time results on their device. 
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A.9.  Transmission 
Format: csv: type;msg_id;bytes;hop_src_user_id;hop_dst_user_id;src_timestamp;sta 
tus 
The data transmission protocol logs from the sender side. Data is transmitted between 
two devices using Bluetooth RFCOMM protocol on a fixed channel (no service 
discovery required). 
A.10.  Reception 
Format: csv: type;msg_id;bytes;hop_src_user_id;hop_dst_user_id;src_timestamp;sta 
tus 
The data transmission protocol logs from the receiver side. Data is transmitted between 
two devices using Bluetooth RFCOMM protocol on a fixed channel (no service 
discovery required). 
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 APPENDIX B: Simulation of the Trust Model based on 
Indirect Trust 
B.1.  Main Function: ReputeRank.m 
1. clc 
2. clear 
3. for n = 5:5:100     %Number of nodes 
4.     if n<51 
5.         load(['mat' num2str(n) '.mat']) 
6.         load(['Umat' num2str(n) '.mat']) 
7.         A=smat;    %Transition Matrix 
8.         U=U;     %Inverse Transition Matrix 
9.     else 
10.        A=stomat(n); 
11.        U=invstomat(A); 
12.    end 
13.    % stopping residual 
14.    err= 1; 
15.    tol=1e-2; 
16.    N=size(A,1);        
17.    PR=recrank1(err,tol,N,A); % Recommendation rank 
18.    REC=recrank2(err,tol,N,A,U); % Recommendation rank & clustering 
19.    REP=reprank(err,tol,N,A,U); % Reputation Rank 
20.    g=0.8; 
21.    HYB=g*REC+(1-g)*REP;  % RPR Rank 
22.    G=digraph(A'); 
23.    indeg = indegree(G); 
24.    ID=indeg./sum(indeg); 
25.    C{n/5}=[ID PR REC REP HYB]; 
26. End 
27. results(A,U,PR,REC,REP,HYB) 
B.2.  Recommendation Rank: recrank1.m 
1. function R=recrank1(err,tol,N,A)  %initial guess for r 
2. R = 1/N*ones(N,1); 
3. while(err>tol) %iterating until the stopping criterion is not met 
4.     S = A*R;  % pre-multiply the current rec rank vector 
5.     err=norm(S-R); % use an absolute stopping residual 
6.     R=S;   % update the rec rank vector 
7. end 
B.3.  Recommendation Rank with clustering: recrank2.m 
1. function R=recrank2(err,tol,N,A,U) 
2. t=invrank(U,err,tol);   %Calculate inverse rec rank 
3. R = t;     %initial guess for r 
4. a=0.8; 
5. while(err>tol) 
6.     S=a*A*R+(1-a)*t; 
7.     err=norm(S-R); 
8.     R=S; 
9. end 
B.4.  Reputation Rank: reprank.m 
1. function Rf=reprank(err,tol,N,A,U) 
2. tr=invrank(U,err,tol);      
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3. Rf=zeros(N,1);      
4. beta=0.8; 
5. for n=2:4   %Graph Length Level 
6.     err=1; 
7.     T=A^n; 
8.     R = tr;   %Trust Vector 
9.     while(err>tol) 
10.        S= beta*T^n*R+(1-beta)*tr; 
11.        err=norm(S-R); 
12.        R=S; 
13.    end 
14.    Rf(:,n-1)=R; 
B.5.  Inverse Rank: invrank.m 
1. function t=invrank(U,err,tol) 
2. N=size(U,1);    % initial guess for IR 
3. IR = 1/N * ones(N,1); 
4. while(err>tol) 
5.     IS = U*IR; 
6.     err=norm(IS-IR); 
7.     IR=IS; 
8. end 
9. x = IR/sum(IR);  %normalize the page rank to have unit sum 
10. m=sort(x(:),'descend'); %Selecting trustworthy nodes 
11. tn=N/5;                 %tn number of highest nodes 
12. t=(x>=m(tn)).*x; 
13. t=(t>0); 
14. t=(t>0)./tn; 
 
B.6.  Generate Transition Matrix: stomat.m 
1. function smat=stomat(n) 
2.     x=randsrc(n,n,[0 1;0.8 0.2]); 
3.     x(all(x==0,2),:)=[]; 
4.     x(:,all(x==0,1))=[]; 
5.     [a,b]=size(x); 
6.     m=min(a,b); 
7.     x=x(1:m,1:m); 
8.     x=x-diag(diag(x)); 
9.     nrm=sum(x,1); 
10. div=repmat(nrm,size(x,1),1); 
11. smat=x./div; 
12. size(smat); 
B.7.  Generate Inverse Transition Matrix: invstomat.m 
1. function ismat=invstomat(AA) 
2. % load('mat10.mat') 
3. % A=smat 
4. A=AA; 
5. G=digraph(A'); 
6.  [sOut,tOut] = findedge(G); 
7. s=tOut; 
8. t=sOut; 
9. I = digraph(s,t); 
10. Ua=adjacency(I); 
11. Ua=Ua'; 
12. U=full(Ua); 
13. div=repmat(sum(U,1),size(U,1),1); 
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14. U=U./div; 
15. ismat=U; 
16. sum(sum(A)) 
17. sum(sum(U)) 
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 APPENDIX C: Simulation of the Trust Model based on 
Direct Trust 
Note: filename.mat files contains the transmission logs obtained [133], [134]. 
C.1.  Co-work Relationship (CWR) 
1. load('msgmc.mat'); 
2. for n=1:76 
3.     nn=n; 
4.     row=msgmc.userid==n; 
5.     totmc=size(msgmc.userid(row,:),1); 
6.     for m=1:76 
7.         a=msgmc(row,:); 
8.         if(isempty(a)) 
9.             continue; 
10.        else 
11.            mc=sum(a.dst==m); 
12.            mul(n,m)=mc; 
13.            cw(n,m)=mc/totmc; 
14.        end 
15.    end 
16. end 
C.2.  Cooperativeness, Frequency and Duration (CFD) 
1. clc 
2. load('tranuc.mat') 
3. load('receuc.mat') 
4. for n=1:76 
5.     nn=n; 
6.     for m=1:76 
7.         t=tranuc(tranuc.src==n & tranuc.dst==m, :);  % n (Frequency) 
8.         r=receuc(receuc.src==m & receuc.dst==n, :); 
9.         if (isempty(t)||isempty(r)) 
10.            continue; 
11.        else 
12.            totmsg=size(t,1)+size(r,1);                 
13.            suc=t(t.status==1,:); 
14.            sucmsg=size(suc,1); 
15.            sucbyt=sum(suc.bytes);                % cm 
16.            totbyt=sum(t.bytes);                  % tm 
17.            p=sucmsg/totmsg;                      % p 
18.            cm=sucbyt/totbyt;                     % cm/tm (Duration) 
19.            if(p~=0) 
20.                en=-p*log2(p)-(1-p)*log2(1-p);    % entropy  
21.                cop(n,m)=cm*en; 
22.            else 
23.                cop(n,m)=0; 
24.            end 
25.        end 
26.    end 
27. end 
28. 
C.3.  Reward System (RS) 
1. load('tx.mat'); 
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2. for n=1:76 
3.     for m=1:76 
4.         row=tx.src==n & tx.dst==m; 
5.         if(sum(row)) 
6.             tot=size(tx.status(row,:),1); 
7.             suc=sum(tx.status(row,:)); 
8.             pnc=(suc/tot)*exp(-(tot-suc)/tot); 
9.             pn(n,m)=pnc; 
10.        else 
11.            pn(n,m)=0.9; 
12.        end 
13.    end 
14. end 
15. 
C.4.  Mutuality and Centrality (MC) 
1. load('frnd.mat'); 
2. for n=1:76                         %network size 76 nodes 
3.     nn=n; 
4.     row=frnd.srcid==n; 
5.     totf=size(frnd.srcid(row,:),1);%number of friends of B (Trustee) 
6.     for m=1:76 
7.         rsrc1=frnd.srcid==n; 
8.         rsrc2=frnd.srcid==m; 
9.         a=frnd(rsrc1,:); 
10.        b=frnd(rsrc2,:); 
11.        if(isempty(a)||isempty(b)) 
12.            continue; 
13.        else   %compute total number of mutual friend between A & B 
14.            cm=sum(ismember(a.frnid,b.frnid));  
15.            cn=cm/totf;                  % Centrality 
16.            comm(n,m)=cm; 
17.            cent(n,m)=cn;                % Centrality of each pair 
18.        end 
19.     end 
20. end 
C.5.  Community of Interest (CoI) 
1. load('int1.mat'); 
2. for n=1:76 
3.     nn=n; 
4.     row=int1.userid==n; 
5.     totc=size(int1.userid(row,:),1); 
6.     for m=1:76 
7.         rsrc1=int1.userid==n; 
8.         rsrc2=int1.userid==m; 
9.         a=int1(rsrc1,:); 
10.        b=int1(rsrc2,:); 
11.        if(isempty(a)||isempty(b)) 
12.            continue; 
13.        else 
14.            cmi=sum(ismember(a.grpid,b.grpid)); 
15.            cni=cmi/totc;         
16.            cint1(n,m)=cmi; 
17.            comint(n,m)=cni; 
18.        end 
19.     end 
20. end 
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 APPENDIX D: Simulation of the ML Model 
Note: File fullfeat.mat contains the five feature vectors; CLR, CWR, MC, CFD, and 
RS. 
Algorithm I: Clustering and Labeling 
D.1.  Main File 
1. load('fullfeat.mat'); 
2. X=[X(:,1) X(:,4)]; 
3. [m n] = size(X); 
4. max_iters = 10;        
5. kk=5;                 % Settings for running K-Means 
6. J=zeros(kk,1); 
7. for K=1:kk 
8.    initial_centroids = kMeansInitCentroids(X, K); 
9.     [centroids, idx] = runkMeans(X, initial_centroids, max_iters, 
false); 
10.    fprintf('\nK-Means K=%d.\n\n',K); 
11.    %Optimization : Run Elbow method 
12.    dist=0; 
13.    for i=1:m 
14.        dist=dist+sum((X(i,:)- centroids(idx(i),:)).^2); 
15.    end 
16.    J(K)=dist/m; 
17. end 
18. figure (2); 
19. plot(1:kk,J) 
D.2.  Initial Centroids 
1. function centroids = kMeansInitCentroids(X, K) 
2. centroids = zeros(K, size(X, 2)); 
3. randidx = randperm(size(X, 1)); 
4. centroids = X(randidx(1:K), :); 
5. end 
D.3.  K-means Clustering 
1. function [centroids, idx] = runkMeans(X, initial_centroids, 
max_iters, plot_progress) 
2. if ~exist('plot_progress', 'var') || isempty(plot_progress) 
3.     plot_progress = false;   % Set default value for plot progress 
4. end 
5. if plot_progress 
6.     figure; 
7.     hold on; 
8. end 
9. [m n] = size(X);      % Initialize values 
10. K = size(initial_centroids, 1); 
11. centroids = initial_centroids; 
12. previous_centroids = centroids; 
13. idx = zeros(m, 1); 
14. for i=1:max_iters   % Run K-Means 
15. % For each example in X, assign it to the closest centroid 
16.    idx = findClosestCentroids(X, centroids); 
17.    if plot_progress    % Optionally, plot progress here 
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18.       plotProgresskMeans(X,centroids,previous_centroids,idx,K,i); 
19.       previous_centroids = centroids; 
20.    end 
21.    % Given the memberships, compute new centroids 
22.    centroids = computeCentroids(X, idx, K); 
23. end 
24. if plot_progress  % Hold off if we are plotting progress 
25.    hold off; 
26. end 
27. end 
D.4.  Find Optimum centroid and closet Centroid for Data points 
1. function centroids = computeCentroids(X, idx, K) 
2. [m n] = size(X); 
3. centroids = zeros(K, n); 
4. for i=1:K 
5.     row=(idx==i); 
6.     x=row.*X; 
7.     centroids(i,:)=(1/sum(row))*sum(x,1); 
8. end 
9. end 
10. 
11. function idx = findClosestCentroids(X, centroids) 
12. K = size(centroids, 1); 
13. idx = zeros(size(X,1), 1);  
14. dist=zeros(size(centroids, 1),1); 
15. for i=1:size(X,1) 
16.    for j=1:K 
17.       dist(j)=sum((X(i,:)- centroids(j,:)).^2); 
18.    end 
19.    [m,id]=min(dist); 
20.    idx(i)=id; 
21. end 
22. end 
D.5.  Plot Data Points 
1. function plotDataPoints(X, idx, K)  % same idx have the same colour 
2. palette = hsv(3);       % Create palette 
3. colors = palette(idx, :); 
4. h=scatter(X(:,1), X(:,2),15,colors); 
5. end 
 
Algorithm II: Weight learning and Decision Boundary 
D.6.  Main File 
1. load('svmlabeled.mat') 
2. XX=svm_cwlpn; 
3. [m n]=size(XX); 
4. k = randperm(m); 
5. Xt=XX(k(1:4620),:) ;  %Cross validation 20% 
6. Xv=XX(k(4620:end),:); 
7. X=Xt(:,1:2); y=Xt(:,3); 
8. Xval=Xv(:,1:2); yval=Xv(:,3); 
9.   
10. numLabels=[1 0 -1]; 
11. for k=1:size(numLabels,2) 
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12.    [C, sigma] = BestParamsLIBSVM(X, double(y==numLabels(k)), Xval, 
double(yval==numLabels(k))); 
13.    gamma=1/(2*sigma^2); 
14.    model = svmtrain(double(y==numLabels(k)), X,sprintf('-q -s 0 -t 
2 -g %g -c %g', gamma,C)); 
15.    fprintf('Class No %d \n',k); 
16.    visualizeBoundaryIBSVMNL2_3d(X, y, model); 
17.    C(:,k)=C; 
18.    gamma(:,k)=gamma; 
19.    w(:,k) = model.SVs' * model.sv_coef; 
20.    % ========== Accuracy========== 
21.    %predictions=svmpredict(yy,Xval ,model, '-q');  
22.    [T,predicted_labels, accuracy, decision_values] = 
evalc('svmpredict(double(yval==numLabels(k)),Xval,model)'); 
23.     clear T; 
24.     acc(k,:)=accuracy; 
25. end 
D.7.  Find Optimum parameters for C and gamma 
1. function [C, sigma] = BestParamsLIBSVM(X, y, Xval, yval) 
2. s=[0.01 0.03 0.1 0.3 1 3 10 30]; 
3. error=zeros(8,8); 
4. for i=1:8 
5.     for j=1:8 
6.         %fprintf('s(i)=%f \t s(j)=%f \t \n',s(i),s(j)); 
7.         C=s(i); 
8.         sigma=s(j); 
9.         gamma=1/(2*sigma^2); 
10. %model= svmTrain(X, y, C, @(x1, x2) gaussianKernel(x1, x2, sigma));  
11.        model = svmtrain(y, X,sprintf('-q -s 0 -t 2 -g %g -c %g', 
gamma,C)); 
12. %predictions = svmPredict(model, Xval); 
13. %yy=zeros(size(yval,1),1); 
14.        predictions=svmpredict(yval,Xval ,model, '-q');  
15.        error(i,j)= mean(double(predictions ~= yval)); 
16.    end 
17. end 
18. [M,I] = min(error(:)); 
19. [I_row, I_col] = ind2sub(size(error),I); 
20. C=s(I_row); 
21. sigma=s(I_col); 
22. end 
D.8.  Plots a non-linear decision boundary 
1. function visualizeBoundaryIBSVMNL2_3d(X, y, model, varargin) 
2. plotData (X, y)  
3. x1plot = linspace(min(X(:,1)), max(X(:,1)), 100)'; 
4. x2plot = linspace(min(X(:,2)), max(X(:,2)), 100)'; 
5. [X1, X2] = meshgrid(x1plot, x2plot); 
6. vals = zeros(size(X1)); 
7. for i = 1:size(X1, 2) 
8.    this_X = [X1(:, i), X2(:, i)]; 
9.    yy=zeros(size(this_X,1),1); 
10.   vals(:, i) =svmpredict(yy,this_X ,model, '-q');  
11.   %vals(:, i)=predicted_labels; 
12. end 
13. hold on  % Plot the SVM boundary 
14. contour(X1, X2, vals, [0.5 0.5] ,'color',rand(1,3)); 
15. end 
16. function plotData(X, y) 
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17. pos = find(y == 1); neg = find(y == 0); % Find Indices of Positive 
and Negative Examples 
18. plot(X(pos, 1), X(pos, 2), 'k+','LineWidth', 1, 'MarkerSize', 7) 
19. hold on; 
20. plot(X(neg, 1), X(neg, 2), 'ko', 'MarkerFaceColor', 'y', 
'MarkerSize', 7) 
21. hold off; 
22. end 
 
 
